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Preface
The Bulletin on Narcotics is designed to provide information on developments
in drug control at the local, national, regional and international levels that would
benefit the international community. It is a United Nations publication that is avail-
able in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish.
Individuals and organizations are invited by the Editor to contribute articles to
the Bulletin dealing with policies, approaches, measures and developments (theoreti-
cal and/or practical) relating to various aspects of the drug control effort. Of particu-
lar interest are the results of research, studies and practical experience that would
provide useful information for policy makers, practitioners and experts, as well as
the public at large.
The present issue of the Bulletin contains papers that were originally prepared
for the Third International Symposium on the Economic and Social Costs of Sub-
stance Abuse, organized by the Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse in Banff,
Alberta, Canada, from 31 May to 3 June 2000.
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Background
There is enormous variation between countries and regions of the world with
regard to illicit drug use and the problems associated with illicit drugs [1]. In South
America and south-east and south-west Asia, where a large share of the world’s
cocaine and heroin is produced, the illicit drug trade has created substantial under-
ground economies with problems for law enforcement and economic control. In the
drug-consuming countries in Europe and North America, the problems are more
related to the adverse health, social and economic consequences of illicit drug use.
Although international treaties provide a common framework for drug policy
and a certain degree of uniformity in social responses to the problems caused by
illicit drugs, there is also wide variation in national drug policies. Responses to illicit
drug problems range from strict enforcement of punitive drug laws to benign ne-
glect. In parts of Australia, Europe and North America, harm reduction policies have
been implemented to reduce the adverse consequences of illicit drug use for users
who cannot be expected to cease their drug use at the present time [1]. Even within
countries, there are often cycles of panic over emerging drug problems, followed by
periods of indifference when other pressing issues push the problem of illicit drugs
to a relatively low place on the national policy agenda [2].
Thus, there are substantial differences in the nature and magnitude of illicit
drug problems as well as the social responses to such problems, over time, both
between countries and regions of the world and within countries. Nonetheless, there
is a strong consensus among people involved in addressing addiction issues that
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success requires long-term commitment and investment. As for vaccination pro-
grammes, progress can be made only over extended periods of time as consistent
efforts are applied to each new generation. There is, therefore, a strong need for
more rigorous and comprehensive economic data on substance abuse to promote
evidence-based decision-making and a more consistent response to substance abuse.
The economic ramifications of illicit drug use are not well understood, either in the
producing countries or the consuming countries and regions.
The purpose of the series of articles appearing in the present issue of the
Bulletin on Narcotics is to bring together related approaches of several authors who
examine various methodological issues and data requirements involved in develop-
ing more complete, reliable and comparable data on economic aspects of substance
abuse. The articles are based on papers presented at the Third International Sympo-
sium on the Economic and Social Costs of Substance Abuse, organized by the
Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse in Banff, Canada from 31 May to 3 June 2000.
The aim of the symposium was to extend the scope of the cost estimation of sub-
stance abuse and to facilitate improvements in cost-estimation methodology.
In the article entitled “Economic evaluation of policies and programmes: fur-
ther uses of estimates of the social costs of substance abuse”, Collins and Lapsley
review areas of cost estimation that still need to be addressed or that are in need of
further development. It proceeds to consider the extension of the use of the data
derived from those studies into the more policy-oriented areas of drug programmes
and project evaluation. The other articles deal with particular issues referred to in
general terms in the Collins and Lapsley article.
In the article entitled “The cost to employers of employee alcohol abuse: a
review of the United States literature”, Harwood and Reichman review literature
from the United States of America concerning the costs borne by employers as a
result of alcohol abuse by employees. The authors’ analysis of the types of impact
of alcohol abuse is also relevant to the workplace effects of smoking and illicit drug
use.
One of the most intractable issues in the cost estimation of substance abuse has
been how to identify the extent of crime that is attributable to alcohol and drug use.
Crimes may be associated with drug use but such an association does not necessarily
imply a causal relationship. In the article entitled “Attributable fractions for alcohol
and drugs in relation to crime in Canada: conceptualization, methods and internal
consistency of estimates”, Pernanen and Brochu examine the problems involved in
developing crime-attributable fractions in Canada.
There are difficulties in identifying the size of public expenditure that arises as
a result of substance abuse. Drug-related expenditures can be spread across the
budgets of many individual government departments and the issue of the develop-
ment of attributable fractions arises once again, in areas such as health and justice
where similar types of expenditures can be attributable to a range of disparate
causes. In the article entitled “Estimating the costs of substance abuse to state budg-
ets in the United States of America”, Foster and Modi present the analysis underly-
ing a study that attempts to estimate the costs of substance abuse across the complete
range of state budgetary units of the United States.
Most of the existing research into the social costs of substance abuse has been
undertaken in and for Western developed economies. Those results are likely to be
of limited applicability to developing economies that may have radically different
institutional structures and may face different types of drug problems. In the article
entitled “Estimating the economic costs of drug abuse in Colombia”, Pérez and
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Wilson, drawing on the Colombian case, illustrate the types of issues that may limit
the applicability of existing research results to developing countries.
The trade in illicit drugs leads to extensive but largely unquantified under-
ground economic activities. Such activities involve various forms of crime, includ-
ing drug-dealing, violence, tax evasion and smuggling. The issues involved in esti-
mating the size of the shadow economy are reviewed in the article by Schneider
entitled “Illegal activities and the generation of value added: size, causes and meas-
urement of shadow economies”.
In the present introduction, the key issues that policy makers must address in
dealing with illicit drug problems are first discussed. A conceptual framework for
estimating the economic costs of illicit drug use is then presented. Focus is placed
on the data requirements, methodological issues and prospects for future develop-
ment of cost estimation studies in more countries and regions of the world. The
problems involved in estimating the avoidable costs of illicit drug abuse and the
cost-effectiveness of interventions are then addressed. A summary of the present
situation regarding the current understanding of economic aspects of illicit drugs and
a discussion of the implications for data systems and research on drug problems
conclude the introduction.
Key substance abuse issues from a policy-making perspective
Four key issues need to be addressed to help policy makers make well-informed
decisions on drugs:
(a) The cost of drug abuse to society;
(b) The portion of those costs that are realistically avoidable;
(c) What investments policy makers should make to avoid such costs and
where they should make them;
(d) How well such investments are performing over time.
With regard to those issues, researchers need to pay greater attention to eco-
nomic aspects of drug abuse and interventions. Policy makers are rarely concerned
with the details regarding the data requirements and methodological issues involved
in addressing those issues. Nevertheless, those aspects need to be addressed at least
in part, if policy makers are to make well-informed, empirically-based decisions on
drug policy.
Substantial attention has been paid by researchers to the costs that society bears
as a result of the use and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. Very little attention, on the
other hand, has been paid to the costs borne by society as a result of the abuse of
illicit drugs. There is no doubt that such a deficiency can be attributed largely to the
serious data problems inherent in any attempt to quantify the social costs of illicit
drug use. It is difficult to quantify the production, consumption, import, export or
price of illicit drugs. In addition, although significant information is available on the
causal links between drug abuse and health, the causal links in other areas, in par-
ticular crime, are extremely difficult to quantify. For those reasons, little quantitative
information exists on the social costs of illicit drug abuse.
Although it is inevitable that economic cost data in that area will be deficient,
it is possible to provide much more comprehensive information than is currently
available. Reasonable estimated values can be placed on some drug abuse costs,
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narrowing the range of costs on which policy makers will be required to make
qualitative judgements. That is not an unusual circumstance. In most social benefit-
cost analyses, some benefits or costs cannot be valued and so must be judged quali-
tatively against those which can be quantified. Assigning values where it is possible
to do so narrows the range of uncertainty in the decision-making process.
The composition of the total community costs of drug abuse is illustrated in
figure I below.
Figure I. Community costs associated with drug abuse
Private costs are those borne by the drug abusers themselves, having made a
rational decision to consume in the full knowledge of the effects upon them of drug
abuse. If drug abusers do not bear the full costs, for example, if their health costs
are subsidized from the public purse, then those costs become the concern of public
policy. If the actions of drug abusers are determined by perceived costs that are less
than actual costs, the difference between the two can be viewed as the social cost
because the abusers have not adjusted their behaviour to reflect those higher costs
and so the latter are not accounted for [3]. The three conditions to be satisfied
simultaneously if costs are to be classified as private costs are as follows: (a) costs
fully borne by abuser; (b) full knowledge of the effects of drug abuse; and (c)
rationality in decision to abuse drugs. That is a stringent set of requirements. In
practice it means that a high proportion of the total costs of drug abuse is likely to
be external rather than internal.
The social (external) costs of drug abuse can be subdivided into tangible and
intangible costs. Tangible costs are those that, if reduced, would release resources to
the rest of the community for alternative consumption or investment purposes. For
example, a reduction in public health-care costs will release resources for govern-
ment expenditure in other areas. A market exists for the resources used in those
areas, therefore, it is possible to attach a price to them.
Intangible costs (for example, loss of life, pain and suffering), when reduced,
do not release resources for other uses. The reduction of such costs is very important
but does not yield benefits that can be redistributed to other people. No market exists
in such benefits, thus it is difficult to assign a value to them.
Total costs
Private (internal) costs Social (external) costs
Tangible costs Intangible costs




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The difficulty of valuing intangibles should not lead to the avoidance of includ-
ing those costs in policy analysis. It is possible that a reduction in drug abuse might
lead to an increase in certain tangible costs. If the inevitable reduction in intangible
costs is not set against the increase in tangible costs, the erroneous conclusion might
be drawn that drug abuse was in the public interest.
The example of health-care costs attributable to drug abuse illustrates the
point. It is possible that the lifetime health-care costs of abusers are less than
those of non-abusers, because the former have lower life expectancies and so
draw upon the health-care resources of the community for a much shorter period.
There is some evidence that that might be the case for smokers; however, the
necessary research has not been undertaken in relation to drug abusers. If it
were assumed, for the purposes of argument, that drug abusers imposed lower
lifetime health costs than non-abusers, the nonsensical conclusion might be drawn
that drug abuse was, in some sense, in the public interest. Such a conclusion
could only be drawn if the high intangible costs of abuse (such as loss of
life, pain, suffering and bereavement) were ignored, and they clearly should
not be ignored.
A summary of the types of external costs of drug abuse is presented in figure
II. Production losses can occur in the paid workforce but they can also represent the
loss of unpaid work (for example, household work and volunteer and community
work). Unpaid work, though productive, is not counted in conventional national
accounts statistics. It should, however, be taken into account in the assessment of
production losses attributable to drug abuse.
Drug-attributable mortality can reduce the size of the workforce. Its impact on
the level of employment may be alleviated by the existence of a pool of unemployed
individuals who are ready to fill the employment gap, although the skills available
among the unemployed may not match the skills lost as a result of drug-attributable
mortality. Drug abuse may also result in reduced production, as a result of increased
absenteeism or reduced on-the-job productivity arising from drug-attributable mor-
bidity.
Health-care costs result from a range of medical conditions attributable to drug
abuse. As indicated above, health costs in any given period of time will also be
affected by the previous premature mortality of drug abusers who otherwise would
still have been alive and imposing costs on the health-care system. Given that the
health-care costs of drug abuse come earlier in the typical life cycle than the health-
care benefits (that arise from the foregone use of health-care services by those who
die prematurely), a drug abuse epidemic would lead to a substantial increase in
current health-care costs for a considerable period of time, even if the lifetime costs
of drug abusers were lower than those of non-abusers. The health-care costs would
exceed the health-care benefits.
Crime costs relate to the policing, judicial and penal expenditures directly and
indirectly attributable to drug-related criminal activity. That is one of the most dif-
ficult areas of quantification of drug-attributable costs. Although it is widely be-
lieved that a significant proportion of burglaries and physical assaults is drug-related,
crime statistics are usually inadequate for the purposes of identifying such a relation-
ship. Most of the property stolen by drug abusers is redistributed rather than de-
stroyed and thus, from a social point of view, cannot be treated as a cost of illicit
drug use. Only the value of property that is destroyed and the insurance administra-
tion associated with losses by drug-related theft should be incorporated into that
component of drug-attributable costs.
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Figure II. External costs
Total external costs
Tangible Intangible
Production Health care Crime Resources Loss of life
Reduced
quality of life
Paid Unpaid
Workforce Absenteeism Productivity Property Insurance Policing Judicial Penal
reduction losses destruction administration
Hospital Medical Nursing Ancillary Production Foreign trade
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The production and consumption of illicit drugs involve the use of resources
that would otherwise be available for alternative production or consumption pur-
poses. If the drugs are produced domestically, the production resources can be con-
sidered to be a cost of illicit drug use. If the drugs are imported, they are drawing
on foreign exchange that would otherwise be available for the purchase of other
goods or services.
It is debatable whether public expenditures on education and research related to
drug abuse should be counted as a drug-attributable cost. On the one hand, those
expenditures can be considered to be discretionary policy responses to drug abuse
rather than directly attributable to that abuse. On the other hand, it could be argued
that such programmes should yield benefit-cost ratios of at least unity, so that in the
absence of the programmes, social costs would have been higher by at least the cost
of those programmes. In the absence of a resolution of that issue, a compromise is
to distinguish the social cost estimates from the costs of research and education
programmes related to drug abuse.
Intangible costs are additional costs borne by society over and above the tan-
gible resource costs. For example, the premature death of a drug abuser of working
age will cause an actual or potential loss of production, but that is not the total loss
to society. Such deaths will cause suffering and bereavement to others; the abusers
themselves, like most members of society, are likely to value their lives more highly
than simply the value of their production. Many societies place a higher value on life
as shown by the substantial resources devoted to extending lifespans and improving
the quality of life of citizens who are over the age of retirement.
The cost estimates referred to here are aggregate cost estimates of illicit drug
abuse. They attempt to compare the actual situation of drug abuse with a hypotheti-
cal counterfactual state that would have existed had there been no drug abuse. Such
a comparison yields the total costs attributable to drug abuse. There is no suggestion
that the counterfactual situation is achievable and, for that reason, no suggestion that
there exists a set of feasible policies capable of reducing the drug abuse level to zero.
One implication of this is that there is no conceivable set of public policies capable
of eliminating the costs of drug abuse. A significant proportion of current costs
arises as a result of past abuse. In addition, there can be no prospect of reducing drug
abuse to zero. The component of abuse costs that is susceptible to elimination as a
result of public policies can be identified as avoidable costs. The extent of avoidable
costs indicates the potential benefits available to public expenditures on drug poli-
cies. The major public controversies about the most appropriate approaches to drug
policies, for example, zero tolerance or harm minimization, make it difficult to
estimate what proportion of the total costs of drug abuse is avoidable.
The most efficient drug policies will be those that yield the highest social rate
of return. Without the information underlying social cost analysis, it is not possible
to undertake policy and programme evaluation. In spite of the high cost of many
public policies and programmes, surpassingly little formal evaluation of them is
undertaken. In general, there is little information available about how well those
investments are performing over time.
A conceptual framework for estimating the costs of substance abuse
Estimates of the economic costs of drug abuse serve several purposes. Firstly,
economic cost estimates are frequently used to argue that policies on drugs should
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be given a high priority on the public policy agenda. Without such a standard for
assessing cost estimates, there is a tendency by the advocates for each social problem
to overbid, adding in items to make their concern a suitably high (even exaggerated)
number. Secondly, cost estimates are helpful in targeting specific problems and
policies. It is important to know which aspects of drug abuse involve the greatest
economic costs. The specific types of cost may also indicate specific areas where
public attention is needed or where specific measures may be effective. Thirdly,
economic cost studies are helpful in identifying information gaps, research needs
and desirable refinements to national statistical reporting systems. There is probably
no better way to set a national research agenda than to conduct a cost estimation
study and use it to map out key areas and topics where information is lacking.
The development of improved estimates of the costs of drug abuse also offers
the potential to provide baseline measures for determining which policies and pro-
grammes are the most effective. International comparisons of reliable cost estimates
could provide important indicators of the effectiveness of national policies. Such
comparisons could indicate, for example, whether the costs of drug abuse are lower
or higher in less restrictive societies, whether the social costs of cannabis are greater
in countries where it has been decriminalized or whether there is less drug abuse in
countries where a greater proportion of the costs are borne by the individual, other
things being equal. Ultimately, cost estimates could be used to construct social cost
functions for optimal tax policy and national target-setting. Perhaps most immedi-
ately promising is the prospect for cost estimates to be extended to more compre-
hensive cost-benefit analyses of specific drug policies and programmes.
The present section includes a brief discussion of cost estimation studies to date
and a description of a new set of international guidelines for estimating the economic
costs of substance abuse. The data requirements for carrying out cost estimation are
detailed and areas for further development are discussed.
Cost estimation studies
As noted in a recent review [4], the majority of studies estimating the economic
costs of drug abuse have been conducted in developed countries, in particular in
Australia [5, 6], Canada [7, 8], Switzerland [9], the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland [10] and the United States [11-13]. Those studies generally use
a prevalence-based approach, measuring the costs in a given year associated with the
prevalence of substance-related morbidity and mortality attributable to past and
present substance use.
The vast majority of cost estimation studies use a cost-of-illness approach, in
which the impact of drug abuse on the material welfare of a given society is esti-
mated by examining the direct costs of resources expended for treatment, preven-
tion, research and law enforcement, plus losses of production due to increased
morbidity and mortality, relative to a counterfactual scenario in which there is no
drug abuse [14, 15]. The focus of cost-of-illness studies is on the tangible social
costs of substance abuse, which equal the sum of the private and external costs after
adjusting for transfers within society. An alternative model is the “externality” ap-
proach, which strictly limits estimates to external costs [12].
Within the cost-of-illness framework, there are two major variations regarding
the valuation of productivity losses due to premature mortality attributable to drug
use: the more commonly adopted human capital approach (see, for example, Rice
and others [11]) and the more recent demographic approach pioneered by Collins
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and Lapsley [5]. In the human capital approach, the lost value of a deceased work-
er’s production is estimated by present earnings plus a discounted rate of future
earnings. The demographic approach compares the actual population size and struc-
ture to that of an “otherwise healthy” population, that is, an alternative population
in which there were no drug-related deaths. Those two approaches are complemen-
tary rather than contradictory. The demographic approach is based on the supposi-
tion that there had never been any substance abuse or problems associated with the
use of psychoactive substances. The human capital approach is based on the suppo-
sition that all substance abuse and problems associated with the use of psychoactive
substances were to end immediately. The human capital approach generates an es-
timate of the present and future costs attributable to drug-related mortality in the
current year, while the demographic approach estimates the present costs of drug-
related mortality in past and present years.
The results of cost estimation studies show sizeable costs attributable to drugs
(see table). There is enormous variation in the results. Cost estimates in the 1980s
ranged from 349 United States dollars per capita in Canada in 1984 [7] to US$ 51
in Switzerland in 1988 [9]. It is difficult to compare the results of those studies,
however, because of differences in methodology and study design. For example, the
estimate for Canada included the costs of licit drugs while the estimate for Switzer-
land was limited to illicit drugs. In all of the studies, the largest economic cost is the
productivity losses from drug-related morbidity and premature mortality [4].
Comparison of selected estimates of the economic costs of illicit drug abuse
in various countries
Original
Year in total costa Cost per
which the estimate Cost capita
Author of the study data were (millions of local (millions of (US
(and year of publication) Country gathered currency units) US dollars) dollars)
Studies undertaken prior
to the development
of the international guidelines
for estimating the costs
of substance abuse
Adrian and others (1989)b, c Canada 1984 Can$ 11 840 8 960 349
Rice and others (1990)b United States 1985 US$ 44 050 44 050 185
Collins and Lapsley (1991) Australia 1988 $A 1 441 1 233 75
Faze and Stevenson (1990)c United Kingdom 1988 £1 820 3 293 58
Institut suisse de prophylaxie
de l’alcoolisme (1990) Switzerland 1988 SwF 514 342 51
Studies utilizing the international
guidelines
Single and others (1996d and 1998) Canada 1992 Can$ 1 371 1 079 38
Collins and Lapsley (1996) Australia 1992 $A 1 684 1 160 66
Harwood and others (1998) United States 1992 US$ 98 000 98 000 384
Source: Exchange rates are based on International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook
1997, pp. 14-15.
aIncluding all indirect and direct costs, unless otherwise indicated.
bIncluding costs of licit as well as illicit drug abuse.
cIncluding estimates of external costs only.
dE. Single and others, The Costs of Substance Abuse in Canada (Ottawa, Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse,
1996).
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International guidelines for estimating the economic costs of drug use
Because of the difficulties in comparing the results of cost estimation studies in
different countries, two international symposia were held in Canada under the aus-
pices of the Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse with funding provided by the United
Nations International Drug Control Programme and a number of provincial, national
and international agencies specializing in addictions. The symposia resulted in the
development of a set of guidelines for estimating the costs of substance abuse [15].
The guidelines begin with a discussion of the purposes of estimation studies.
Instead of giving details on the exact procedures to be followed in every setting, the
guidelines provide a general framework for the development of cost estimates and
include a matrix of the types of costs to be considered and a detailed discussion of
the following theoretical issues:
(a) Definition of substance abuse;
(b) Determination of causality;
(c) Comparison of the demographic and human capital approaches to cost
estimation;
(d) Treatment and measurement of addictive consumption;
(e) Treatment of private costs;
(f) Measurement of intangible costs;
(g) Treatment of non-workforce mortality and morbidity;
(h) Treatment of research, education and law enforcement costs;
(i) Estimation of avoidable costs;
(j) Budgetary impact of substance abuse.
The guidelines conclude with a discussion of future directions that places em-
phasis on the need to include developing countries in economic cost studies and the
implications of the guidelines for research agenda and data collection systems.
The development of the international guidelines has resulted in fewer differ-
ences in the methodological approach followed in different cost estimation studies,
as the more recent studies have used the same basic cost-of-illness methodology.
Nonetheless, there is still considerable variation in results (see table). The estimated
costs of illicit drug abuse in 1992 range from US$ 38 in Canada [8], to US$ 66 in
Australia [6] and to US$ 384 in the United States [13]. The higher estimates in the
study conducted in the United States may reflect the fact that there is greater illicit
drug use, as well as greater problems and costs arising from such use, in that coun-
try, but part of the variation in findings may have resulted from differences in how
estimates were made of drug-attributed mortality and morbidity.
Types of costs and data requirements in cost estimation studies
Although studies vary with respect to how the economic costs of drug use are
combined into different categories, the costs described below have often been in-
cluded in prior cost estimation studies [4, 16] or have been recommended for inclu-
sion [17]. The data requirements for each of those major types of costs are also
noted. The general cost categories are presented in approximate order of their mag-
nitude in prior cost estimation studies.
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Indirect productivity costs
Indirect productivity costs refer to productivity losses due to premature mortal-
ity, lower productivity resulting from drug use (such as absenteeism) and the re-
moval of some individuals from the legitimate market economy due to crime and
crime careers. Estimating indirect productivity losses (and health-care costs) firstly
requires estimates of mortality and morbidity attributable to drug use. Some deaths
and hospitalizations are attributable simply because, by definition, they are caused
by drug use (for example, drug-overdose deaths). In other cases, drug use is a contri-
butory cause that accounts for a certain proportion of deaths and hospitalizations. To
estimate the portion of specific chronic diseases attributable to drug use, information
on the relative risk of drug use is combined with data on the number of persons
using drugs at levels associated with a particular relative risk, in order to generate
an estimate of the “aetiologic fraction” or attributable proportion of the cause of
disease or death that can be reasonably attributed to drug use. For acute conditions
where drug use is a contributory but not a necessary cause (for example, assaults,
homicide, suicide and motor vehicle trauma attributable to drug use), the attributable
fractions must be determined from special studies based on local information. Once
the attributable proportion is estimated, it is then applied to the number of recorded
deaths and hospitalizations due to the particular cause in order to generate an esti-
mate of drug-attributable mortality and morbidity.
Thus, in order to estimate morbidity and mortality, prevalence data are required
on drug use and on drug use by injection. Also required are the recorded number of
deaths and hospitalizations, ideally by cause, age and gender; the list of conditions
that epidemiological research has shown to be attributable to drug use; and the
associated relative risks. Meta-analyses are available that review the epidemiological
literature and estimate the relative risk of drug use for various causes of disease and
death (see, for example, English and others [18] and Fox and others [19]). Estimates
of the attributable fractions for certain causes of death (such as assaults, homicide
and suicide) and disease, however, should be based on local information. To stand-
ardize the results in terms of per capita rates, data on population structure by age and
gender and on life expectancy by age and gender are also required. In order to then
estimate the value of lost productivity due to morbidity or premature mortality, data
on mean income by age and gender are required (for estimating morbidity costs) and
data on present value of lifetime earnings by age and gender are required (for
estimating costs of premature mortality).
Health-care costs
Health-care costs comprise treatment in general and psychiatric hospitals, co-
morbidity costs, ambulance services, residential care, treatment agencies, ambulatory
care (physicians’ fees and other professional services), prescription drugs and other
health-care costs (such as household help and rehabilitation equipment). The re-
quired data include hospitalization costs; physicians’ fees, costs of other professional
services and number of cases seen by physicians and other professional service
providers, by age and gender; ambulance costs (total costs, total number of trips,
number of trips for drug-related causes); and costs of pharmaceuticals used to treat
drug-related conditions (total number of prescriptions and number of prescriptions
by cause).
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Law enforcement costs
The costs of law enforcement consist of the portion of police, court, corrections
and customs costs attributable to drug use. The costs for enforcement of drug laws
per se are relatively uncontroversial and all of the associated costs may be included.
An argument can be made to include some of the costs for enforcement of property
crime (such as burglary or theft) and violent crime (such as assault and homicide);
however, estimates of an appropriate attributable fraction of those crimes that can be
causally attributed to drug use are generally lacking.
Prevention, research, training and averting behaviour costs
The costs of prevention, research, training and promotion of averting behaviour
include drug prevention campaigns, training for physicians and other health profes-
sionals, specialized training on drug issues for law enforcement officials, and pro-
grammes for the promotion of averting behaviour (such as community crime preven-
tion). The inclusion of such policy costs is debatable, as they concern discretionary
expenditures in response to drug abuse rather than costs directly attributable to drug
abuse. In most cost estimation studies, those costs are included but identified sepa-
rately as policy costs. The inclusion of such costs requires data on the costs for
prevention and specialized drug training for the health professionals and law en-
forcement officials.
Administrative costs for transfer payments
The cost of welfare payments, such as social welfare assistance or workers’
compensation for persons disabled due to drug abuse, is limited to administrative
costs. That is, the actual payouts to recipients are not included, as the productivity
lost due to drug-related morbidity is also included. To count both the productivity
lost due to drug-related illness and the welfare payments to persons unable to work
because of the effects of drug abuse would represent double counting.
Other direct costs
Other costs include fire and accident damage attributable to substance abuse
and direct workplace costs, such as the costs of drug-testing in the workplace or the
attributable portion of such schemes as the Employee Assistance Programs and other
health programmes.
Selected areas for further development
The choice of which costs to include is not a simple issue and it depends in part
on the availability of data. If there are no data, it is perilous to exclude a particular
cost item, as ignoring it would effectively treat the cost as zero. Indirect estimates,
therefore, may be required for some cost items. For example, estimating productivity
lost due to absenteeism, high job-turnover and accidents, in most studies, relies on
estimates of the lower earnings of drug users or drug-dependent persons. Such es-
timates do not provide good control of confounding factors that may account for
both drug use and lower productivity. Clearly, more exact estimation procedures
would be desirable.
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Another issue that requires further development is the attribution of crime to
drug use. As Brochu and Pernanen note in their article in the present issue of the
Bulletin on Narcotics, there is little doubt that drug abuse is a contributory cause for
some property crimes and violent crimes. In most countries, high rates of illicit drug
use have been found among criminal offenders. In Canada, for example, as many as
80 per cent of convicted criminal offenders reported having used illicit drugs during
their lifetime, 50-75 per cent showed traces of drugs in their urine at the time of
arrest and close to 30 per cent were under the influence of drugs when they com-
mitted the crime for which they were accused. Similarly, disproportionate numbers
of drug addicts admitted for treatment have criminal records. Chronic or dependent
use of heroin, cocaine or crack, amphetamines or hallucinogens is often implicated
as a contributory cause of property crime, particularly burglary and theft. Assault,
homicide and other crimes of violence are a result of disputes between sellers and
buyers or other sellers in the illicit drug market. Illicit drug users are disproportion-
ately involved in incidents of spouse and child abuse.
While drug abuse is related to crime, the relationship is not always causal, as
Brochu and Pernanen point out. The fact that a crime is committed by someone using
illicit drugs does not necessarily mean that the use of drugs caused the crime to be
committed. There are several plausible causal connections. The pharmacological
effects of drugs such as cocaine, other stimulants and phencyclidine (PCP) might
induce violence; however, the pharmacological effects of most other illicit drugs
would not lead to violent behaviour and some drugs may even have the opposite effect.
Most addicts do not commit violent crimes, and those who do commit assault or other
forms of violence began doing so before becoming drug-dependent. Thus, the pharma-
cological effects of drugs are at best only a partial explanation for violent behaviour.
As noted by Brochu and Pernanen, another potential causal connection between
drug use and crime is the need for addicts to commit property crimes to support drug
use. There are heroin and cocaine addicts who commit property crimes to purchase
drugs, but the majority of illicit drug users are not dependent and even most dependent
drug users do not commit property crimes. In the majority of cases, addicts who
committed property crimes had been engaging in criminal behaviour prior to drug use,
and many former addicts continue to commit property crimes even when they no longer
use drugs. As with the pharmaceutical explanation, the connection between drugs and
crime undoubtedly plays a role in many cases, but it is only a partial explanation.
Brochu and Pernanen also note that some crimes result from territorial disputes
between rival distributors, and arguments and robberies involving buyers and sellers
on the illicit market. That is most common in areas that are disadvantaged economi-
cally and socially, and that have traditionally high rates of violence.
Perhaps the most plausible causal connection is that both criminality and drug
use, in particular drug-use dependency, are related to a similar set of socio-demo-
graphic and personality variables such as poverty, poor future career or income
prospects and low investment in social values. Those factors may represent common
underlying causes of both criminality and illicit drug use. Illicit drug use and crime
may be mutually reinforcing, but the real cause of both drug use and criminal
behaviour may be a complex set of underlying personality and social determinants.
In summary, there is little doubt that drugs are a contributing causal factor in
many crimes, but the fact that a crime is committed by a drug addict or by an
individual under the influence of drugs does not necessarily mean that the crime can
be causally attributed to drug use. Some crimes, in particular crimes of violence, are
undoubtedly caused by the use or marketing of illicit drugs. Credible estimates of the
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proportion of those crimes that are causally attributable to drug use are generally
lacking; thus, the article by Brochu and Pernanen fills an important gap, at least with
regard to the progress of research in Canada. Similar studies are required in other
countries.
Estimation of the economic costs of pharmaceutical abuse is another area in
which further research is needed. Most studies are limited to consideration of illicit
drug abuse, largely because of difficulties in determining when medication use be-
comes abuse. A further difficulty in estimating the costs of pharmaceutical abuse is
that health-care recording systems, such as the International Classification of Dis-
ease, sometimes fail to make a clear distinction between a disorder caused by licit
drug use and a disorder caused by illicit drug use.
Further research is also required in order to take advantage of recent advances
in willingness-to-pay methods that are used to value the cost of mortality. In the
willingness-to-pay approach, information from surveys, insurance data sets or other
sources is examined to determine how much people are willing to pay for relatively
small changes in the risk of death. From those figures, an estimate of the value of
life is produced. While that technique appears to have a reasonably sound theoretical
basis, there continue to be considerable problems in terms of the accuracy and
consistency of estimates obtained using such an approach. Another difficulty is that
the cost estimates from studies utilizing willingness-to-pay methods cannot be com-
pared with the gross domestic product. The results can only be meaningfully com-
pared with the total value of life in a society, a figure that is invariably much higher
than the gross domestic product and that generally lacks intuitive meaning. Nonethe-
less, a growing number of economic studies use willingness-to-pay methods, and
future cost estimation studies may be able to utilize that emerging methodology to
produce reasonable estimates of the largely intangible costs of premature mortality.
Prospects for expansion of cost studies to more countries
Economic cost studies utilizing the international guidelines are currently under
way in several countries in Europe. The data required to conduct such estimates,
however, are extremely difficult to obtain in most developing countries. Several
developing countries, for example, Chile and Colombia, are planning to estimate the
economic costs of drug abuse. A host of economic impacts arising from the produc-
tion and distribution of illicit drugs will need to be taken into account in those
studies, and the international guidelines will need to be revised to take those vari-
ables into account.
Prospects for a satellite account for substance abuse in the System
of National Accounts
It has been suggested that the development of improved, internationally com-
parable methods for estimating the costs of substance abuse should be attempted, as
far as possible, within the framework of the existing System of National Accounts
[15]. The development of estimates of the costs of substance abuse in the framework
of the System of National Accounts would be a further step towards the improve-
ment and refinement of national accounting systems, increasing their relevance and
usefulness. It took decades for the development of standardized measures such as the
gross domestic product under the System of National Accounts, but the ultimate
utility of such measures has been worth the time and effort.
Introduction: Improving economic data to inform decisions in drug control 15
Estimating avoidable costs of substance abuse
Economic cost estimates include both avoidable and unavoidable costs. The
estimates do not represent the amount of money that could realistically be saved
through effective government and social policy and programming. The counterfac-
tual situation in economic cost studies, in which there are no problems associated
with drug use, is hypothetical and generally not realizable under any circumstances.
Even if completely effective policies could be found with no appreciable costs for
enforcement, treatment and prevention programming, implementation would not be
instantaneous and there would still be lingering adverse consequences from past use
of the psychoactive substances.
Economic cost studies in Australia [5, 6] estimate the percentages of mortality
and morbidity, and associated economic costs, that are avoidable. They utilize an
“Arcadian normal” [20], which is the lowest age-standardized mortality rate for the
relevant mortality or morbidity category among 20 comparable Western countries.
The “Arcadian normal” is used to estimate the lowest percentage of preventable
morbidity and mortality yet achieved in any of the chosen countries. While that is
an extremely conservative assumption, such a method is nevertheless a useful tool
for quantifying the percentage of preventable morbidity and mortality and their
associated costs, which can be reduced and ultimately avoided.
Many of the estimated avoidable costs of drug abuse may be reduced or elimi-
nated only over long lead times. There are several reasons for the slow reduction in
avoidable costs. Firstly, lead times for policy implementation will not be effective
instantaneously. Secondly, even after the implementation of effective policies, there
will be long lead times before the health effects of policy changes are achieved. It
may take years before the health status of former drug users is equivalent to persons
who never used drugs. Finally, as some costs apply to premature mortality, it may
take years before there is an appreciable decline in deaths attributable to drug use.
Estimating the cost-effectiveness of interventions
Estimation of the cost-effectiveness of interventions to eliminate, reduce or
minimize the harm associated with drug abuse requires, firstly, comprehensive data
reflecting the costs of abuse. Without such data, it is not possible to determine the
total amount of resources that should be allocated to interventions. Some of those
costs may be crude estimates that are necessary for policy purposes, to justify and
support resources for interventions and their evaluations. Researchers cite burden-of-
illness studies in support of research and of interventions; the same estimates should
be required for the costs of illicit drugs. Prior to making any decisions on methodo-
logical issues, it should be determined whether the cost-effectiveness of only one
particular intervention is being considered or whether the initial policy objective is
to determine the relative cost of alternative interventions or programmes.
Cost-effectiveness, effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis
For cost-effectiveness, effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis, essential require-
ments include determining the costs that are to be included, estimating those costs
which are considered essential and for which there are no reliable data and specify-
ing how to measure whether the desired outcome or effectiveness has been achieved.
In measuring effectiveness or outcome, it is especially important to specify the time
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period to be considered. If, for example, the intended outcome of a programme is
for an addict to be drug-free, the time period by which effectiveness is to be meas-
ured must be determined. That specification can be compared with measures such as
years of survival in therapeutic drug trials.
The choice of methodology depends on the question to be answered. If there
has already been a decision to undertake an intervention, then the appropriate analy-
sis is a cost-effectiveness, or value-for-money, analysis. In a cost-effectiveness
analysis, either the required outcome or the amount of money available is specified,
that is, one parameter is fixed. The objective is therefore to determine the least-cost
way of achieving a specified objective, for example, providing a predetermined
number of addicts with detoxification treatment or providing the largest number of
addicts possible with detoxification treatment for a predetermined amount of money.
In each case, one parameter is fixed and the relative merits of the intervention are
not being evaluated.
Cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken only when the decision on whether
to proceed with the programme, treatment or intervention has not yet been made. It
is important to remember that cost-benefit analysis, valuing all the identifiable costs
and benefits with a common unit of value, reaches a conclusion from a societal point
of view, regardless of which groups or persons bear the costs and which groups or
persons obtain the benefits. For that reason, the results may prove to be unacceptable
to politicians and policy makers. Much of the criticism levelled at cost-benefit analysis
fails to acknowledge that. It is worth noting that when the term cost-benefit analysis
is used by non-economists, what is frequently meant is cost-effectiveness analysis.
Cost-effectiveness of prevention
Cost-effectiveness of prevention requires special consideration. For example, a
significant proportion of the costs of illicit drugs borne by governments is associated
with law enforcement, both preventive and punitive. Disaggregation of those two
aspects of law enforcement costs could require comprehensive research, would be
difficult and would inevitably involve some arbitrary judgements, and the results
would not necessarily be transferable or generalizable.
Outcome measurement has special difficulties when assessing the cost-effec-
tiveness of prevention. The question is whether outcomes, such as abstinence from
illicit drugs, should be applied only to high-risk groups, to target groups by age and
geographical location at greatest risk, or to those with an already high participation
rate in consumption of illicit drugs. An alternative would be for outcome measures
to be applied to the entire population. Another point for consideration is whether
preventive strategies, to be most cost-effective, should focus on preventing initial
consumption of illicit drugs or an early intervention for those who are already
consuming illicit drugs. Relative cost-effectiveness studies may provide answers in
terms of likely outcomes, but those outcomes may not be politically acceptable. The
illegal status of many drugs of addiction in most societies may make prevention
programmes more expensive than if those drugs were decriminalized. If costs of a
preventive programme are calculated to be large in return for a very small gain, such
programmes may still be funded so that governments can be “seen to be doing
something”. That is, a decision to fund a programme may be socially and politically
acceptable even when there is a very low cost-effectiveness ratio. While optimiza-
tion according to cost-effectiveness ratios may not be acceptable, knowledge of
ratios can nevertheless be used to inform present and future policy decisions.
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Cost-effectiveness of treatment
Alternative treatment modalities are rarely subjected to economic evaluation,
though such evaluation presents fewer problems and fewer ambiguities than other
areas of drug abuse control. Firstly, the population is much more readily defined
than the population for whom prevention strategies may be applicable. Secondly, a
number of treatment modalities and therapeutic interventions are currently being
provided in a range of countries, so that comparative cost-effectiveness studies
within and between countries would be possible. Those treatment programmes in-
clude drug-assisted and non-drug-assisted detoxification, psychotherapy, addict sup-
port organizations and prescribed methadone. A portion of the costs of some of those
programmes may be collected but there is a dearth of economic evaluations of
treatment alternatives, making it difficult for policy makers to make informed deci-
sions on such matters.
Law enforcement considerations
Difficulties associated with the disaggregation of law enforcement costs have
already been mentioned. The argument concerning costs that are incurred only be-
cause a drug is illicit should also be acknowledged, although there is no agreement
as to whether such costs should be calculated as part of the costs of illicit drugs.
Punitive costs of law enforcement, in particular costs of incarceration, are usually
only crude estimates, partly because there are very few data available and because
the decisions relating to the inclusion and exclusion of costs are necessarily arbi-
trary. Although many crimes are associated with the consumption of illicit drugs, it
is not appropriate to assign causality to all of those crimes.
Data requirements
Data requirements have been referred to throughout the present discussion.
Both gross cost estimates and micro-costing data relating to drug abuse are often
non-existent or very crude. In order to improve the use of economic data to enable
informed policy decisions to be made, more comprehensive and detailed cost studies
are required. There needs to be agreement of objective criteria for measuring out-
comes, so that the cost-effectiveness of programmes can be compared over time.
Because of the absence of cost data, it is not possible to estimate marginal costs;
thus, informed decisions relating to economic size and expansion or contraction of
programmes cannot be made.
It should be emphasized that the costs required for estimates include not only
money, but also the intangible costs associated with crime, violence, suicide and
premature deaths. Economic analysis is needed to provide information on the cost-
effectiveness of interventions on both current costs and future costs. When compari-
sons are being made between the relative effectiveness of programmes designed to
reduce drug abuse, some non-paid inputs must also be costed. For example, the costs
of services provided by volunteers in non-governmental organizations should be
estimated; otherwise real costs will not be identified and transferability will be
limited.
The likelihood of compliance and the costs associated with non-compliance
require estimation. Thus, there is a need for persons involved in economics and other
disciplines, such as behavioural science and epidemiology, to collaborate in the
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design and evaluation of effective interventions. The estimation of outcome prob-
abilities can be combined with economic estimates to inform policy decisions about
programmes for prevention and intervention. While evidence such as that obtained
from randomized controlled trials is not usually available to estimate outcome prob-
abilities, the relative rigorousness of the available data should be acknowledged and
addressed.
Determining the right policy mix
Drug policy inevitably involves a mixture of intervention strategies. Illicit drug
use is discouraged through the application of criminal laws against the production,
distribution and use of illicit drugs. Treatment is provided in various ways and
preventive education may be conducted through school programmes and the mass
media. Long-term investments include basic research on biomedical aspects of drug
use, socio-behavioural risk factors and specialized training for health-care and law
enforcement personnel. A key task for policy makers is determining the most appro-
priate mix of the various strategies, all of which are directed at reducing drug-related
problems and associated costs. Enhanced research on the cost-effectiveness of spe-
cific policies and programmes not only helps in deciding which interventions should
continue to receive support and funding, but it also helps policy makers determine
the most appropriate mix of strategies to achieve the overall goals of a national drug
strategy.
Estimating performance over time
Knowledge of the costs attributable to drug abuse at one point in time is of
limited value. While the magnitude of the estimated costs might help in setting
general priorities, indicating the importance of drug abuse on the political agenda in
comparison with competing concerns, the true value of cost estimates can only be
realized when estimates are available from a series of cost estimation studies indi-
cating trends in total costs and the various cost components.
The utility of cost estimates over time is enhanced when the specific outcome
indicators and performance measures are set out. That focuses the assessment of
drug programming and policy on the specific impacts on cost components. For
example, the initiation of enhanced outreach and treatment programming for intra-
venous drug users might be targeted to the reduction of drug-related crime and crime
costs.
While the attribution of cost reductions to specific programmes and policies is
at best a difficult undertaking, changes in specific costs attributable to drug abuse
can help assess the effectiveness of programming and serve as a general barometer
of the effectiveness of a drug strategy. The process is dialectic in nature: the policy
and programme mix must be periodically evaluated and adjusted, based on changes
in the economic costs and other considerations.
Efforts should be made to promote comparability, across countries and world
regions, over time. The development of the international guidelines for estimating
the costs of substance abuse is only a first step in that direction. The guidelines
should be periodically reassessed and revised, based on the experience in applying
them in different settings.
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Conclusions
In the present article, the authors examined methodological issues involved in
developing more rigorous and comparable data on economic aspects of substance
abuse. After discussing the conceptual framework for estimating the economic costs
of illicit drug use, it was noted that there were numerous contentious methodological
issues and data requirements. Nonetheless, the prospects for future development of
cost estimation studies have been improved by the recent development of interna-
tional guidelines and the growing experience in cost estimation in a number of
countries.
There is a great need for improved data on economic aspects of drug issues.
Economic cost studies can identify the economic impact of drug abuse on the total
value of goods and services in the economy and specify which sectors of the econ-
omy bear the greatest costs. Although not all of the economic costs are avoidable,
reasonable estimates of avoidable costs are possible. The continuing development of
economic analyses, such as cost-effectiveness studies and cost-benefit analyses of
policies and programmes, should direct policy makers to make better-informed
choices on where to invest and help them to assess performance.
Improving data on economic aspects of drug abuse will necessarily entail im-
proving data collection systems. Economic cost studies to date have identified many
knowledge gaps. Particular care must be taken in estimating productivity losses due
to drug abuse and in developing a reasonable estimate of the proportion of crime that
can be causally attributed to drug use.
There are many potential benefits to be gained by filling such knowledge gaps
and improving the general level of understanding of the economic ramifications of
substance abuse. Policy makers want to know the answers to four key questions:
(a) The costs of drug abuse to society;
(b) The proportion of those costs that are avoidable;
(c) How best to invest in order to avoid or minimize such costs;
(d) How well those investments are doing.
More complete and rigorous data on economic aspects of drug abuse would provide
policy makers with a more comprehensive understanding of the ramifications of
drug abuse. In addition, such data would provide synergy for greater multilateral and
multisectoral cooperation in prevention.
With leadership from international drug agencies such as the United Nations
International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), a process has already begun that
will enhance the development and use of economic data and, ultimately, improve the
quality of decisions made on drug issues at the national, regional and international
levels.
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ABSTRACT
The present article identifies the theoretical areas in substance abuse estimation
that have not been sufficiently addressed. Those include issues relating to the
definition of social costs, a more comprehensive labour market analysis, the
social benefits of drug consumption and the distributional impacts of substance
abuse. Examples are presented of types of cost estimates, how the results of
estimates can be interpreted and the policy use of each type of cost.
Data requirements are identified and the process of proceeding from aggre-
gate estimates to disaggregated evaluation is reviewed. Issues of attribution are
considered, and the importance of calculation of avoidable costs of substance abuse
is explained.
General issues are reviewed with regard to benefit-cost analysis and evalua-
tion criteria applicable to substance abuse. The article presents as a case study the
economic evaluation of Quit Victoria. It uses the calculations of the social costs of
tobacco to provide the basis of benefit-cost evaluation of Quit Victoria. The study
resulted in a positive benefit-cost ratio under all assumptions.
The article concludes with a review of the issues to be addressed in the
economic evaluation of a medically supervised injecting room that is being un-
dertaken in New South Wales, Australia. It emphasizes the importance of esti-
mating social costs in project appraisal and public policy-making.
Introduction
The objectives of the Third International Symposium on the Economic and
Social Costs of Substance Abuse, held in Banff, Canada, from 31 May to 3 June
2000, were set out in the August 1999 planning concept paper of the Canadian
Centre on Substance Abuse. The short-term goal was to test and improve the inter-
national guidelines formulated by the Centre [1]; the medium-term goals were to
improve the database for cost estimation, to fill existing gaps in methodology and
to extend the scope of such studies to include estimates of avoidable costs; and the
long-term goal was to expand cost estimation to comprehensive cost-benefit analyses
of alternative policy options.
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The present paper deals specifically with the long term-goal of the Symposium,
the economic evaluation of policy options. Before discussing issues of economic
evaluation, however, it should be pointed out that much theoretical and data devel-
opment remains to be undertaken before estimation of the costs of substance abuse
can be considered to have reached a satisfactory level.
Theoretical areas in need of further development include:
(a) Definition of social (external) costs of substance abuse. Consensus has not
yet been reached on the definition of social costs, even though it is of crucial
importance to the estimation of such costs. For example, the question of addiction
and its impact on informed and rational decision-making has yet to be resolved
satisfactorily in spite of the popularity among economists of the theory of rational
addiction [2]. Another important issue is whether costs imposed by substance abus-
ers on members of their immediate families should be considered to be private or
social costs;
(b) Labour market analysis. The issue is whether labour markets fully adjust
factor returns so that the costs of substance abuse are internalized upon the abuser and
can therefore be treated in some circumstances as private costs. If labour markets do
not perfectly adjust in this way (which is more plausible), the question is what
proportion of drug-related productivity losses can be considered to be social costs;
(c) Social benefits of drug consumption. Some types of substance use can lead
to private and/or social benefits (as is the case with moderate alcohol consumption,
which is neither addictive nor abusive). The question is whether such benefits should
be set against the costs of substance abuse or whether they should be simply ignored,
as they are in most studies;
(d) Distributional impact of substance abuse. The Second International Sym-
posium on the Economic and Social Costs of Substance Abuse, held in Montebello,
Canada, from 2 to 5 October 1995, recommended that future studies should indicate
the incidence of the social costs of substance abuse among broad community groups
(substance abusers, other individuals, business and government). Such a process
involves difficult methodological issues akin to those involved in tax incidence
analysis. However, from a political point of view, the incidence of the costs of
substance abuse is particularly important since such a high proportion of those costs
is likely to be borne by individuals and businesses, rather than by government. That
area of analysis is in need of substantial further development. There may well be
scope for extending it to include an analysis of the incidence of such abuse costs in
different household income categories, that is, the distributional consequences of
substance abuse.
Areas of primary importance for future data development are:
(a) Development of attribution factors for drug-related crime;
(b) Impact of substance abuse upon productivity (both absenteeism and on-
the-job productivity);
(c) Further development of epidemiological information on passive smoking;
(d) Measurement of the costs of the abuse of pharmaceuticals;
(e) Analysis of the impact of tobacco smuggling;
(f) Valuation of intangible costs such as pain, other forms of suffering and
loss of life;
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(g) Estimation of avoidable costs;
(h) Costs of fires attributable to cigarette smoking;
(i) Costs of drug-related litter and other forms of pollution.
There is no dispute with the primary objective of the Third Symposium, which
was to refine the development and use of the social costs of substance abuse. How-
ever, the discussion to date has largely ignored the further uses to which the wealth
of data generated in the process of producing estimates of social costs can be prof-
itably applied, in particular in the area of project appraisal. Brown and Jackson [3]
used “project appraisal” as a general term referring to attempts by applied welfare
economists to evaluate the efficiency of alternative projects or more widely the
efficiency of alternative policies. That is the sense in which the term is used in the
present article.
Social cost estimates and their uses
Estimation of social costs performs the important function of indicating the size
of the substance abuse problem and its component parts. Extending the analysis to
estimation of avoidable costs gives valuable information about the potential eco-
nomic returns available to policies and programmes designed to curb substance
abuse. The aggregate estimates have been used in various countries as a powerful
political argument for mobilizing public resources to be used against drug abuse.
Such aggregate estimates do not, however, indicate to which particular programmes
and policies those resources should be directed.
Table 1 presents a summary of various types of exercises involved in the
estimation of the social costs of substance abuse, together with the interpretation and
significance of each type of exercise.
Table 1. Cost estimates of substance abuse
Type of estimate Interpretation of results Example of policy use
Aggregate costs Total external costs of substance Indication of the size of the substance
abuse compared with a situation abuse problem
of no substance abuse
Avoidable costs Potential economic benefits from Determination of the appropriate level
substance abuse harm minimization of resources to be devoted to harm
strategies minimization strategies
Incidence of costs Distribution of the external costs Mobilization of support from various
of substance abuse among various groups (such as the business community)
community groupings for programmes against substance abuse
Disaggregated costs External costs of substance abuse Economic evaluation (cost-benefit or
disaggregated by category cost-effectiveness analysis) of harm
minimization programmes
Budgetary impact Impact of substance abuse on Assessment of the case for industry
government expenditure and making payments to government as
revenue compensation for abuse of substances
produced by the industry
Source: Adapted from J. D. Collins and H. M. Lapsley, “Estimating and disaggregating the social costs of
tobacco”, The Economics of Tobacco Control: Towards an Optimal Mix, I. Abedian and others, eds. (Cape Town,
Applied Fiscal Research Centre, University of Cape Town, 1998).
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Economic evaluation (the topic of the present paper) and, in particular, cost-
benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis applied to substance abuse issues are
logical developments of the types of analysis referred to in table 1.
Studies estimating the social costs of substance abuse are based on the collection
and development of data on all aspects of the economic impact of substance abuse. As
an indication, a typical study concerning the aggregate cost of substance abuse would
involve the compilation and/or use of data on some or all of the following:
Epidemiological information on substance abuse;
Mortality classified by disease;
Morbidity classified by disease;
Drug use surveys;
Use and abuse of pharmaceuticals and associated costs;
Public and private hospital occupancy;
Public hospital costs of diagnosis-related groups;
Occupancy and costs of public and private nursing homes;
Publicly funded medical services;
Health expenditure and sources of funding;
Health insurance;
Consumption expenditure;
Labour force;
Labour force absenteeism;
Award rates of pay;
Employee earnings and hours of work;
Unpaid work;
Household incomes and wages, salaries and supplements;
Company incomes and turnover;
Valuation of pain, suffering and loss of life;
Output of manufacturing industry;
Tobacco and alcohol market shares;
Population size and structure;
Demographic impact of substance abuse;
Income tax and indirect tax revenue;
Customs duties;
Subsidies and assistance to relevant industries;
Motor vehicle usage and accidents;
Drug-related crime and law enforcement;
Property insurance;
Consumer prices;
Substance abuse programme costs.
Studies of the aggregate cost of substance abuse provide a high proportion of
the data needed for programme evaluation. If the physical output of programmes (for
example, reduction in smoking prevalence, liver cirrhosis or drug psychoses) can be
identified, aggregate cost studies will normally yield virtually all the data needed for
the economic evaluation of the benefits of individual projects.
Such an extension of the use of aggregate data rarely occurs and those project
appraisals attempted tend to be undertaken independently of the aggregate cost stud-
ies. (A surprising number of evaluations are undertaken by teams that appear to
possess little in the way of economic expertise.) A gold mine of economic data is
available for project appraisal but appears to be rarely used for such purposes.
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A logical development of the Guidelines of the Canadian Centre on Substance
Abuse [1] would be an extension into the area of project appraisal. In the present
article, some of the theoretical and practical problems of such evaluation are consid-
ered, using examples from Australia with which the authors have been, or are cur-
rently, involved.
From aggregate estimates to disaggregated evaluation
Aggregate estimates of the social costs of substance abuse give no indication of
the benefits potentially available to harm reduction programmes since:
(a) Some of those costs relate to past substance abuse (for example, morbidity
attributable to smoking) and are therefore unavoidable costs;
(b) There can be no expectation that it will be possible to completely prevent
the abuse of any particular substance. Even for periods well into the future, when the
effects of past abuse have “washed out” of the system, it may be possible to reduce
the costs of substance abuse but not to eliminate them.
It is necessary therefore to estimate the avoidable costs of substance abuse in
order to be able to indicate the extent of potential benefits to harm minimization
programmes. Estimates of avoidable costs, however, fail to indicate how those cost
reductions might be achieved or whether the social benefits resulting from such
programmes would exceed their social costs. Those issues can be settled only by a
process of project appraisal.
Project appraisal evaluates the efficiency of alternative projects or alternative
policies. Its aims are to determine, by enumerating the benefits and costs of alter-
native projects or policies, the appropriate level of public resources to be devoted to
the problem, and the nature of the solutions to the problem. Its objective is to
maximize the social rate of return resulting from the use of public resources so that
the resources can be used as efficiently as possible.
Project appraisal is approached from the perspective of the community as a
whole, not from the perspective of individuals, firms or the public sector. Such a
social perspective complicates the analysis substantially, since private project ap-
praisal avoids many of the difficult theoretical and practical issues that social ap-
praisers must deal with, in particular the valuation of benefits and choice of discount
rate. Furthermore, since the viewpoint is that of the community as a whole and not
just that of the government, the issues are much more complex than those of public
expenditure funding and public revenue benefits.
In principle, the process of project appraisal should lead to the allocation of
resources to all public programmes that yield at least a minimum rate of return. That
rate of return should take account of the rates of return, calculated on a consistent
basis, on investment in the private sector, to ensure an efficient allocation of re-
sources between the private sector and the public sector. In practice, there are many
types of public goods and services that the private sector would never supply (unless
through private provision facilitated by public funding). Even if it were possible to
calculate public and private rates of return on such a consistent basis, political
constraints on public expenditure levels mean that the objective of project appraisal
is usually to achieve the efficient allocation of previously determined public ex-
penditure levels between competing public sector uses. Governments generally pur-
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port to be attempting to reduce the size of the public sector on the grounds that
private expenditure is more efficient than public expenditure. The empirical basis for
such a generalization is often extremely questionable and it usually appears to be
based more on ideology than on analysis. Combined with the equally questionable
doctrine that personal and company income tax rates should be reduced as much as
possible, it has had a powerful effect on the imposition of constraints on public
expenditure. At that level of evaluation, the appropriate evaluation tool is benefit-
cost analysis (BCA).
The scope of project appraisal can be extended into programme budgeting,
which is a system of managing government expenditure by attempting to compare
the programme proposals of all government agencies authorized to achieve similar
objectives [4]. It appears that, in the area of health, such lofty objectives are rarely
sought, let alone achieved. The paucity of individual project appraisals makes the
implementation of programme budgeting seem a distant objective.
In many cases, the objectives of public expenditure analysis may be even more
modest. The objective of the evaluation exercise may be predetermined (for exam-
ple, a reduction of 10 per cent in juvenile smoking prevalence) so that the analysis
is reduced to cost comparisons of alternative programmes designed to achieve the
same objective. In other situations, it may be considered that it is so difficult to value
a programme’s output that BCA is impossible. In those circumstances, a cost-effec-
tiveness analysis (CEA) is more appropriate [5].
CEA can be defined as a detailed comparison of the costs of alternative tech-
niques for achieving the same predetermined objective. In practice, CEA can be used
to determine how a given objective can be achieved at the least cost, or how a
desired output can be maximized for a given cost. The objectives and outputs of
programmes subject to CEA are almost always one-dimensional since, if alternative
programmes yield multiple outputs in different ratios, it becomes necessary to assign
values to each type of output. That then moves the analysis into the realm of BCA.
Murray and others [5] discuss a broader view of cost-effectiveness in terms of
allocating a fixed budget between interventions in such a way as to maximize health
in a society. They acknowledge that only a few applications of this broader use—
in which a wide range of preventive, curative and rehabilitative interventions that
benefit different groups within a population are compared in order to derive impli-
cations for the optimal mix of interventions—can be found.
The advantage of CEA in its usual and more limited sense is that there is no
need to value output benefits. That makes the analysis much simpler than BCA,
since it is necessary to identify only the costs of alternative interventions. That is
generally a much more straightforward process than the valuation of programme
benefits, even though significant problems may arise in the allocation of overhead
costs.
The major disadvantage of CEA is that the policy objective is predetermined
rather than arising from the analysis. CEA is of no assistance in determining policy
objectives. As Murray and others [5] pointed out, the implicit assumption of CEA
that the required additional resources would need to be transferred from another
health intervention or from another sector is rarely discussed.
A further extension of evaluation techniques comes in the form of cost-utility
analysis (CUA). While CUA is the least common method of economic evaluation
identified in the present article, its use within the health-care sector warrants some
discussion. Such a method of analysis calculates the cost per specified health effect
(of a programme, a technology or a pharmaceutical intervention) and expresses
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outcomes as uniform units of health. Those units are presumed to have similar values
across all conditions. The health effects are weighted to reflect individual or societal
preferences for different health outcomes.
The most common weighting units are quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). The QALY measurement attempts to com-
pare treatment priorities, identifying and measuring the utility of using resources to
treat people of different health status, with different likely outcomes of treatment.
QALY is regarded as a unit of health that combines extension of life with a measure
of its worth. Its use is focused on societal decisions relating to which good or service
to produce relative to one another, that is, allocative efficiency. There have been a
number of “league tables” developed comparing QALY measures of quality and
quantity of life years gained. It is possible, for example, to compare QALYs from
resources spent on smoking cessation programmes with resources spent on organ
transplantation.
The DALY measurement combines healthy life years lost because of premature
mortality with healthy life years lost because of disability. It is a useful economic
tool as the resource implications of each DALY component can be identified and
estimated. The total loss of DALYs worldwide reflects the global burden of disease.
CUA can be considered a special form of CEA in which effects are measured
in health status; it can contribute to societal decision-making by determining
allocative efficiency. While it is still a matter of contention whether QALYs and
DALYs can be effective and acceptable public policy tools, they are increasingly
being used to contribute to economic evaluation in the health-care sector.
General issues in benefit-cost analysis
Social benefit-cost analysis attempts to describe and quantify the social benefits
and costs of a policy or programme expressed in terms of a common monetary unit.
The current value of the flow of social benefits over the life of a project is compared
with the current value of the flow of expenditures that have yielded those benefits.
Discounting techniques are used to permit comparison of the current value of dif-
ferential flows of the benefits and expenditures over time. The costs and benefits,
once valued in comparable terms, are then compared in terms of a criterion such as
a benefit-cost ratio or some measure of the project’s rate of return.
The theoretical and practical issues involved in BCA have been discussed at
length in the literature and it would be inappropriate to undertake a full review here;
however, a brief recapitulation of the major issues is presented below as they form
the basis for the discussion by the authors of an example of BCA in the field of drug
control.
Valuation of benefits and costs
As indicated earlier, exercises focusing on aggregate costs of substance abuse
should identify and place values on all the costs of abuse of the substance under
review. Any reduction of those costs resulting from implementation of a particular
programme will represent benefits of that programme. The theoretical and practical
issues involved in the valuation of programme benefits should already have been
addressed in the study on the costs of substance abuse. An approach based on human
capital should provide all the necessary information, including discounted future
28 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LII, Nos. 1 and 2, 2000
costs. The approach based on demographics will not yield information directly about
future substance abuse costs; thus, extra analysis will be necessary.
Estimates of the aggregate costs of substance abuse should already have made
the necessary distinctions between private and social costs and should have ensured
that double-counting of costs was avoided by including only real (not pecuniary)
costs. The estimates should already have taken account of valuation problems, in-
cluding the impact of private market imperfections such as monopoly power or
managed exchange rate regimes, and the difficulties of placing valuations on intan-
gibles such as pain, other forms of suffering and loss of life. (For a review of issues
involved in estimating the costs of tobacco use, see J. Lightwood and others [6]).
It will still be necessary to undertake the extra research involved in identifying
programme costs, but that should prove to be a relatively straightforward exercise.
Discounting of benefits and costs
The choice of discount rate, by which the time streams of benefits and costs are
to be reduced to values expressed in monetary units in a common year, is one of the
major theoretical problems of BCA. It is important for long-lived projects, for which
the benefit-cost ratio can be particularly sensitive to the choice of discount rate. For
example, it has been concluded that the issue of whether the lifetime health-care
costs of smokers are higher than those of non-smokers depends upon the discount
rate that is applied [7].
For a typical public investment project, the higher the discount rate is, the lower
the benefit-cost ratio will be. As discussed below, serious theoretical problems re-
main in the choice of discount rate. That may not be as great a problem, however,
for drug programme evaluations as it can be for other forms of public investment
analysis.
The most usual application of social BCA is in the evaluation of large public
investment projects, such as roads, bridges and power stations, which typically in-
volve a large initial investment, operating costs over the predetermined life of the
project and then, possibly, significant expenditure at the end of the project life if, for
example, the facility has to be scrapped. The highly uneven time stream of costs is
to be compared with a relatively steady flow of benefits. Expenditure patterns over
time on drug programmes (such as the Victorian Smoking and Health Program in
Australia, discussed below) are quite different, however; there, relatively steady
expenditure flows from the beginning lead, after a period of time, to a relatively
steady flow of benefits. If the benefit and cost flows of the projects to be compared
are relatively steady over time, the ranking of the projects may be relatively insen-
sitive to the choice of discount rate.
Serious issues about the choice of discount rate remain unresolved. Essentially,
the choice is between the social opportunity cost rate and the social time preference
rate.
The social opportunity cost rate is a measure of the best alternative use to which
the community might have put the resources used in the project under review. That
reflects the rates of return available to alternative investments, in the private sector
or the public sector. The social time preference rate is a measure of the community’s
valuation of current consumption against future consumption. A society that places
the interests of the current generation above those of future generations will have a
high social time preference rate. The two rates are, in an imperfectly competitive real
world, most unlikely to be the same. One would expect the social time preference
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rate to be lower than the social opportunity cost rate. The issue of which category
of discount rate to choose has not been resolved [3].
Evaluation criteria
The results of BCA are presented using one or more of the following three
measures:
(a) Net present value is the present value of the future time stream of net
benefits (that is, benefits less costs). The future benefits and costs are discounted to
present values by use of what is deemed to be an appropriate discount rate. All other
things being equal, the higher the discount rate that is chosen, the lower the net
present value will be;
(b) Benefit-cost ratio is the ratio of the present value of a programme’s ben-
efits to the present value of its costs. Once again, because the process involves
discounting the size of the calculated measure, it is crucially dependent on the choice
of discount rate;
(c) Internal rate of return is the discount rate that equates the net present
value to zero. That measure has the advantage of not being dependent upon a choice
of discount rate—the calculation generates the internal rate of return directly. The
logic of such a measure is that it effectively represents the rate of return generated
by the programme or project.
As a result of different sets of implicit assumptions underlying the calculation
of the criteria, the ranking of the projects under review may not be consistent for all
three criteria.
Distributional issues
In public policy deliberations, most countries take account of distributional
considerations, expressed broadly as the extent of poverty and wealth in the commu-
nity. Different substance abuse programmes may have different distributional im-
pacts. It is possible (although there is no supporting empirical evidence) that the
damaging effects of smoking on health are more highly concentrated on the poor
than are the effects on health of alcohol abuse. Thus, anti-smoking programmes
might have what the community considers to be more desirable distributional con-
sequences than anti-alcohol programmes. BCA can assign distributional weights
designed to reflect what are perceived to be society’s distributional values, perhaps
giving more weight to benefits accruing to the poor than to those accruing to the
more affluent.
Economic evaluation of Quit Victoria
The authors have recently attempted a benefit-cost analysis of an ongoing pro-
gramme in Australia called the Victorian Smoking and Health Program, also known
as Quit Victoria [8]. The benefit-cost analysis is based on data generated by an
aggregate cost study presented in the same paper that also attempts, for the first time
in Australia, to estimate the social costs of tobacco use for the state of Victoria. This
section of the present article draws heavily upon the methodological discussion in
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the Quit Victoria report and presents a summary of the results of the analysis. Many
of the problems confronted in the Quit Victoria BCA are common to evaluations of
programmes in the area of substance abuse.
Quit Victoria was established in 1985 with the objective of reducing the harm-
ful effects of tobacco use in Victoria. Its main source of funding is the Victorian
Health Promotion Foundation, which was originally funded through the state tax on
tobacco. As a result of the fact that state tobacco taxes have recently been declared
to be unconstitutional, the Foundation is now funded through direct grants from the
Health Department of Victoria. Other funders of Quit Victoria are the Anti-Cancer
Council of Victoria and the National Heart Foundation (Victorian Division). Quit
Victoria conducts media campaigns, school and community education and anti-
smoking sponsorships and supports legislation designed to reduce tobacco consump-
tion.
Any estimate of the benefits of a public health programme such as Quit Victoria
relies upon identification of an implicit mechanism of the link between implemen-
tation of the programme and the harm reduction outcome. The mechanism is, in
principle, as follows:
Programmereduction in consumptionreduction in harm
There are two fundamental links in the above-mentioned mechanism:
(a) Programme leads to a reduction in consumption. This raises two ques-
tions:
i(i) What reduction in consumption is attributable to the programme?
(ii) Over what period of time does that reduction occur?
(b) Reduction in consumption leads to reduction in harm. Three questions
arise:
ii(i) What reduction in harm is attributable to the reduction in consump-
tion?
i(ii) Over what period of time does the reduction in harm occur?
(iii) Over what period of time does the reduction in costs (whose esti-
mation is the objective of the exercise) occur?
Any such exercise must therefore address the dual issues of quantifying the
health effects of anti-smoking programmes and determining the periods of time over
which those programmes take effect.
A further significant question is whether programmes such as Quit Victoria
produce permanent reductions in smoking prevalence or whether smoking preva-
lence would return to former levels if such programmes were to be abandoned. Is
the effect of programmes such as Quit Victoria like a screw, remaining in its new
position when the driving force is removed, or is it like a spring, reverting to its
former position? The answer to that question will determine whether there is a need
for ongoing anti-smoking programmes or whether such programmes can cease once
the desired reduction in smoking prevalence is achieved. The answer is also crucial
to the process of estimating the rates of return on anti-smoking programmes.
Expenditures or programmes such as Quit Victoria may lead to positive “exter-
nalities”, such as reductions in the prevalence of smoking in other states. In estimat-
ing the impact of such a programme, account should be taken of such externalities.
Other states may benefit from the money spent on the programme by the state of
Victoria (for example, when Quit Victoria messages on billboards at the Melbourne
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Cricket Ground are seen on national cricket telecasts) and Victoria may benefit from
expenditure by other states and by the Government of Australia. No attempt was
made to estimate those externalities in the Quit Victoria study. In the case of Quit
Victoria, all such externalities are positive, that is, the programmes confer benefits
(rather than impose costs) on other states. The same is probably true for virtually all
harm minimization programmes whose effects spread beyond the jurisdictions fund-
ing those programmes.
A related issue is whether the impact of Quit Victoria programmes, in reducing
smoking prevalence in one state, could be evaluated using the changes in smoking
rates in other states as a comparator. If their prevalence was also reduced, a com-
parison of Victoria with New South Wales, for example, might well underestimate
the effectiveness and positive outcome of expenditure of the Quit Victoria pro-
gramme.
The calculations of the social costs of tobacco in Victoria in 1988 and 1992 [8]
provide the basis for BCA evaluation of Quit Victoria.
Social BCA involves comparison over the life of a programme of its social
costs and social benefits. The Quit Victoria study presents estimates of social costs
in Victoria for the years 1988 and 1992, on the basis of which an attempt to predict
future social costs can be made. The study makes what is deemed to be a conserva-
tive assumption that the social costs of tobacco smoking rose linearly between 1988
and 1992 and that, in the absence of anti-smoking programmes, they would remain
at 1992 levels, expressed in real terms, in the future.
The problem arose concerning estimation of the reduction in the social costs of
tobacco use in Victoria that could be attributed to Quit Victoria expenditure. Gen-
erally, the best measure of smoking in any community is taken to be the smoking
prevalence rate, that is, the percentage of the relevant population who smoke. Over
the life of Quit Victoria, the total smoking prevalence rate in Victoria has declined
substantially, mirroring the decline in the national rate. How much of the decline in
Victoria is attributable to Quit Victoria?
The smoking prevalence rate in Victoria is subject to a wide range of influ-
ences. The major influences can be summarized as follows:
(a) Quit Victoria;
(b) Other anti-smoking policies in Victoria, for example, restrictions on ciga-
rette advertising;
(c) Anti-smoking campaigns of the federal Government and of other state
governments;
(d) Federal and state tobacco tax policies;
(e) Other federal and state regulatory policies, for example, sponsorship bans
and restrictions on smoking in the workplace;
(f) Broader economic and non-economic factors, such as changes in living
standards or in attitudes towards healthy living.
Can such varied influences on the Victorian prevalence rate be quantified sepa-
rately? Little evaluation work has been undertaken of anti-smoking programmes and
policies in Australia. Perhaps the most intensive study in that area is the recently-
published evaluation of the National Tobacco Campaign [9]. The results published
to date, however, provide no useful quantitative estimates of the Campaign’s impact
on the national prevalence rate, and little other verifiable information on the topic
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is available. There is an urgent need for research disaggregating the effects of the
various factors influencing prevalence rates; however, it is currently not possible to
identify those effects.
The approach adopted in the study was to identify the decline in the prevalence
rate in Victoria over the relevant period and to consider the proportion of the decline
that could be attributed to the activities of Quit Victoria. The range of attributable
proportions adopted in the study was 10-30 per cent, that is, it was assumed that 10-
30 per cent of the decline in the prevalence rates in Victoria was attributable to the
activities of Quit Victoria. The actual attributable decline is most likely to lie within
that range. Chaloupka and Warner [10] provide international information on the
impact of anti-smoking programmes.
Declines in prevalence will lead to reductions in social costs but the lags in-
volved in that process are difficult to identify. A decline in smoking prevalence may
lead to a virtually instant decline in some costs, such as those arising from fire-
related deaths, injuries and damage. On the other hand, other types of costs may only
be responsive to declines in smoking prevalence with a considerable lag. For exam-
ple, reduced smoking prevalence may lead to a decline in costs related to lung cancer
only after a period of many years. It appears impossible, on the basis of currently
available research, to estimate the relevant average lag period. For evidence on
individual lags, see Armstrong [11]. The Quit Victoria study adopted the approach
of making an educated guess of the range of values in which the actual lag might
lie and to test the sensitivity of the results to the adoption of different lags. All other
things being equal, the longer the assumed lag, the lower the calculated rate of return
will be, since the total benefits will be lower and they will accrue later in the life
of the programme.
The present study, therefore, assumes that a given proportionate reduction in
the prevalence rate will lead to the same proportionate reduction in social costs after
a relevant period. Results are calculated on assumed average lags of 6, 8 and 10
years.
There is no problem identifying the annual costs incurred to date in financing
Quit Victoria. There is, however, a problem in forecasting expenditure, compounded
by the fact that the future prevalence rate will presumably be a function of future
expenditure. There are three possible scenarios to be considered:
(a) The “spring” scenario: maintenance of Quit Victoria expenditure at the
current real level will keep the smoking prevalence rate at the current levels;
(b) The “screw” scenario: reduction of the Quit Victoria expenditure level to
zero will not lead to any change in the current prevalence rate;
(c) The “modified spring” scenario: maintenance of the current expenditure
level of Quit Victoria will lead to further declines in prevalence.
There are other possible scenarios but they are likely to be variants of the
above-mentioned scenarios.
The scenario assumed to be the least favourable to Quit Victoria is the “spring”
scenario. Compared with that scenario, the “screw” scenario would imply lower
expenditure for the same benefits while the “modified spring” scenario would imply
higher benefits for the same expenditure. The most conservative approach, the
“spring” scenario, was used for the present study. Thus, it was assumed that the
expenditure level of Quit Victoria would be maintained at the real 1998 level and
that the prevalence rate would remain constant at the 1998 level.
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From that, an important question arises: over what period should such an analy-
sis for Quit Victoria be undertaken? In investment analysis, it is usually possible to
determine the life of the project. In the case of Quit Victoria, the programme has no
predetermined life and it was difficult to predict future public policies towards smok-
ing in Victoria. Given that the benefits of Quit Victoria programmes may accrue
over many years and that they would certainly continue to accrue for at least a period
of time after one programme had ended, the adoption of too short a period of
analysis would lead to an underestimation of the programme benefits. On the other
hand, it is extremely difficult to predict future developments in medical technology
and, thus, future medical costs. Technological improvements may lead to cost reduc-
tions, for example, as a result of the development of new vaccines. Alternatively,
they may lead to cost increases, for example, as a result of the development of more
effective but more expensive medical treatments. The higher the adopted discount
rate, the lower the value placed on future benefits will be. For example, one dollar’s
benefits to be received in 30 years will have a current value of 17 cents at a discount
rate of 6 per cent, but only 6 cents at a discount rate of 10 per cent. For the purposes
of the Quit Victoria study, a period of analysis of 30 years was adopted.
The absence of adequate research results with regard to the links between
programmes like Quit Victoria, smoking prevalence and the social costs of smoking
means that a study such as the present one must identify its underlying assumptions
and test the sensitivity of the results to changes in those assumptions. In table 2,
below, details are presented of the three sets of assumptions underlying the evalu-
ation of Quit Victoria in the present study.
Table 2 shows, for each of the issues identified in the discussion above, the
most conservative assumption (in terms of reducing the indicated rate of return to
the Quit Victoria programme), the least conservative assumption and the most plau-
sible assumption (in terms of its approximation to reality). Thus, in that context, the
term conservative denotes “yielding a comparatively low rate of return”.
Table 2. Assumptions underlying the Quit Victoria evaluation
Attributable Time lag between
decline in smoking reduction in prevalence
prevalence and reduction Characterization Discount
(percentage of in social costs of the effect of Quit rate
Set of assumptions total decline) (years) Victoria expenditurea (percentage)
Most conservative 10 10 Acts as a spring 8
Least conservative 30 6 Acts as a screw 4
Most plausible 20 8 Acts as a spring 6
aIf the effect of the expenditure on Quit Victoria is assumed to act as a “spring”, it is necessary to maintain the
Quit Victoria expenditure at the current level in order to maintain the current rate of smoking prevalence. If the
expenditure is assumed to act as a “screw”, the prevalence rate will remain at its current level even though all Quit
Victoria expenditure will cease.
In table 3, evaluation results are presented on the basis of the three sets of
assumptions. The following four evaluation measures are calculated for each set of
assumptions:
(a) Net present value in 1987 prices: the value of the time stream of Quit
Victoria social benefits less the time stream of its costs with both benefits and costs
discounted back to the values in 1987, the year in which Quit Victoria was instituted;
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(b) Net present value in 1999 prices: net present value in 1987 prices con-
verted to 1999 prices by the application of the change in the relevant consumer price
index between 1987 and 1999;
(c) Benefit-cost ratio: the ratio of the present value of Quit Victoria benefits
to the present value of the costs;
(d) Internal rate of return: the discount rate that equates net present value to
zero or the benefit-cost ratio to unity; in effect, the social rate of return generated
by the programme.
Table 3. Social benefits of Quit Victoria
Net present value
(millions of Australian dollars)
Internal rate of
Benefit-cost return
Set of assumptions 1987 prices 1999 prices ratio (percentage)
Most conservative 156 224  5.4 24.1
Least conservative 1 675 2 416 51.1 55.9
Most plausible 632 911 15.8 37.9
Two major conclusions can be drawn from table 3.
(a) The evaluation results are extremely sensitive to the choice of assumption
sets;
(b) Even on the most conservative set of assumptions, expenditure on Quit
Victoria yields extremely high rates of return.
The estimated social benefits of Quit Victoria are high even under the most
conservative analysis. The Quit Victoria programme would yield negative net ben-
efits only if the impact of the programme accounts for no more than 1.5 per cent of
the overall reduction in smoking prevalence over the relevant period. It appears
implausible that the Quit Victoria programme could have such a minimal impact.
The conclusion to be drawn is that it is extremely difficult to conceive of any
other public expenditure, outside the area of public health, that would yield social
rates of return of the same order of magnitude as those of Quit Victoria.
There seems no doubt that expenditure on Quit Victoria to date has yielded, and
will continue to yield, very high social benefits to the residents of Victoria. Presented
below are some of the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis about appro-
priate future policies towards the programme.
Given the steady decline in smoking prevalence rates in Australia over the last
decade, the question that arises is whether there is any reason to believe that it is
possible to reduce smoking prevalence further. It would be necessary to determine
the minimum smoking, or baseline, rate that could be achieved in a fully informed
community at Australia’s stage of economic development.
Perhaps the best indication of the baseline rate of Australia is smoking behav-
iour among general medical practitioners in Australia [12]. Given that zero smoking
prevalence is not achievable, the smoking rates of general practitioners could be
interpreted as the best achievable in a fully informed population. About 9 per cent
of male general practitioners and about 4 per cent of female general practitioners are
Economic evaluation of policies and programmes 35
smokers and only about 4 per cent of doctors under the age of 30 smoke. Surveys
of physicians in the United States of America have shown similar results. About 2-
3 per cent of medical students in Australia smoke. That may be considered to be the
minimum baseline rate, as medical students (because of their age) have all been
exposed to tobacco education prior to their decision to smoke. Those figures com-
pare with an actual prevalence rate in Victoria of 25.3 per cent in 1997.
There is substantial scope for continued improvement in the overall prevalence
rate, especially if the Australian community were to become fully informed about all
relevant aspects of smoking, including not only the health impact of smoking, but
also the highly addictive properties of nicotine.
There seems to be no obvious reason to assume that Australia has, in 2000,
reached the minimum achievable prevalence rate. With regard to such rates, the
“most plausible” evaluation adopted in the present study may well be too conserva-
tive. The case for continued Quit Victoria expenditure is extremely strong. Again,
if the effect of Quit Victoria expenditure is like a spring, the rate of return to future
expenditure would be high, even though it represents a holding operation—prevent-
ing the prevalence rate from rising again. Thus, there seems to be every justification
for continuing the Quit Victoria programmes in the future.
Given the high calculated rate of return on Quit Victoria expenditure, it would
appear that the current level of expenditure on Quit Victoria is far too low. If public
resources are being directed to programmes that yield lower marginal rates of return
than those attributable to Quit Victoria, then it is clear that resources are being
misallocated.
What are the issues to be determined in such a BCA exercise? The following
represents the major issues that arose in the Quit Victoria study:
(a) What the aggregate social costs of abuse of the substance under review
are;
(b) What programme expenditures, both past and future, amount to;
(c) To what extent the reduction in prevalence could be attributed to the
programme;
(d) Whether the effects of anti-abuse programmes are permanent or tempo-
rary (can be likened to a screw or to a spring);
(e) Whether the programme confers externalities on other jurisdictions;
(f) What the optimum size of the programme is;
(g) What future medical costs will be;
(h) How long a period the BCA should cover;
(i) What the time lags between reduced prevalence and reduced costs are;
(j) What the discount rate should be;
(k) What the evaluation criterion should be.
Issues in the economic evaluation of a medically supervised injecting centre
The state of New South Wales in Australia has recently passed legislation to
enable an 18-month trial of a medically supervised injecting centre, to be situated in
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an inner-city area in Sydney with high usage of illicit drugs. Heroin will not be
supplied, so to that extent the role of the centre can be seen as similar to the
provision of clean needles and syringes, as a public health strategy to reduce blood-
borne virus transmission. The trial is to be accompanied by a substantial evaluation
component involving quantifiable measures, including:
(a) Public health (e.g. drug overdose and blood-borne virus transmission);
(b) Health of clients, (e.g. fewer deaths, utilization of treatment services);
(c) Public amenity (e.g. public injecting and disposal of injecting equipment);
(d) Criminal activity;
(e) Economic analysis, including cost analysis.
The evaluation protocol is still being developed. It is anticipated that, when the
centre opens in 2000, it will be accompanied by a comprehensive collection of
clinical, epidemiological and economic data. The evaluation is an example of eco-
nomic data contributing to overall appraisal of a drug policy intervention. The eco-
nomic analysis to be undertaken for the centre can be directly related to the types
of estimates listed in table 1. Firstly, aggregate costs have been used to identify and
quantify the extent of the problem, contributing to the political decision to undertake
the trial. The second type of estimate, avoidable costs, forms an important compo-
nent of the economic evaluation, as the anticipated reduction in costs relating to
ambulance attendances, treatment of blood-borne viruses and overdose deaths are
examples of quantifiable avoidable costs.
The incidence of costs is also relevant to the study. For example, the business
community bears some of the costs of substance abuse, while people who live in
streets where injecting drug users congregate bear certain costs, including reduced
services owing to factors such as public nuisance and lower property values, as the
character of their suburb changes.
CEA, requiring disaggregated costs, will identify the extent of harm minimiza-
tion achieved by the operation of the centre. Some externalities can be anticipated
to be identified during the evaluation of the trial phase. After the initial trial, CEA
may be useful in making informed decisions relating to economic evaluation of
alternative strategies to reduce harm associated with illicit drugs.
The final type of estimate in table 1 is budgetary impact. While expenditure on
government-provided programmes is relevant to that category, there is no revenue
impact, as heroin is illegal and therefore not taxable.
There are a number of economic issues associated with the trial in addition to
those listed in table 1. They include economies of scale (for example, the state of
New South Wales is trialling only one centre while the state of Victoria plans to trial
five centres), substitution of different levels of health professionals that influence
costs (New South Wales, for example, has mandated medical supervision, which is
not required in Victoria), and whether exposure to, and uptake of, treatment pro-
grammes may result in increased costs to public programmes in the short term.
Conclusion
The present article has addressed what is suggested to be the next stage of the
development and use of guidelines concerning the costs of substance abuse. It is
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envisaged that, as those cost estimates become further refined, their use should also
extend into economic evaluation, to enable cost comparisons of policy effectiveness
over time and to facilitate economic appraisals of programmes.
The completed case study of Quit Victoria, a cost-benefit evaluation, provides
one example of the use of disaggregated cost data, which demonstrates high social
benefits from the programme. The second example of economic evaluation, the
medically supervised injecting centre, which is yet to be undertaken, involves a
range of cost data and a range of specified outcome measures. The economic evalu-
ation of the centre will underline the importance of including cost data and economic
criteria in the initial study design.
As economic issues relating to substance abuse and project appraisal of harm
reduction strategies become more prominent in public policy-making, the next stage
of social cost estimation becomes important. If the extensive data inputs and analyti-
cal outputs of studies concerning the costs of substance abuse are not used in project
appraisal, substantial (and expensive) data resources will continue to be under-
utilized.
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ABSTRACT
It is widely recognized that alcohol and drug abuse by workers can adversely
affect their performance and the productivity of the workplace. The specific ways
in which substance abuse can be harmful are well understood. Major elements of
the costs incurred (for example, in lost productivity and earnings of workers and
in deaths at the workplace) are captured in the most recent cost studies, as well
as in the international guidelines for estimating the economic costs of substance
abuse. However, no studies have rigorously measured the full economic burden
on the workplace alone, because of the theoretical and empirical difficulties
arising from the spread of the impact of substance abuse, via the markets, among
employers (through lost profits), workers (through lost earnings and benefits) and
consumers (through higher prices for goods and services). Both employers and
workers recognize the nature of the problem and have worked together through
bodies such as the International Labour Organization to find common solutions
and formulate multilateral policies. Data for the United States of America show
that policies are frequently established at the workplace to reduce alcohol and
drug abuse by workers.
Introduction
It is widely recognized that alcohol abuse by workers can adversely affect their
performance and the productivity of the workplace. The specific ways in which
alcohol abuse can be harmful are fairly easy to understand and their impact can be
readily analysed and quantified.
The cost methodology proposed under the international guidelines for estimat-
ing the economic costs of substance abuse recognizes and takes into account the
impact of alcohol abuse, without providing for a detailed breakdown of workplace
costs. However, recent studies of the cost of alcohol abuse to society have covered
major elements of such costs, including lost productivity and earnings of workers
and deaths at the workplace. In general, published studies that attempt to estimate
the impact of alcohol abuse on the workplace alone have not been available.
The lack of such studies may be due to the major theoretical and empirical
problems associated with attempts to estimate the costs incurred at the workplace as
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a result of alcohol abuse. Employers, as actors in markets for labour, other inputs,
capital and goods and services, play a key role in spreading the impact of alcohol
abuse among employers (lost profits), workers (lost earnings and benefits) and con-
sumers (higher prices for goods and services). The distribution of costs between the
parties cannot be determined by using theoretical concepts, but is subject to market
conditions and the bargaining ability of employers, workers and consumers.
Despite uncertainty about the causal link between alcohol abuse and its appar-
ent economic consequences, both employers and workers recognize the nature of the
problem. They have worked together through bodies such as the International
Labour Organization (ILO) to formulate multilateral policies to address the problem.
Data for the United States of America show that workplaces have largely embraced
policies to reduce alcohol abuse by workers.
The present paper is based on a literature search conducted in the following
databases: ETOH, HealthSTAR, Information on Drugs and Alcohol (IDA),
MEDLINE and Substance Abuse Information Database (SAID). The publications of
the following bodies were also searched: the Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse
(CCSA), the United States Department of Labor, ILO, the National Institute on Drug
Abuse (NIDA), the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA)
and the United States Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA). The databases and lists of publications were searched using various
combinations of the following search terms: cost, economics, employers, employees,
workers, workplace, alcohol and alcoholism.
Economic theory and employee alcohol abuse
Economic theory may be directly applied to analyse the impact of alcohol abuse
by workers in the workplace, as illustrated in figure I. Worker productivity can be
described in terms of the amount and value of the work done. In a market economy,
the wages paid to workers are expected to equal the value of their productivity to
the enterprise. Earnings are by definition the amount of time worked multiplied by
the wages paid per amount of time.
Figure I. Impact of alcohol abuse on the amount
and quality of production
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A review of the literature reveals that alcohol abuse can affect both the amount
of time worked (through absenteeism, tardiness or extended sick leave) and the
productivity of workers (by making them less quality-conscious and more mistake-
prone). The problems experienced by the affected workers may also have an adverse
impact on the productivity of their co-workers and managers. In figure I, lost work
time is reflected in a shift from H0 to H1, and reduced or impaired productivity in
a shift in wages from W0 to W1. Expected productivity is W0 x H0; actual produc-
tivity is W1 x H1. The difference in value represents the performance decline due
to alcohol abuse.
The challenge to management arising from alcohol abuse by workers is to
achieve levels of productivity as close as possible to the expected levels. That means
minimizing lost work and poor productivity due to alcohol abuse. Matters are com-
plicated, however, by the fact that employees miss work and underproduce for a
number of reasons.
Costs to the workplace arise when the actual productivity of workers is less
than expected for a given wage level. However, if a worker that abuses alcohol is
less productive in a job that requires less productivity and pays less, there may be
no difference between expected and actual employee productivity; hence, there is no
cost to the workplace. It is the “hidden” alcohol abusers that cost the workplace
money.
Economic theory notes two further complications (figure II). First, workplaces
generally establish wages based on the value of productivity of all workers in a
group, the average productivity. A group of workers with hidden alcohol abusers has
a lower average productivity because of the few abusers, and the entire group there-
fore receives a lower wage. Thus, the workplace balances expected and actual pro-
ductivity, although at the cost of paying the majority of workers less than the value
of their individual productivity.
Figure II. Redistribution of alcohol-related costs in the workplace
Secondly, should the workplace misread (overestimate) average worker produc-
tivity, the costs would be higher because higher average wages would be paid. The
increased costs may translate into reduced profits for the workplace; however, they
may also cause an increase in the price of the goods and services provided. Thus,
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management failure to recognize productivity problems due to worker alcohol abuse
(or any other factor) will mean either reduced profits or increased prices, or some
combination of the two. The costs of worker alcohol abuse are therefore borne by
workers, consumers and the workplace, and their respective shares are indeter-
minate, theoretically.
Behaviours and outcomes associated with employee alcohol abuse
A review of publications and other materials available from bodies such as the
Department of Labor, ILO and NIDA revealed a range of workplace behaviours
possibly related to alcohol. Employers should be aware of the consequences of
alcohol abuse by workers at the firm level, including [1]: increased absenteeism and
tardiness; increased insurance claims for treatment and services for alcohol abuse
and its various sequelae; increased use of workers’ compensation and sick leave;
developing and implementing a substance abuse policy; testing for alcohol and
drugs; development and administration of an employee assistance programme; acci-
dents and damage; theft and fraud; increased turnover and replacement; diverted
supervisory, managerial and co-worker time; friction among workers; poor decision-
making; damage to a company’s public image; and increased liability.
The above-mentioned consequences of alcohol abuse for the workplace are all
confirmed by the substantial literature on the effects of alcohol on cognition and
performance. The literature is compiled and summarized by NIAAA in publications
such as the tri-yearly report entitled Alcohol and Health and the NIAAA peer-review
journal Alcohol Research and Health (formerly Alcohol Health and Research
World).*
Recent evidence showing the relationship of alcohol abuse to adverse
workplace outcomes such as those enumerated above was collected in the United
States from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA). Table 1
presents data from the 1997 NHSDA on the workplace outcomes and behaviours
that are associated with heavy alcohol use (generally not in the workplace) by
workers.
Table 1. Adverse workplace outcomes reported for 1997 by full-time workers
aged 18 to 49
Employees reporting Employees not reporting
heavy alcohol use heavy alcohol use
Workplace outcome (percentage) (percentage)
Worked for three or more employers in the past year 8.0 4.4
Missed two or more days of work in the past month
due to illness or injury 12.4 8.5
Skipped one or more days of work in the past month 11.3 5.1
Voluntarily left an employer in the past year 19.7 15.8
Fired by an employer in the past year 0.9 1.4
Had a workplace accident in the past year 8.5 5.3
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies, National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse (Washington, D.C., 1997).
*See, in particular, vol. 19, No. 2, on alcohol and cognition (1995).
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A clear increase in adverse workplace outcomes was reported by employees
who were heavy users, defined as drinking five or more drinks on five or more
occasions in the past month. Such outcomes are not unique to alcohol, however. The
higher rates reported by heavy users indicate that they are more likely to have
problems, but it is necessary to study whether the heavy users have other character-
istics that may also be linked to those outcomes, such as their demographic charac-
teristics. In fact, the population of heavy alcohol users is disproportionately com-
posed of young males, who are also at risk of experiencing adverse workplace
outcomes. An analysis will need to adjust for other factors (the attribution factor) to
develop meaningful estimates of the impact of heavy alcohol consumption on
workplace problems.
Alcohol-related job performance problems can be caused not only by
alcohol consumption while on the job (often a cause for dismissal), but also by
heavy drinking when not at work [2]. A 1986 study analysing the “hangover
effect” in airline pilots is frequently cited in the literature [3, 4]. Using a flight
simulator, Yesavage and Leirer studied the performance of airline pilots under
three different alcohol conditions [5]. A single episode of moderate drinking
(leading to an increase in blood alcohol concentration (BAC) to 0.10/100
millilitres) produced a dramatic increase, from 10 to 89 per cent, in the number
of pilots unable to perform all operations correctly. Fourteen hours later, after the
BAC of the pilots had returned to 0.0/100 millilitres, 68 per cent still could not
perform all operations correctly.
Nevertheless, statistics regarding the impact of alcohol abuse on workplace
outcomes must be interpreted with caution. While certain types of behaviour and
outcome (for example, increased accidents) may be attributed, in part, to employee
alcohol abuse, other factors undoubtedly contribute as well. For example, a 1989
study by Bernstein and Mahoney [6] found that up to 40 per cent of industrial
fatalities and 47 per cent of industrial injuries can be linked to alcohol consumption
and alcoholism. Researchers must disentangle the effects of alcohol from the effects
of other factors such as gender, race, ethnicity, age, educational attainment, occupa-
tion and industry. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, in its census of fatal
occupational injuries, reported 28,068 fatal occupational injuries in the United States
from 1992 through 1996. The risk of occupational injury and death varies signifi-
cantly across industries, with mining and quarrying, agriculture, construction, trans-
portation and public utilities all reporting substantially higher rates of unintentional
injuries and deaths [7].
Another example is provided by a large-scale study concerning illicit drug
use and job performance in the United States Postal Service [8]. The authors
concluded that drug use as exhibited by a positive pre-employment test was
significantly associated with turnover, absenteeism and other negative workplace
outcomes. Butler cites the following results from another study conducted within
the United States Postal Service: “Applicants who had tested positive for illicit
drugs were 2.67 times as likely to experience problems requiring employee
assistance programme intervention, 2.44 times as likely to be formally
disciplined, and 1.88 times as likely to accumulate an elevated dollar amount of
medical claims than those who had tested negative for drug use” [3]. All such
outcomes incur costs for the employer, the employee and others. A portion of
the costs may be directly attributed to employee substance abuse. However, a
cost-of-illness study that immediately assigns the full cost to drug abuse is
misleading.
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Prevalence of alcohol abuse among United States workers
NHSDA, conducted annually since 1990 by SAMHSA, is the primary source of
statistical information on the use of alcohol, tobacco and illicit drugs in the United
States. The 1994 and 1997 NHSDA included a special module designed to collect data
on the use of illicit drugs and alcohol by United States workers and on company
policies on drug and alcohol use. An analysis of the 1997 NHSDA was released in 1999
by the SAMHSA Office of Applied Studies [9]. The analysis included the following
findings regarding the prevalence of current heavy alcohol use* among workers
employed in various occupations and establishments of different sizes (see table 2):
(a) Among full-time workers, 6.2 million, or 7.6 per cent, reported current
heavy alcohol use;
(b) Heavy alcohol use was more common among 18- to 25-year-olds (11.7
per cent), males (11.1 per cent), Hispanics (9.8 per cent) and whites (8.1 per cent),
those with less than a high school education (14.7 per cent), and those who reported
personal income of $9,000-$19,999 (9.4 per cent);
(c) Workers in medium-size establishments (25-499 employees) reported the
highest rate of heavy alcohol use (8.3 per cent);
(d) Current heavy alcohol use varied across occupational categories, the high-
est rates being accounted for by food preparation workers, waiters, waitresses and
bartenders (15 per cent); handlers, helpers and labourers (13.5 per cent); and con-
struction workers (12.4 per cent).
Table 2. Current heavy alcohol use among full-time United States workers aged 18
to 49, 1994 and 1997
Percentage of heavy alcohol users
Item 1994 1997
Establishment size
1-24 employees 9.6 7.0
25-499 employees 7.9 8.3
Over 500 employees 7.3 7.4
Occupational category
Food preparation, waiters, bartenders 12.2 15.0
Handlers, helpers, labourers 15.7 13.5
Construction 17.6 12.4
Precision production and repair 13.1 11.6
Other services 5.1 11.4
Transportation and materials moving 13.1 10.8
Machine operators and inspectors 13.5 9.0
Protective services 6.3 7.8
Executive, administrative, managerial 6.5 7.1
Extraction and precision production 12.9 5.5
Technicians and related support 6.2 5.1
Administrative support 3.5 5.1
Professionals (specialists) 4.4 4.4
Sales 8.3 4.1
Source: SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (Washington, D.C.,
1994 and 1997).
*Heavy alcohol use is defined as consuming five or more alcoholic beverages on the same occasion
on five or more occasions in the past 30 days.
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It is clear that many people who abuse alcohol are employed. Though the rate
varies across establishment size, occupational categories and regions, all employers
are vulnerable to the adverse effects of employee alcohol abuse. The first step that
employers can take to mitigate the impact of alcohol abuse in the workplace is to
understand and recognize what the impact is.
Workplace efforts to reduce employee alcohol abuse
Workplaces in the United States generally take specific measures to prevent or
discourage employee alcohol abuse. Recent workplace surveys have found that em-
ployers (in particular medium- and large-scale employers) have several policies or
services intended for that purpose. They include the distribution of basic educational
and information materials, the provision of employee assistance programmes and
insurance for treatment of alcoholism, policies to counter alcohol abuse and even the
testing of workers for improper use of alcohol.
The United States Department of Labor [1] suggests a five-part programme to
control substance abuse in the workplace. Each component is also found in the
recommendations established by ILO, including the following: a written substance
abuse policy; an employee education and awareness programme; a supervisor train-
ing programme; an employee assistance programme; and drug- and alcohol-testing,
as appropriate.
Employer efforts to prevent or reduce the incidence of substance abuse among
employees vary by establishment size and industry (see table 3). In general, the
Table 3. Workplace policies covering full-time United States workers
aged 18 to 49, 1997
(Percentage)
Information about drug Written policy about Employee assistance
Item and alcohol use drug and alcohol use programme
Establishment size
1-24 employees 50.7 45.9 26.8
25-499 employees 87.1 84.6 60.6
Over 500 employees 92.3 90.4 75.4
Occupational category
Protective services 95.2 92.6 79.7
Transportation and materials moving 85.9 83.3 46.5
Extraction and precision production 85.5 81.5 65.0
Technicians and related support 78.6 75.3 61.7
Administrative support 81.4 77.7 54.7
Machine operators and inspectors 79.6 76.3 52.7
Precision production and repair 75.3 72.4 48.4
Professionals (specialists) 75.2 72.4 56.4
Handlers, helpers, labourers 71.7 70.0 51.3
Executive, administrative, managerial 71.5 70.3 49.7
Other services 67.1 62.8 36.2
Food preparation, waiters, bartenders 66.8 63.4 26.5
Sales 62.2 59.3 43.3
Construction 60.0 55.6 30.3
Source: SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (Washington, D. C.,
1997).
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larger the establishment, the more likely it is: (a) to provide information about
alcohol and drug use; (b) to have a written policy about drug and alcohol use; (c)
to offer an employee assistance programme; and (d) to test current employees or
applicants for alcohol use [1, 10, 11]. In 1997, in the occupational categories in
which employers were most likely to offer information about, and to have a written
policy on, drug and alcohol use, the percentage that did so for drugs and alcohol,
respectively, were: in protective services, 95.2 and 92.6 per cent; in transportation
and the moving of materials, 85.9 and 83.3 per cent; and in extraction and precision
production, 85.5 and 81.5 per cent [9]. The occupational categories in which em-
ployers were most likely to offer an employee assistance programme were protective
services (79.7 per cent), extraction and precision production (65 per cent) and tech-
nicians and related support (61.7 per cent).
Workplace testing for alcohol use, though still less common than other policies
for dealing with alcohol abuse, is increasing in prevalence. A national survey of
workplaces conducted in 1995 found that 21.7 per cent tested applicants and 28.4
per cent tested current employees (see table 4).
Table 4. National estimate of alcohol testing among private non-agricultural
workplaces by size, industry and census region, 1995
(Percentage)
Workplace with testing programmes, by test group
Applicants and
Characteristics Applicants Current employees current employees
All workplaces 21.7 28.4 36.0
Workplace size
50-99 employees 19.2 25.0 31.4
100-249 employees 19.7 26.8 33.6
250-999 employees 26.5 34.1 42.9
Over 1,000 employees 33.3 40.0 55.2
Industry
Manufacturing 33.7 38.1 49.5
Wholesale/retail 19.4 26.3 33.1
Communications, utilities, transportation 30.3 47.4 52.7
Finance, insurance, real estate 5.8 7.3 11.0
Mining and construction 29.3 39.0 45.5
Services 13.3 20.2 26.5
Source: [10].
Alcohol testing programmes can be divided into two main types: conditional and
unconditional [10]. Conditional testing consists of assessments conducted for certain
employees, taking into account factors such as an accident or the determination of
reasonable cause. Unconditional testing includes random and regular assessments that
any employee may be required to undergo regardless of job performance or behav-
iour. On the whole, conditional testing is more prevalent than unconditional testing.
Within workplaces that conduct conditional testing, 73.9 per cent reported testing
employees following an accident and 77.9 per cent reported testing after establishing
reasonable cause. Among workplaces conducting unconditional testing, random test-
ing (48.4 per cent) is far more prevalent than regular testing (12.4 per cent).
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Though alcohol testing continues to increase in prevalence, very few alcohol-
testing programmes exist in workplaces that do not also test for illicit drugs. Further-
more, alcohol testing rarely occurs as a single strategy to reduce employee alcohol
abuse. Testing programmes almost always occur in conjunction with formal policies
and employee assistance programmes [10, 11].
Alcohol testing, on its own, is considered to be an ineffective and misleading
way for an employer to combat employee alcohol abuse. A positive alcohol test does
not necessarily indicate impairment. Testing programmes should be implemented in
conjunction with a formal written policy that establishes the purpose for testing,
rules, regulations, rights and responsibilities of all the parties concerned [3, 10, 12].
The data clearly show that employers take the problem of alcohol abuse among
employees very seriously. The majority of employers, especially in large work-
places, have some form of substance abuse policy or programme. Employers have
not had the opportunity to base their decisions to develop and implement substance
abuse policies on empirical evidence. There is an abundance of material showing the
prevalence of alcohol abuse among employees and its impact on the workplace.
Such data are available at both the national and industry level [3, 9, 12]. In general,
however, there is a lack of data for an analysis of the impact of alcohol abuse on
specific workplaces and on the employers concerned.
Can employers measure the cost of employee alcohol abuse?
While employers have access to a wealth of information regarding the preva-
lence of alcohol and other drug use among workers, most estimates of the prevalence
and consequences (including the cost) of alcohol and other drug use are derived
from large surveys of households, such as NHSDA [9]. While information at the
national level is useful, employers must base policy decisions regarding employee
substance use and abuse on assessed needs in their own workplaces. Estimates of
prevalence and cost at the national level may be of little use to employers in deciding
on policy at the workplace or company level. Table 2 shows that rates of employee
alcohol abuse vary widely across occupational categories, regions and demographic
characteristics. At the very least, employers should take into account the basic
demographic make-up of their workforce, determined by such factors as gender, age
and educational attainment, as well as industry and occupational category, when
assessing data at the national level.
The literature provides few examples of the cost of alcohol abuse in specific
companies and workplaces. The vast majority of the literature on alcohol and other
drug abuse in the workplace pertains to incidence and prevalence rather than evalu-
ations of cost [3, 9, 13, 14]. Several studies have relied on self-reporting of alcohol
and drug use and related workplace outcomes through employee surveys [13, 14].
Employee surveys can be valuable because workers are in the best position to assess
the problem, provided that steps are taken to ensure the anonymity and confidenti-
ality of reported results [15].
A 1995 study by French and others not only measured the prevalence of smok-
ing, alcohol, illicit drug use and prescription drug use, but also reported workplace
consequences such as reduced performance and absenteeism [13]. The study used an
employee survey administered to more than 1,200 randomly selected employees at
five different workplaces (manufacturing services, manufacturing, municipal Gov-
ernment, financial services and health-care services). The survey asked employees
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whether their drinking and related problems (such as a hangover, an illness or an
accident) had caused any of the following workplace consequences: poor perform-
ance, tardiness or leaving work early, absence, accident and injury, being high at
work and needing emergency care. At three of the five workplaces, approximately
20 per cent of the drinkers reported poor performance attributable to the effects of
alcohol during the past year. Fewer than 10 per cent of drinkers at each site indicated
that they had been tardy or absent, or that they had left work early because of
alcohol use. None of the respondents reported being hurt at work in an accident due
to alcohol use, and less than 1 per cent at each site revealed that they had been high
at work during the past year.
While the authors do not attempt to estimate the costs of employee drinking,
they do use an employee survey to assess the workplace consequences. From a
policy perspective, the value of the work of French and others is that it presents
empirical results from a unique and relatively small data sample. More studies of
that kind would assist employers in measuring the impact on performance and pos-
sibly the costs of substance abuse in the workplace.
In 1988, the American Productivity and Quality Center, a non-profit body that
works with organizations to improve productivity and quality, undertook a research
project funded by the United States Department of Labor [1]. The purpose of the
project was to determine whether the costs associated with substance abuse in the
workplace could be tracked. On the basis of discussions with and reviews by experts
from organizations such as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, the National Academy of Sciences, NIAAA, NIDA and the
Social Security Administration, the research team developed a “total costs model”
that organizations could use to calculate both direct and indirect costs. The model
requires the collection both of objective financial data and of more subjective per-
formance data. The data collected were the costs incurred in dealing with the con-
sequences of alcohol abuse listed above in the section entitled “Behaviours and
outcomes associated with employee alcohol abuse”. The only items not covered in
the data collected were the increased use of workers’ compensation and sick leave;
friction among workers; poor decision-making; damage to a firm’s public image;
and increased liability. The performance data were collected via two subjective
employee surveys. Sample questions included the following: “From your observa-
tions, how do substance abuse problems interfere with job performance?”; and
“Have you observed substance abusers having any of the following problems:
missed deadlines, excessive mistakes, decreased efficiency, etc.?”
Three companies agreed to conduct a pilot test of the model, without having
full access, in each case, to all of the data included in the model. However, the
research team refined the model to make it adaptable to different types of organiza-
tion with different data capabilities. The companies that tested the model indicated
that it provided valuable information upon which to base future cost-benefit esti-
mates. Two of the three companies indicated that they would continue to use the
model. On the basis of the pilot test of the model, the research team concluded that
the costs typically tracked by employers are only the tip of the iceberg. While the
model proved to be a good way for the three companies that tested it to assess the
impact of substance abuse on their workplaces, certain types of impact and costs still
need to be measured. The data collected usually fail to capture the so-called ripple
effect, that is, “costs incurred when mistakes are made by substance abusers and
problems and/or errors then occur down the line or ripple throughout the rest of the
organization” ([1], p. 65).
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The model has several limitations. The way in which the performance data are
collected could bias individual responses. The model calls for collecting data about
the job performance of employees from supervisors in an interview format. Data
collected in such a manner are inherently subjective and thus difficult to aggregate
and compare across companies. In addition, a small sample size of only three com-
panies, with an unknown number of employees being interviewed at each company
for performance data, makes it impossible to generalize from conclusions drawn
about the usefulness of the total costs model.
The total costs model was the only one of its kind found in the literature
reviewed. Although some organizations may not have all the required data at their
disposal, such a model would provide valuable guidance to employers in evaluating
the cost of substance abuse in their workplaces.
Workplace costs and international guidelines
The international guidelines for estimating the economic costs of substance
abuse [16] are designed to cover the types of cost that result from worker abuse of
alcohol. Table 5 shows the relationship between the major cost categories of the
guidelines and a range of specific impacts identified in the literature review. Most
of the impacts fit into the major cost categories of the guidelines.
Despite the conceptual fit, there are two problems. First, some of the specific
impacts have not yet been evaluated in cost-of-illness studies. For a variety of
reasons, such as lack of data and limited resources, studies have not yet determined
those costs. That applies, in particular, to workplace-specific costs, such as those
arising from absenteeism and tardiness, increased turnover and replacement, diverted
co-worker and managerial time and friction among workers.
Table 5. Cost categories, international guidelines and estimating the impacts
of alcohol abuse
International guideline Impacts dealt with in the literature
(cost category) (cost category)
Consequences to health Increased insurance claims for alcohol abuse treatment and
services and for the various sequelae of alcohol abuse
Prevention, research etc. Development and administration of an employee assistance
programme
Premature mortality Accidents and damage
Lost employment or productivity Increased absenteeism and tardiness; increased use of
workers’ compensation and sick leave; increased turnover and
replacement; diverted supervisory, managerial and co-worker
time; friction among workers; and poor decision-making
Property destruction (fire, accident) Accidents and damage and increased liability
Legal consequences Theft and fraud
Outside the guidelines Developing and implementing a substance abuse policy and
testing for alcohol or drug abuse
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Secondly, the costs may have been subsumed under broader estimation catego-
ries and dealt with, in whole or in part, in recent cost-of-illness studies. For example,
the costs of workplace accidents are generally included in the costs of the following:
all accidents, injuries and trauma; health care; lost work due to morbidity, disability
and premature death; and property destruction.
Another factor that must be taken into account in carrying out studies in differ-
ent countries is the difference in economic and social systems. In some countries, for
example, health services are paid for in part by insurance provided at the workplace
(often with cost-sharing by the workers), while in others, national health systems are
financed through payroll taxes and other tax revenues. Thus, issues related to the
burden or location of costs need to be understood before workplace costs can be
estimated.
Conclusion
There is ample evidence that alcohol problems have major impacts beyond the
workplace. A wide range of such impacts have been studied and their costs esti-
mated, but even more remain to be considered. Studies based on the international
guidelines for estimating the costs of substance abuse capture many of the costs of
workplace alcohol abuse, even though a detailed breakdown and analysis of work-
place costs may not be provided.
In general, the available published studies fail to estimate the costs of alcohol
abuse specifically related to the workplace, in particular those that fall upon employ-
ers. The studies of costs to society include important components of costs beyond
the workplace, but they explicitly refrain from attributing specific amounts to work-
places and, in particular, to employers.
Economic theory shows that it is very difficult and potentially meaningless to
develop estimates of the cost of alcohol problems for a particular workplace or
population of workers. That is because the impacts felt and costs incurred beyond
the workplace are shared or redistributed in uncertain proportions between employ-
ers, workers, customers and consumers.
Alcohol abuse by workers is clearly a matter of great concern to employers in
the United States, most of whom have established policies, services, benefits or
initiatives dealing with the issue. Such efforts are designed to counter the potential
economic harm caused by alcohol in the workplace and by its negative impact on
the efficiency, quality and costs of the business organization.
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ABSTRACT
A research programme in Canada is aimed at estimating attributable fractions for
the use of alcohol and illicit drugs in relation to crime. Analyses from two studies
of new inmates in federal penitentiaries are presented, the first based on a com-
puter-driven questionnaire completed by 8,598 inmates and the second on inter-
views with 477 inmates. One method used in the estimation combined the follow-
ing three models linking psychoactive substances to criminal behaviour: the
intoxication model, the economic model and the systemic model. Data pertaining
to the first two models were used to illustrate this method. Consistency checks
showed that crime events attributed to illicit drugs or alcohol were concordant
with the inmate being addicted to a substance, and with the inmates’ overall
assessments of drugs or alcohol on their criminality. Issues discussed include
validity, the extent to which findings can be generalized and the advantages and
drawbacks of basing attributable fraction estimates on data from self-reports on
individual crime events.
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Introduction
The present article outlines the steps taken to arrive at estimates of attributable
fractions for drugs and alcohol in relation to crime in Canada. In particular, the
article looks at a method that will enable estimates to be made for important sub-
groups of the population and different types of drugs and types of crimes.
Some of the empirical studies needed for making overall estimates are still at
the fieldwork stage, and therefore no final estimates can be made. However, the
following is presented: (a) the method; (b) its conceptual background; (c) some
findings that will lead up to the estimates; and (d) some methods used for checking
the robustness (the internal consistency) of the estimates. Some preliminary calcu-
lations that give an indication of the range of attributable fractions for federal in-
mates in Canada are also provided.
The empirical material available for the estimates in the present article is lim-
ited to information on inmates in federal prisons in Canada. In all probability, that
population incurs costs to society far beyond its numerical size. For a full cost
accounting, however, data on drug and alcohol use and criminality patterns in other
populations is also needed, in particular with regard to individuals arrested for a
variety of crimes and inmates in provincial prisons, who generally have committed
less serious crimes than federal inmates have.
Conceptual background
Any estimation procedure for the causal contribution of psychoactive sub-
stances on crime is based on key conceptual assumptions. These assumptions are
based on findings from past empirical research in the field. Applying the conceptual
frames to social reality requires data that allow assessments regarding how applica-
ble alternative causal models are. Because such conceptually relevant data have been
missing, researchers have sometimes refrained from making any estimates on the
crime component in the social costs of alcohol and illicit drugs. This has been the
case for recent social cost estimates in Canada. In other studies, estimates have been
based on questionable conceptual and empirical assumptions.
The starting point for the present calculations is to use the following three
models, which assign different causal roles to drugs and alcohol in relation to crime:
(a) the pharmacological or intoxication model; (b) the economic means model; and (c)
the illegal system model. The models used are a tripartite collection that Goldstein
used for classifying drug-related violence. In addition, in the fourth model in the
series, some crimes are alcohol-related or drug-related by legal definition. However,
they are solidly based on empirical findings from research on a variety of crimes.
The intoxication model attributes a direct causal role to a substance used at the
time of a crime. The assumption is that intoxication made, or helped make, the
individual commit an illegal act that he or she would not otherwise have committed.
In the study of the effects of alcohol, this model is often referred to as a “disinhibition”
model. It has been used frequently in various estimations of the role of alcohol on
crime, specifically in calculating attributable fractions linked to violent crime. Since
no other information has been available regarding the causal role of alcohol, it has
been assumed that all crimes in which the perpetrator had been drinking were caused
by drinking, that is, that if the perpetrator of the violent crime had not been intoxicated
at the time, he or she would not have committed the crime. With one important
Attributable fractions for alcohol and illicit drugs in relation to crime in Canada 55
modification, this model is also used as part of the four model conceptual frame for
estimating attributable fractions for drugs and alcohol on crime.
The second causal model used, the economic means model (or, in Goldstein’s
terms, the economic-compulsive model) pertains mainly to the role of drugs and to
a much lesser extent to alcohol, as motivators in predominantly acquisitive crimes.
Psychoactive substances serve as incentives for a person to commit a crime so that
they will get money or other means for acquiring drugs or alcohol.
The third causal model, the systemic model, concerns crimes that were commit-
ted, for example, in the course of selling drugs, collecting drug debts and conflicts
over drug territory. If it can be assumed that the individual would not have commit-
ted these crimes had he or she not been involved in the illegal economy, the crime
can be considered to be caused by the drug being present as a commodity within a
system of illegal transactions and enforcement methods.
The fourth, the substance-defined model, is not a causal one, but represents a
tautological connection with alcohol and drug use. The crimes in this category are
included on the basis of laws regulating alcohol and drugs in society. Drinking and
driving is by far the most common of the alcohol-defined crimes. Several drug-related
offences, such as the manufacture, smuggling and trafficking of drugs, are included
in the category of drug-defined crimes. Possession and use of most illicit drugs are also
defined as criminal acts in many countries and would be covered by this model. (The
present estimates are limited to the population of federal inmates, therefore few cases
of minor drug crimes will appear in the estimates.) These will be added as the fourth
stage of the construction of the composite attributable fraction model.
Some overlap can be expected between the positive cases in the four models in
any population. A certain proportion of individuals who committed a crime under
drug intoxication were also driven by the motive to get more drugs for personal use,
for instance (so as to prevent their supply from running out). In a similar way, some
individuals who used violence to collect a drug debt for themselves or for someone
else in the distribution chain did so in order to get drugs or the means to buy drugs
for personal use. If there is a great deal of overlap between the positive cases from
the three models, it can be inferred that any one of the models would have provided
a good approximation of the attributable fraction. More importantly, however, a
great deal of overlap is also an internal confirmation of the validity of the combined
measure.
Individual-level versus aggregate-level data
As shown below, it is possible with the right kind of data to use aggregate-level
data to calculate attributable fractions for some factors on crime. Time series analy-
ses have been used for this purpose. However, they require relatively valid data that
has been collected over lengthy periods of time. Such data exist for alcohol but do
not exist for illegal drugs. For illicit drugs, aggregate-level analyses cannot therefore
be used for calculating attributable fractions.
Aggregate-level data have certain weaknesses for the purpose of causal attribu-
tion. They are dependent on the availability of data on other potential causative
factors to be used as controls. Even for alcohol consumption, no statistical series
exist on alcohol use in different subgroups. Using this method, it is therefore not
possible to calculate attributable fractions for alcohol on, for example, crimes com-
mitted by those under the age of 30 and over, or for men versus women.
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Using individual-level data for estimation makes it possible to distinguish indi-
vidual cases from non-cases on attributable fraction variables. This means that attrib-
utable fractions can very easily be arrived at, for example, for different types of crimes
or for different subgroups of offenders. Given a large enough sample of perpetrators
or crime events, estimates can be obtained of what proportion of violent crimes among
perpetrators under 30 years of age were attributable to alcohol or drugs.
The greatest drawback of individual-level data is that they must be collected by
special studies. In addition, much of the information has to be based on self-reports,
and it is known that self-reports may be unreliable. The questions generally concern
past behaviour with a risk for memory lapses. In the case of sensitive information,
social desirability may affect the validity of the information given.
The present data are based on information about inmates in federal penitentia-
ries. All information (all the sample units) represents cases on the dependent vari-
able: there are no individuals in the sample who did not commit a crime and who
could serve as controls for analyses assigning an explanatory value to independent
variables, such as alcohol or drug use, or risk calculations linked to alcohol and
drugs. This places restrictions on the type of analyses that can be made.
The ideal type of study, which would allow a flawless estimation of attributable
fractions, may be easily specified in theory but, at the present time at least, is
impossible to conduct in practice. The choice is between methods that are all lacking
in some respects. The choice depends primarily on the data available for the purpose
and the modelling preferences of the researchers.
The empirical studies in the research programme
Two studies are used for estimation in the present article: the Computerized
Lifestyle Assessment Instrument (CLAI) data made available by the Correctional
Service of Canada (CSC) and interviews with 477 male inmates in federal prisons
in Ontario and Quebec (the Pathway study). The latter study was specifically con-
ducted for the estimations of the project. In some respects, the studies complement
each other and in other respects they support alternative estimation methods. If the
alternative estimates are within a tolerable range of differences, confidence in their
robustness is strengthened.
Data collection has been completed in a third study relevant to assigning an
attributable fraction for alcohol and illicit drugs in relation to crime in Canada:
information on arrests made in 24 locations in Canada during a one-month period
(1-31 May 2000). These data were collected by police officers and are based on
information available at the time of the arrest. Most sites were selected on the basis
of a stratification of communities in Canada according to population size: (a) two
megacities (with populations of over 1 million); (b) three large cities (with
populations of between 500,000 and 1 million); (c) three medium-sized cities (with
populations of between 250,000 and 500,000); (d) six small cities (with populations
of between 100,000 and 250,000); and (e) ten other communities of interest. Within
categories (b), (c) and (d), sites have been selected on the basis of statistical infor-
mation on their overall crime rate: one characterized by a relatively high crime rate,
one with a medium rate and one with a low crime rate. (Such stratification was not
possible in the “megacity” category.) Data from the study of arrestees add informa-
tion on another population of relevance to the connections between drugs, alcohol
and crime.
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Three smaller-scale studies were later added to the research programme for the
purpose of extending descriptive and causal objectives to other key populations:
interviews with 100 male inmates in provincial prisons; interviews with 100 male
provincial probationers; and interviews with 100 female inmates in provincial
prisons.
Information on the crime and substance use patterns of provincial inmates and
probationers is important because criminality differs between these two populations
and the federal inmates who are the subject of the present article. Convicted crimi-
nals with a sentence of at least two years’ imprisonment serve their sentences in
federal penitentiaries, those with a lesser prison sentence serve their time in provin-
cial custody.
The Computerized Lifestyle Assessment Instrument and the Pathway studies
The Computerized Lifestyle Assessment Instrument study
The Computerized Lifestyle Assessment Instrument (CLAI) is both a diagnostic
tool and a survey instrument used by the Correctional Service of Canada. It is
administered to all federal inmates upon admission to an assessment centre, prior to
their being sent to an institution. CLAI helps in taking into account treatment and
other individual needs of the inmate. There are detailed questions on alcohol and
drug use and criminal activities. Such details make the database uniquely suitable for
some of the purposes of the present article.
The data are collected by means of a computer-driven questionnaire: the in-
mates enter responses to questions that appear on a computer screen. It takes an
average of two hours to fill out the questionnaire.
The data collection on the CLAI started in 1990. Over the years, an increasing
number of penitentiaries have contributed information to the computer file. In the
file to which the authors have access, there is information on close to 17,000 in-
mates. The best geographical coverage is for the period 1993-1995 and has been
selected for the present analyses (N=8598). However, the differences between the
total file and the subfile are generally negligible.
The Pathway study
In this study, 477 inmates were interviewed at regional reception centres in
Ontario and Quebec. The data were collected between September 1999 and January
2000 in Ontario and between February and December 1999 in Quebec. The most
central data collection instrument of the study was a calendar used in charting the
36 most recent months in the inmate’s life prior to arrest. The focus was on several
aspects of the relationship between drug and alcohol use and criminal behaviour.
Much of this information was not available in the CLAI data.
The Pathway study also incorporated central questions from the CLAI on the
inmate’s drug and alcohol use and criminality. It included the same tests for depend-
ence on alcohol (the Alcohol Dependence Scale) and drugs (the Drug Addiction
Severity Test), enabling an aggregate-level reliability check of estimates made from
the two studies.
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Differences between the CLAI and the Pathway studies
A major difference between the studies is that the CLAI drew its population
from all five regions of the Correctional Service in Canada (Atlantic, Ontario,
Pacific, Prairie and Quebec), while the Pathway study was carried out on inmates in
the Ontario and Quebec regions only. The decision to limit that study to the two
regions was made for financial reasons. Analyses will be conducted to determine
what effect the difference in geographical base of the inmate populations may have
for the results and how any biases can be corrected.
The time periods of data collection also differ. As was pointed out above,
information from 1993-1995 has been used to arrive at the CLAI estimates in the
present article. The Pathway data, on the other hand, were collected an average of
five to six years later. Analyses of the CLAI data from the Quebec region (which
has been providing data regularly since the early 1990s) showed very small differ-
ences in drug-use patterns among inmates over a period of six years.
The selection procedure for federal inmates in the two studies was about the
same, although the CLAI study was a census (with some attrition), while the Path-
way study used a random sampling procedure to select incoming inmates to the
study. A sampling procedure was necessary because the inflow of new prisoners was
greater than what could be handled by two interviewers, which was the maximum
number possible for logistical reasons. In both studies, the inmates participated in the
interview about two weeks into their stay at the reception centres.
Reasons for attrition in the Pathway interviews at the Ontario and Quebec
reception centres are shown in table 1. The response rate in the Ontario part of
the study, calculated out of those who were contacted for an interview, was
84.8 per cent. The corresponding figure for the Quebec part of the study was
78.9 per cent.
Table 1. Pathway study: sample attrition and response rates in Ontario and Quebec
Response rates
Subjects Ontario Quebec
Total sampled 342 419
Not eligible 10 44
Not available 35 90
Approached 297 285
Refused 44 56
Interrupted 1 4
Interviewed 252 225
Response rate (percentage) 84.8 78.9
As was mentioned above, the main data collection instrument of the Pathway
study is a 36-month calendar onto which a monthly record of drug-use patterns and
criminality was recorded. Whereas the CLAI instrument only asked for crime-
specific information on alcohol and drug use in connection with the most serious
crime on the present sentence, the calendar instrument asked for this information on
all self-reported crimes over a three-year period. Many of these crimes have re-
mained undetected by authorities. The great number of crime episodes and the
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longer reference period, among several other features, adds to the power of the
analyses that can be performed on the Pathway data.
While the CLAI data were entered by the inmate in response to questions and
response alternatives appearing on a computer screen, the calendar data were filled
in by the interviewer while she (all research assistants on the study were women),
together with the respondent, consulted the calendar in order to place occurrences in
the correct time period on the calendar. Other data collection instruments in the
Pathway study were filled out as a write-in questionnaire by the inmate, although he
was allowed to ask questions on the meaning of questions, for example. Most of the
interview session was spent on the calendar.
The relationship between estimates and possible biases
Comparisons between the CLAI and the Pathway studies must take into account
that they pertain to somewhat different geographical areas and to time periods that
are five to six years apart on average. In the CLAI data from the period 1993-1995,
37 per cent of the new inmates had been admitted in the Ontario region and 40 per
cent in the Quebec region. Thus, approximately 23 per cent of inmates in the CLAI
data file are from outside the two regions. A correction factor will be used in
generalizing findings from the Pathway study to the total federal inmate population
in Canada.*
Three major limitations remain, even with the corrections outlined above:
(a) All the estimates presented in the present article pertain to inmates in
federal prisons in Canada only. Generalizations to similar populations should be
made with great caution. Separate studies will be carried out on provincial prisoners
and individuals who have been arrested for a crime (as was mentioned above);
(b) All the estimates presented here pertain to male offenders only. The Path-
way study was carried out on male inmates exclusively. The Correctional Service of
Canada collects CLAI data on both male and female inmates. However, the CLAI
file to which the authors have access currently does not contain data on female
prisoners. Female inmates make up only about 2 per cent of the federal inmate
population, and special characteristics of this group would have a negligible effect
on the overall estimates pertaining to the federal inmate population;
(c) All the findings in the CLAI and the Pathway studies were based on
information provided by the inmates themselves. Giving of false information cannot
be ruled out, and memory lapses may also play a part. This, of course, is a shortcoming
common to much of the social-survey-type research in sensitive areas of study.
Constructing the estimates
The intoxication model data
Some of the questions in the CLAI study were used in the Pathway study, partly
for the purpose of replicating the questions with a different data collection method.
*Preliminary findings indicate that the attributable fraction on crime for alcohol and the combined use
of drugs and alcohol is considerably higher in western Canada than in Ontario and Quebec, while the
fraction for drugs only is very similar between those regions.
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Crime-specific information on drugs and alcohol use was available for the most
serious crime on the inmate’s current sentence. The proportions of inmates who were
under the influence of a substance when committing such a crime are as follows:
Associative fractions from intoxication model
CSC-CLAI Pathway-CLAI
Drugs 0.16 0.20
Alcohol 0.21 0.19
Drugs and alcohol 0.13 0.14
No substance 0.50 0.47
Total 1.00 1.00
These figures correspond to the one-model estimates of attributable fractions
sometimes used in social cost calculations. If a restricted focus is maintained on the
attributional fraction for alcohol on crime, an attributional fraction of 0.34
(0.21+0.13) would be arrived at, on the basis of the CSC study, and 0.33 on the basis
of the Pathway study. For drugs, the fractions would be 0.29 and 0.34 respectively.
It should be noted, however, that a large portion of the cases for drugs and alcohol
overlap. The main difference in the estimates from the two studies is a 25 per cent
higher attributable fraction for drugs in the Pathway study.
According to the CSC study, cocaine had been used prior to the crime by 9 per
cent of the inmates, cannabis by 3 per cent and heroin by 2 per cent. In addition,
cocaine in combination with alcohol had been used prior to the crime by 5 per cent,
cannabis with alcohol by 3 per cent and other drugs with alcohol by 5 per cent of
the inmates. (Heroin had not been used with alcohol.) These figures will later be
used in constructing four-model attributable fractions for cocaine, cannabis and
heroin.
Among the individuals who were under the influence of any of these sub-
stances, the following proportions of inmates said that they would not have commit-
ted the crime if they had not been under the influence:
Intoxication crimes attributed to alcohol and drugs by the perpetrators
(Percentage)
CSC-CLAI Pathway-CLAI
Drugs 77 66
Alcohol 79 70
Drugs and alcohol 86 74
By multiplication, the part of the attributable fraction contributed by the intoxi-
cation model is obtained as shown by the following figures:
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Corrected associative fractions from intoxication model
CSC-CLAI Pathway-CLAI
Drugs 0.13 0.14
Alcohol 0.16 0.13
Drugs and alcohol 0.11 0.10
No substance 0.60 0.63
Total 1.00 1.00
These figures pertain to the most serious crime on the inmates’ current sen-
tence. They will later be adjusted based on available information regarding all the
crimes on the inmates’ current sentence.
The comparison between the two sets of estimates gives an indication of the
robustness of the estimates in the face of different data collection methods (compu-
ter-driven questionnaire in the CLAI versus personal interview situation in the Path-
way study). The estimates from the two studies are fairly similar, considering that
they are based on partly different regional populations and different time periods.
The economic model data
In response to questions on the role of alcohol and drugs as motivators for the
most serious crime, such as “Was this crime committed to get or while trying to get
alcohol/drugs for your own personal use?”, the following proportions of inmates
reported that such was the case:
Associative fractions from economic model
CSC-CLAI Pathway-CLAI
Drugs 0.12 0.15
Alcohol 0.03 0.03
Drugs and alcohol 0.06 0.05
No substance 0.79 0.77
Total 1.00 1.00
The data show that illicit drugs are greater motivators for crime than is alcohol,
as expected: 12 per cent of the inmates in the CSC study and 15 per cent in the
Pathway study stated that they had committed the most serious crime on the current
sentence in order to get drugs for their personal use, while the percentage for alcohol
was 3 per cent. Combined use as a cause of crime was evident also in this context,
with 6 per cent and 5 per cent of inmates stating that the crime was committed in
order to obtain both alcohol and drugs for personal use. Expressed as a total share,
alcohol was at least a partial motivator in 9 per cent in the CSC study (3 per cent
+ 6 per cent) (compared with 8 per cent in the Pathway study) of the most serious
crimes committed, while this was true for double that share (6 per cent + 12 per cent)
(compared with 20 per cent in the Pathway study) in the case of illicit drugs. There
is considerable agreement between the estimates from the two studies, which adds
confidence to the reliability of the estimates.
62 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LII, Nos. 1 and 2, 2000
With a starting point in the intoxication model, the importance of the economic
factor will depend on the number of cases it adds to those already identified by the
former model. The findings presented in table 2 indicate that the additional contri-
bution of the economic factor is rather modest.
Table 2. Perpetrators who committed the crime in order to get alcohol or drugs
according to whether they were on alcohol or drugs at the time of the crime (CSC-CLAI)
(Percentage)
On alcohol
Subjects On alcohol and drugs On drugs On neither
To get alcohol 10.6 3.6 0.3 0.2
To get drugs 1.8 12.8 56.1 1.9
To get drugs and alcohol 6.3 25.4 9.1 0.7
To get neither 81.4 58.3 34.5 97.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Combining the two models, the corrected intoxication model and the economic
model gives the following estimates from the two sets of CLAI data:
Associative fractions from combined intoxication-economic model
CSC-CLAI Pathway-CLAI
Drugs 0.13 0.17
Alcohol 0.15 0.13
Drugs and alcohol 0.14 0.12
No substance 0.58 0.58
Total 1.00 1.00
The estimates based on the CSC study do not differ greatly from the estimates
from the corrected intoxication model: the fraction for alcohol is 0.01 lower and that
for the combination of drugs and alcohol is 0.03 higher. The differences in the
Pathway data are approximately of the same magnitude.
Calculations show that 93 per cent of cases in the combined model from the
CSC study were already included in the corrected intoxication model. The number
of drug cases rose by 7 per cent compared with the corrected intoxication model,
while 4 per cent were added to alcohol cases and 1 per cent to the combined
category of drugs and alcohol.
The contribution from the systemic (illegal economy) model
to the attributable fraction
The information for this segment of the conceptual model was available in the
calendar part of the Pathway study. These analyses were not available at the time of
writing. Including cases from the systemic model will not change the attributable
fraction for alcohol from the two-model estimate because almost all cases in the
systemic model will be attributable to drugs. Neither is it likely that the attributable
fraction for the combined category of drugs and alcohol will change to any notable
degree from the two-model estimate.
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Substance-defined crimes
In the last stage of the model combinations, drug offences will be added as
attributable cases to the drug category, and drinking and driving infractions as cases
to the alcohol category.
Internal consistency checks
Consistency and reliability checks were especially needed in material that was
based entirely on self-reports.
Consistency check number one
One internal consistency check relates the attributable fraction status of the
crime to the addiction status of the inmate based on two validated and widely used
dependency scales: the Alcohol Dependence Scale (ADS) and the Drug Addiction
Severity Test (DAST). If there is a strong positive relationship, that is, if the cases
on the attributable fraction variable to a large extent overlap with the perpetrator
being defined as an addict, this is an additional indicator of the construct validity of
the attributable fraction and it will increase confidence in the measure. Consistency
check number one is demonstrated in the following figures:
Consistency check between two-model attribution of crime to drugs and alcohol
and addiction status of perpetrator (CSC-CLAI)
(Percentage)
Crime attributable to
Inmate addiction Drugs Alcohol Alcohol and drugs No substance
Drugs 76  9 65 13
Alcohol  5 35 42  5
The figures show that 5 per cent of inmates whose most serious crime was
attributable to drugs according to the two-model estimate were addicted to alcohol,
while 76 per cent were addicted to drugs. A high proportion of drug-addicted indi-
viduals was also found among those whose crime was attributed to the combination
of alcohol and drugs. Similarly, 35 per cent of those whose crime was attributable
to alcohol were addicted to alcohol and 9 per cent to drugs. Addiction to drugs and
to alcohol was relatively high among those whose crime was attributed to both
substances. Among those perpetrators whose crime was not attributable to any sub-
stance, only 5 per cent were addicted to alcohol and 13 per cent to drugs, both
proportions well below the level of addicted inmates in the total population (12 per
cent and 29 per cent).
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Consistency check number two
The inmates were asked to rate the effect that alcohol and drugs had on their
involvement in crime by answering the question “What do you feel has been the
overall effect of your drug use (alcohol use) on your involvement in crime?”. This
has been used as another internal consistency check, as demonstrated in the follow-
ing figures:
Consistency check between two-model attribution of crime and the perpetrators’
assessment of the influence of drugs and alcohol on their criminality (data from
CSC-CLAI)
(Percentage)
Crime attributable to
Perpetrators Drugs Alcohol Alcohol and drugs No substance
Who felt that drugs
had increased
involvement in crime 85 28 77 21
Who felt that alcohol
had increased
involvement in crime 17 76 75 10
More than four fifths of those offenders whose most serious crime was attrib-
utable to drugs felt that their drug use generally had increased their involvement in
crime. In comparison, less than one fifth felt that alcohol had increased their involve-
ment. The same substance-specific pattern was evident with regard to the inmates
whose crimes were attributable to alcohol. The proportion of offenders with a crime
attributable to drugs who felt that alcohol had increased their involvement in crime
(17 per cent) was relatively close to the proportion of offenders whose crime was not
attributable to any substance and who felt that alcohol had increased their involve-
ment in crime. The proportion of offenders with a crime attributable to alcohol (28
per cent) was also relatively close to the proportion of offenders whose crime was
not attributable to any substance (22 per cent).
A comparison will be made later between two-, three- and four-model estimates
as to how well they discriminate on these and other consistency checks. The aim is
to obtain some insight into what was gained in accuracy between estimates of attrib-
utable fractions from different combinations of models, and whether it is justified to
assign the crime or the individual as a case on the attributable fraction variable.
Another indication of the reliability of the measure was mentioned above. It
is the extent of overlap in the cases that the different models bring to the attrib-
utable fraction. As shown, the cases included on the basis of the economic model
greatly overlapped with the cases obtained from the (corrected) intoxication model.
On the other hand, 76 per cent of the intoxication cases for the combined category
of alcohol and drugs could not be found in the economic model, mainly because
there were many more cases from the intoxication model than from the economic
model.
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Questioning the assumptions
Assessments about being under the influence of drugs or alcohol
Self-reports on the level of intoxication have been used in numerous surveys on
alcohol use in general populations around the world. On the whole, the experience
is that the data obtained are sufficiently valid. Self-reports on drinking among alco-
hol abusers are considered to be even more valid. Emergency-room studies also
indicate that self-reports yield valid data on alcohol use in connection with the
injury, whether from violence or accident. There is also strong evidence that drug-
use surveys in general populations of adults, high school students etc. on the whole
provide valid data on drug use.
A fair number of studies have been conducted on the validity of self-reports on
substance use among drug users and abusers. Out of 54 reports examined by the
present authors, 48 assessed that the self-reports were reasonably valid if certain
conditions were met in the execution of such studies.
Many studies on violent crimes have used police or court records to ascertain
whether the perpetrator and victim had been drinking at the time of the crime.
Results from such studies are used to provide attributable fractions in calculating
social costs of alcohol. However, there is often no definition of “being under the
influence” in such studies, and circumstantial information (such as the crime having
occurred inside or outside a bar) is sometimes used to classify a crime as being
alcohol-related. In addition, information on alcohol and drug use in police and court
records is to a large extent provided by individuals involved in the crime. It is
therefore doubtful if studies using official records of crime events provide estimates
that are appreciably more valid than data based on self-reports by inmates.
Whether the crime would have been committed
in the absence of alcohol or drugs
The assumption that the inmate is in a position to assess whether he would have
committed the crime had he not been under the influence of alcohol or drugs can be
seriously questioned. As discussed in the CSC and Pathways studies, 77 per cent and
66 per cent of those under the influence of drugs, 79 per cent and 70 per cent of
those intoxicated from alcohol and 86 per cent and 74 per cent of those intoxicated
from both substances stated that they would not have committed their most serious
crime had they not been intoxicated. The correction decreases the sizes of the attrib-
utable fractions by 14 per cent to 23 per cent in the CSC study, and 26 per cent to
34 per cent in the Pathway study. Despite severe doubts regarding the validity of
such judgements, such a correction seems to provide an improvement compared with
accepting the intoxication model without any downward adjustments.
The validity of judgements about one’s own motivations
for committing a crime or crimes
In this case, to get drugs or alcohol for personal use is perhaps easier to assess
for the actor than the counterfactual scenario of the previous point.
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Using two different methods of data collection
Another indication on the aggregate validity of the responses to the questions
asked can be had from a comparison of the CLAI findings and the subset of identical
questions that were included in the Pathway study. Such a comparison also, to some
extent, serves as a check of the assumptions above, in the sense that it provides an
indication as to the robustness of the estimates in the face of varying situational
settings: an interview situation with a female research assistant from outside the
prison setting versus responding to a computerized questionnaire by means of
punches on a keyboard. It has been found that, although the figures from the two
studies are not identical, they fall within a relatively narrow range of estimates.
Discussion
One important conceptual question concerns what to do with the combined
category of crime associated with both alcohol and drugs. It is important to ask
whether crimes attributable to this combination can be divided up between attribut-
able fractions for alcohol and fractions for drugs. It may not make sense to ask an
inmate or arrested person which of the substances was the most important in causing
the crime. To some extent, the perpetrator’s history of abuse, treatment and societal
reactions may provide sufficiently valid information for assigning a prime role to
either of the two substances.
Is it, however, necessary to separate the role of drugs and alcohol in the cases
where both had been involved in causing the crime? It is a fact that they exist in the
crime episodes simultaneously, either as pharmacologically causal, motivating or
systemic factors. Perhaps it is time to take this into account in assigning attributable
fractions. However, the advisability of using a combined attributable fraction will
naturally depend on what purpose it is used for, and the framework of the costing
process in particular.
Another question is whether something is being missed by using the four-
component method by comparison, for instance, with the analyses of aggregated
data that have been used to arrive at attributable fractions for alcohol on crime
(almost exclusively violent crime). Different types of time-series analyses are poten-
tially the most powerful methods available for aggregate-level estimates.
In this context, it is worth remembering that it is not at all possible to conduct
time-series analyses for illicit drugs. Some type of individual-level data must be
used. Information must be collected from individuals who participated in the crime
episodes. Observers or informants can be used in some cases, but the most relevant
and detailed data can only be provided by the actors themselves, through self-
reports. An interesting question is how comparable attributable fractions for alcohol
from, for instance, time-series analyses are to attributable fractions based on self-
reports of the role of alcohol as a determinant in individual crime events. Such
comparisons are possible for a number of countries or other jurisdictions, but for
alcohol only.
It is possible that something further may be missed in the four-model method.
There may be countries and cultures where additional models should be taken into
account, in addition to the intoxication model, the economic and the systemic model
and the substance-defined crimes.
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There may be simpler ways of collecting data for the method of estimation used
in the present article. The study from Canada presented here has six components.
Conducting such studies of inmates in prisons and individuals who are arrested
requires a sometimes lengthy process for obtaining access to relevant samples.
Having several components also requires added effort and supervision, compared
with conducting one larger-scale study. There may be a simpler way of getting the
same information or sufficient information of some other kind that would make it
possible to calculate reasonably valid attributable fractions.
The final aim of the project is to provide attributable fractions for alcohol,
drugs, cocaine, cannabis and heroin on crime in Canada. However, for the purpose
of calculating the social costs of keeping inmates in federal penitentiaries (a consid-
erable sum), using attributable fractions for federal inmates is probably more accu-
rate than using an overall fraction for all crimes in Canada. In the same way, esti-
mates from the study of individuals arrested by the police may be more (but not
exclusively) relevant for policing costs.
Validity issues in general population studies are in some respects identical to
studies with inmates. Under-reporting may be more likely in general population
studies because there is no incentive to tell the truth, in particular about drug use and
other illegal activities. In some cases, such an incentive does exist for inmates if they
want to be free of their drug problem or to spend their prison time in a treatment
environment which, in many cases, is more pleasant than a standard prison setting.
This of course opens up possibilities for over-reporting the role of alcohol and drugs.
The method outlined above provides easily accessible information on the share
of crime contributed by different causal processes and their combinations. From the
perspective of prevention, it will also be important to know which type of causal
process predominates, what the overlaps between the determinant models are and
what changes occur over time in these constellations.
Finally, using attributable fractions that are built up from individual-level
causal models regarding the effects of alcohol and drug use on crime may bring the
study and estimation of attributable fractions closer to the main body of research on
drugs, alcohol and crime.
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ABSTRACT
The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University
is conducting a study on the impact of substance abuse on the budgets of the
governments of the 50 states in the United States of America, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico. The goals of the study are to provide policy makers
with a map of how substance abuse affects the costs of state governments; to
document the total bill for substance abuse that states pay, itemizing expenditure
on prevention, treatment, research and consequences; and to point the way to
more cost-effective investments.
The present article documents the methodology used in the study by the
National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse to estimate state costs linked
to substance abuse. The methodology relies on previously documented costs of
illness research to estimate the costs imposed by substance abuse on the health-
care system and on the state workforce. It also documents costs that are directly
attributable, namely, prevention, treatment, research and regulation. Finally, the
methodology establishes the pool of substance-involved individuals for whom
prevention and treatment may be a necessary condition of reducing public spend-
ing. The study demonstrates that states devote tremendous resources to managing
the effects of substance abuse, while only a small portion of state spending is
aimed at reducing substance abuse through treatment and prevention pro-
grammes. By providing a map of state spending on substance abuse, the study has
established a base against which policy makers can begin to compare the value
of alternative policies concerning prevention, treatment, regulation and tax that
might reduce the consequences of substance abuse and addiction. Understanding
the enormous costs attached to current policy choices with regard to substance
abuse should help policy makers think more strategically about how they might
invest in interventions that would yield a better return.
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Introduction
In the United States of America, spending on efforts to deal with substance
abuse has, historically, been a minor blip on the radar of state budgeting. As the
links between substance abuse and crime, child abuse and neglect, traffic accidents,
disease and disability have been uncovered, state policy makers have begun to
understand that substance abuse and addiction and their associated costs cut far
deeper into state budgets than previously imagined.
To document just how large the toll is, the National Center on Addiction and
Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA) is conducting a study of the
impact of substance abuse on the budgets of the governments of the 50 states in the
United States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The goals of the study are
to provide policy makers with a spending map of the many ways that substance
abuse affects the costs of state governments; to document the total bill for substance
abuse that states pay, itemizing expenditures on prevention, treatment, research and
consequences; and to point the way to more cost-effective state investments.
Better investments in the area of substance abuse are essential for three reasons.
Firstly, current government spending on efforts to deal with substance abuse is bad
public policy because it does not attempt to address the problem of untreated substance
abuse and addiction, paying extraordinary costs for preventable consequences. Sec-
ondly, current thinking about government spending as inevitable annual outlay rather
than as investment in better results neither encourages nor demands the development
of more cost-effective prevention, treatment or intervention. Finally, the bad public
policy of not addressing the problem of substance abuse and addiction is fast becom-
ing bad politics because it involves profligate spending with no accountability.
The aim of the present article is to document the methodology used by CASA
to estimate state costs linked to substance abuse and addiction for the purposes of
inviting both domestic and international comment and refining the approach.
Previous attempts to document costs of substance abuse primarily have taken
the form of cost-of-illness studies that estimate the overall economic costs to society
of the abuse of drugs, alcohol and tobacco [1, 2]. Those studies have been compel-
ling but they have not provided comprehensive estimates of costs to government.
Other approaches have estimated the costs of substance abuse to selected govern-
ment programmes such as health care [3, 4], federal entitlement programmes [5],
prisons and jails [6] and child welfare [7]. Those estimates have been of value to
states but their narrow focus has not provided policy makers with aggregate spend-
ing across budget categories. Both approaches have failed to capture the attention of
a critical mass of state policy makers or persuade them of the economic value of
allocating resources in a different manner.
Methodology
To gather data for the study, CASA administered a survey in September 1998
in the 50 states of the United States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The
survey was completed by the authorities of 45 states, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico.* The participating jurisdictions account for approximately 90 per cent
of budget spending at the state level in the country.
*The states that did not participate in the survey were Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, North
Carolina and Texas.
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To determine which state programmes to include in the study, CASA undertook
the following:
(a) A wide range of literature on the consequences of substance abuse for
government programmes was reviewed;
(b) State programmes designed to prevent or treat substance abuse or to deal
with the consequences of substance abuse were identified. In the latter category,
only those programmes were included that were large enough to be of any conse-
quence in terms of affecting the total amount spent on efforts to deal with substance
abuse;
(c) State budget and programme officials were consulted to understand how
those programmes were financed and to determine the most efficient and effective
way to gather the data on spending;
(d) Between March 1998 and August 1998, interviews were conducted in
California, Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey and Vermont* to ascertain which gov-
ernment programmes were affected by substance abuse and to learn what, if any-
thing, had already been done to record the costs to states of substance abuse. Some
states, such as California, had already done extensive studies on the subject and had
even tallied up direct state expenditures on the prevention and treatment of substance
abuse [8].
CASA selected state budget officers as the appropriate target for data collection
because those officers had the broadest view of and most expertise in the budget-
related issues and because CASA was particularly interested in educating budget
officers about the extent to which substance abuse affected the budget. A question-
naire was designed, dividing functions into broad sections, consistent with the way
that most budget offices were organized. The programmes for which data were
needed were grouped into nine clusters: human and social services; developmental
disabilities and mental health; health; education; correctional services; public safety;
judiciary; regulation and compliance; and capital spending. The instrument was
designed in that way in order to make it easier for the budget office to distribute the
survey questions among a variety of specialists in the budget office, requesting a
manageable amount of data from each individual.
In order to capture as much of the spending associated with a particular pro-
gramme as possible, CASA designed a survey instrument** to obtain data on:
(a) Fiscal year 1998 for each state, the state’s own sources of general revenue,
including spending of general funds and non-general funds but not federal or local
funds;***
*Two former state budget directors were contracted to help choose states and set up interviews. The
study team, consisting of staff and consultants, conducted over 40 interviews with state officials and their
staff. The interviews were designed to identify ways to develop a cost base that was both complete and
consistent with the way in which programmes were organized and administered in different states.
**The survey instrument was developed for and with CASA by the Fiscal Studies Program, a research
unit within the Rockefeller Institute of Government (in Albany, New York). The Fiscal Studies Program
was also responsible for collecting the budget data and conducting specific analyses.
***General funds refer to predominant funds for financing a state’s operations. Revenues are received
from broad-based state taxes; however, how specific functions are financed differs from state to state. Non-
general funds refer to other state funds (expenditures from revenue sources that are restricted by law for
particular governmental functions or activities), for example, a tax dedicated to a particular trust fund; and
bonds (expenditures from the sale of bonds, generally for capital projects).
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(b) Reported expenditures (not appropriations) from the executive budget
presented in the winter or spring of 1998, since some states did not publish data on
the adopted budget (differences between the proposed and adopted budgets were not
expected to be large enough to skew the findings);
(c) All costs (programme administration, fringe benefits, service providers
and capital).
To refine the programme categories, clarify instructions and get a sense of the
kinds of questions state budget officers would have, CASA pre-tested the question-
naire in California, Florida and New York.
Linking expenditure to substance abuse
The data represented a combination of costs attributable to substance abuse and
costs associated with substance abuse. Costs attributed directly to substance abuse
and addiction fell into three main categories: (a) spending on prevention, treatment
and research; (b) spending on the consequences, including health-care spending
based on the probable causal link between substance abuse and addiction and a
particular disease state, and spending on state worker absenteeism linked to sub-
stance abuse; and (c) expenditures for alcohol and tobacco regulation. For those
categories, it was either self-evident that costs were attributable (prevention, treat-
ment, research, regulation and compliance) or it was important to establish a causal
link (health care and state workforce).
For other areas of spending, whether substance abuse caused the spending was
of less concern than whether treatment or intervention would reduce the cost of the
consequences associated with the problem. It is, however, a very important policy
distinction. The cost-of-illness model has focused on increasing the precision of
linking costs to causality. The operational question for a policy maker is not how
many welfare recipients are receiving assistance because of their substance abuse,
but how many welfare recipients will be impeded in their efforts to cease being on
welfare and return to work because they abuse alcohol or drugs. Similarly, it is less
important to establish the percentage of state inmates who committed crimes because
of substance abuse than to determine the group of prisoners for whom treatment for
substance abuse may be necessary to keep them from returning to prison.
It is necessary to establish the pool of substance-involved individuals, in other
words, those who constitute the target group for policy intervention. Subsequent
work should focus on matching the different forms of intervention with the different
needs of individuals within that pool. Substance abuse often appears as one of a
cluster of behaviours leading to increased costs to states; thus, solving the addiction
problem is a necessary step towards eliminating those costs, but it will not always
be sufficient.
Estimating the share of state spending on efforts
to deal with substance abuse
CASA developed estimates of the share of spending for each programme de-
signed to deal with problems that reasonably could be attributed to or associated
with substance abuse by relying on an extensive review of the literature on the
subject, including research conducted by CASA itself. Where possible, those esti-
mates were based on peer-reviewed research. Where published research was lacking,
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CASA developed estimates and clearly documented the techniques used. Although
using such a range of techniques lacked methodological purity, it provided national
estimates where none were currently available.
The first step was to identify spending on programmes that were devoted to
dealing with problems attributable entirely (100 per cent) to substance abuse. For the
remaining programmes, the shares were adjusted for state differences in the preva-
lence of substance abuse.*
To obtain a national estimate for state spending on efforts to deal with sub-
stance abuse, CASA calculated average per capita substance abuse spending in each
programme area for the total of the 47 responding jurisdictions. It multiplied those
averages by the population of the non-responding states to estimate their substance
abuse spending. Estimated spending for both responding and non-responding juris-
dictions were summed to estimate spending levels for the nation as a whole. Al-
though 47 jurisdictions participated in the project, in some instances they did not
complete certain sections of the survey. In those cases, CASA also estimated aggre-
gate spending for the non-responding states in all categories except research because
of the low response rate in that section of the survey (only five responses).
Substance abuse prevention, treatment and research
CASA asked states to report all spending for programmes aimed at reducing
alcohol, drug and tobacco use and abuse and for programmes providing treatment for
tobacco use and for alcohol and illicit drug abuse. Examples included statewide media
campaigns, local prevention networks, inter-agency coordination of prevention pro-
grammes, prevention education, treatment facilities, outpatient care programmes,
research and capital spending for treatment facilities. All such programmes were
devoted to dealing with problems attributable entirely to substance abuse.
Health care
Health-care spending was the second largest component of state budgets, after
primary and secondary education. States spent about $60.4 billion (about 9.7 per
cent of total state expenditures) of their own funds to finance health care under the
Medicaid programme, the federal and state programme of health insurance for the
poor and medically needy [10]. Some states also financed health-care costs for
people not qualifying for Medicaid.**
Substance abuse increased state spending on health care in three ways:
(a) Some people would become ill or injured as a result of their own sub-
stance abuse and would receive health care related to the illness. For example, lung
cancer resulting from smoking led to a variety of health-care expenditures, such as
hospital, physician and medication costs;
*Costs in those categories were linked primarily to alcohol and illicit drugs. Because the sample size
was not sufficient to estimate the prevalence of illicit drug abuse by state and because most research showed
the primary drug of abuse to be alcohol with a high prevalence of alcohol abuse occurring in conjunction
with illicit drug use, the associated fractions were scaled using alcohol prevalence of binge drinking in the
state in the past month [9].
**Examples of other state-funded health-care programmes include programmes for patients infected
with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) who receive general assistance, child health-care pro-
grammes and prenatal care programmes.
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(b) Substance abuse injured innocent parties. Mothers who smoked during
pregnancy would generally have lower birthweight babies, thus increasing state-
financed costs from the time of the child’s birth (and possibly increasing state-
financed health expenditure throughout the child’s life);
(c) People who smoked or abused alcohol or drugs often would have a lower
level of health in general and would have more frequent, longer and more severe
illnesses. For example, bouts of influenza tended to last longer for smokers than for
non-smokers. Because the available data were inadequate, the CASA analysis did
not include such costs.
CASA calculated the health-care portion of the analysis without taking into
account the cost data from the state survey for two reasons. The basis for the
estimates of health-related spending was epidemiological research showing a link
between substance abuse and illness. Some states might have explored such litera-
ture in greater depth than others and some might have interpreted the research
differently. It made sense to interpret and apply the epidemiological research uni-
formly across states. In addition, many states did not have ready access to data that
described the illnesses of or the health care received by their residents on Medicaid
and that were related specifically to substance abuse or that identified substance
abusers; that fact made it difficult for patterns of Medicaid utilization to be analysed.
Although in some cases such data existed, they were located in massive databases
that included confidential patient information; thus, it would be difficult for states to
use the databases for research purposes.
Although obtaining data on state-level spending by type of illness would have
been ideal, it was not possible. Instead, state-level data on spending by type of
provider were obtained. CASA devised the following two-step methodology to es-
timate the share of state health expenditures accounted for by efforts to deal with
substance abuse, taking advantage of as much state-specific data as possible:
(a) National-level attributable fractions by substance and provider type were
estimated. An attributable fraction is an estimate of the share of spending in a given
programme that is caused by smoking, alcohol or drug abuse. For example, if 12 per
cent is the “smoking-attributable fraction” for Medicaid-financed physicians’ serv-
ices, it means that, on average, about 12 per cent of Medicaid payments to physi-
cians is attributable to smoking;
(b) Those attributable fractions were multiplied by state-specific health spend-
ing to arrive at state estimates of spending attributable to substance abuse.
Step one: national attributable fractions
National-level attributable fractions were developed for each major form of
substance abuse (smoking, alcohol and drugs), for each major type of medical pro-
vider (such as hospitals, physicians and home providers). A total of 24 different
attributable fractions were developed: three substance types by eight provider
types.*
To estimate attributable fractions, population-attributable risk (PAR) values
were used, either estimated directly or as reported in epidemiological research. A
*The provider types refer to hospital overnight, emergency room, outpatient, medical-provider visit,
home-provider visit, medical supply purchase, prescription drugs and dental.
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PAR value is an estimate of the probability that a given episode of disease is attrib-
utable to (or caused by) a factor such as substance abuse. It reflects both the relative
risk of getting the disease and the prevalence of substance abuse. For example, if 19
per cent is the alcohol-related PAR value for liver cancer, it means that 19 per cent
of the incidence of liver cancer is the result of alcohol abuse.
For alcohol, the PAR values used were developed by the National Institute on
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism of the United States for specific diagnosis (malig-
nant neoplasm of the esophagus, alcohol-related injury involving motor vehicle traf-
fic etc.). For illicit drugs, CASA developed its own PAR values based on a thorough
review of the epidemiological research. In the case of smoking, CASA used state-
specific smoking attributable fraction developed by Miller and others [11].
Those PAR values were applied to the latest available public-use medical care
databases, relying on the coding system of the International Classification of Dis-
ease [12]. The database of the 1987 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey,
conducted by the National Center for Health Services Research, was used for hos-
pital inpatients, hospital outpatients, physician services, prescription drugs and mis-
cellaneous services. It was assumed that nursing home expenditures would have the
same attributable fractions as that of elderly hospital patients. The process under-
taken to calculate hospital spending attributable to alcohol was as follows:
(a) The amount of hospital spending financed by Medicaid for each patient
with a given disease was multiplied by the PAR value of that disease. The number
of all patients with that disease was calculated in order to develop an estimate of the
hospital spending financed by Medicaid for that disease that was attributable to
alcohol abuse. The process was repeated for each illness represented in the data file;
(b) The total amount of hospital spending financed by Medicaid that was
attributable to alcohol across all diseases was calculated in order to estimate the total
hospital spending by Medicaid that was attributable to alcohol;
(c) The amount of hospital spending financed by Medicaid that was attribut-
able to alcohol was divided by the total hospital spending financed by Medicaid to
arrive at the “alcohol-attributable fraction”: the share of hospital spending financed
by Medicaid that was attributable to alcohol abuse;
(d) The process was repeated for other provider types and other substance
types. The result was an attributable fraction for each type of provider and each type
of substance.
Step two: applying attributable fractions to state health spending
To develop state-by-state estimates of Medicaid and other health spending at-
tributable to substance abuse, CASA multiplied the attributable fractions by provider
type (derived in step one) by the 1998 spending by provider type obtained from the
Health Care Financing Administration. Several states did not provide a sufficiently
detailed breakdown of spending by provider type. For those states, CASA used a
two-step process. First, it calculated average attributable fractions by substance type
using state-specific data for 1997 from the Health Care Financing Administration,
effectively weighting the national provider-type attributable fractions by the state’s
spending by provider type. CASA then multiplied those state-specific weighted-
average attributable fractions by 1998 total state spending on health programmes to
arrive at substance abuse attributable spending.
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State workforce
Several studies have focused on documenting and quantifying the adverse ef-
fects of alcohol, tobacco and illicit drug use on the workforce [13-15]. Some have
been studies of one organization only, others of large firms and still others of par-
ticular regions, making the comparison of results difficult. A further complicating
factor is the variation in definitions of the quantity and frequency of substance use.
Drug and alcohol use has been associated with employee absenteeism, lower
productivity, increased turnover, workplace accidents and higher costs of health
insurance [14]. Because of severe data limitations, the CASA study has focused only
on analysing the absenteeism of substance abusers (comparing it with that of persons
not abusing substances); by sex and substance type.*
CASA conducted a logistical regression using data from the National Household
Survey of Drug Abuse (for 1994) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (for
the periods 1984-1988 and 1992-1994). The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
allowed CASA to control a large number of relevant demographic and socio-eco-
nomic variables and to focus on absenteeism. That methodology was used to pinpoint
a probable causal relationship between employee substance abuse and absenteeism.
The sample was restricted to individuals who had paying jobs in the private sector,
who had occupations in any area except the military, farming, fishing or forestry and
who worked in any industry but not in the military, public administration or agricul-
ture. From that analysis, CASA identified prevalence rates and extra days absent as a
result of substance abuse, for men and women, by substance type.**
Following that, the prevalence of substance abuse (by gender and type of sub-
stance) was multiplied by the number of persons in the state’s workforce (broken
down by gender) to obtain the estimated number of substance abusers in the
workforce (broken down by gender and type of substance). Those subtotals were
multiplied by gender-specific and substance-specific extra days of absences per
person per year to obtain the total number of days lost per year. Once those subtotals
were combined, that number was divided by the expected number of days of work
per year (the number of persons in the workforce multiplied by 230 days) to obtain
a proportion spent on substance abuse.
In the state workforce section of the survey, CASA requested payroll figures for
state government employees, total spending on fringe benefits and the share of
spending on efforts to deal with substance abuse in employee assistance pro-
grammes. The share of spending attributable to substance abuse, adjusted for state
differences in prevalence of binge-drinking and illicit drug use, was applied to the
payroll and fringe benefits. That total was added to 100 per cent of the share of
spending on substance abuse in employee assistance programmes to obtain the figure
for total spending attributable to substance abuse in the state workforce sector.
*CASA adopted the methodology in its study entitled “Substance Abuse and American Business”
(publication forthcoming).
**The following definitions were used:
(a) Smoker: an employee who smoked more than 16 cigarettes per day in the previous month;
(b) Heavy drinker: a male employee who drank more than 5 drinks, five or more times in the
previous month or a female employee who drank more than 3 drinks, five or more times in the previous
month;
(c) Current drug user: an employee who used cannabis and/or cocaine in the previous month;
(d) Absent: an indicator for worker absence at any time during the previous month (National
Household Survey of Drug Abuse) or week (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth).
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Criminal justice
For most states, spending on prisons has been the fastest growing part of the
budget, jumping by 28 per cent between 1995 and 1996 [6]. In its report on the adult
prison population, CASA documented the enormous impact of substance abuse on
state spending for correctional services [6]. To estimate the percentage of the inmate
population involved in substance abuse, CASA used the following categories for
such inmates:
(a) Ever used illegal drugs regularly;
(b) Convicted of a drug law violation;
(c) Convicted of an offence involving driving under the influence;
(d) Under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol while committing the crime
that led to incarceration;
(e) Committed an offence to get money for drugs;
(f) Had a history of alcohol abuse (defined as ever having received treatment
for alcohol abuse).
Using such a definition, it was estimated that 81 per cent of state prison inmates
were involved in substance use.
To arrive at total state costs of adult correctional services associated with sub-
stance abuse, CASA combined state expenditures for such services in the following
areas:
(a) Costs of running and maintaining adult correctional facilities, associated
administrative and staffing costs;
(b) Costs of special programmes such as mental health, education or religious
services provided to adult inmates;
(c) Parole and early-release programmes;
(d) Adult probation;
(e) State categorical aid to localities for adult correctional services;
(f) Capital spending on prisons.
CASA applied the 81 per cent share, adjusted for state differences in prevalence
of alcohol and illicit drug use, to the costs of the state offender rehabilitation pro-
grammes and added 100 per cent of the costs of treatment programmes for alcohol
and drug abusers provided by state correctional departments. It was assumed that a
similar share (81 per cent) of adult probationers and parolees were involved in
substance abuse and that local spending of state aid for correctional services would
follow the same pattern.
Juvenile justice
Data on the prevalence of drug and alcohol abuse in the juvenile justice system
were found to be scarce.* In one study, it was shown that 70 per cent of juvenile
offenders had a serious alcohol or illicit drug problem [16]. In a more recent study
*CASA is conducting a study of substance abuse and the juvenile justice system.
78 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LII, Nos. 1 and 2, 2000
in New Jersey, 67 per cent of male juvenile offenders reported having used cannabis
in the previous 30 days while 57 per cent of such offenders reported having used
alcohol in the previous 30 days [17]. In a study in Maricopa, Arizona, 56 per cent
of male juvenile offenders tested positive for drugs [18].
In the absence of recent national estimates of the extent of substance abuse in
the juvenile justice system, CASA conducted an analysis of data for 1997 gathered
through the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program by the National Institute of
Justice of the United States Department of Justice. Variables were chosen to mirror
those in the CASA report on the adult prison population [6]. Juveniles* in correc-
tional facilities who had been involved in drugs were categorized as follows:
(a) Tested positive for drugs;
(b) Reported having used alcohol in the previous 72 hours;
(c) Under the influence of or in need of alcohol or drugs;
(d) Received treatment in the past;
(e) Currently receiving or could use treatment for abuse of alcohol or various
illicit drugs. It was found that 66.3 per cent of youth in the juvenile justice system
were involved in substance abuse.
To arrive at total state costs for juvenile justice attributable to substance abuse,
CASA combined state expenditures in the following areas:
(a) Juvenile correctional facilities, including residential centres, boot camps
and work-study camps;
(b) Diversion programmes;
(c) Capital costs of juvenile correctional facilities.
CASA applied the 66.3 per cent share, adjusted for state differences in preva-
lence of alcohol and illicit drug use, to the costs of such juvenile justice and added
100 per cent of the costs of treatment programmes for alcohol and drug abusers
provided by state departments of juvenile justice.
Judiciary
The judiciary system has several branches: criminal, juvenile, family and civil
and drug courts (which may be further differentiated into family drug court or
juvenile drug court). CASA did not identify any studies documenting the full impact
of substance abuse on courts, although several studies documented the prevalence
and characteristics of drug law offenders (drug possession and trafficking) in both
juvenile and adult courts [19, 20]. To develop a more comprehensive picture of the
impact of substance abuse on the courts, CASA employed the methodology de-
scribed below:
Criminal courts
CASA analysed the involvement of arrestees in substance abuse, using 1997
data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program, to estimate the proportion
*All the juveniles in the sample were male.
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of substance abusers entering the judiciary system. The following categories were
used for those involved in substance abuse:
(a) Tested positive for drugs;
(b) Reported having used alcohol in the previous 72 hours;
(c) Under the influence of, or in need of, alcohol or drugs;
(d) Received treatment in the past, currently receiving treatment or could use
treatment for abuse of alcohol or illicit drugs.
It was estimated that 83.8 per cent of criminal court costs were substance-
linked.
Family courts
Previous CASA research had shown that 70 per cent of child welfare cases
were involved in substance abuse [7]; that is, in those cases, the problem had been
caused or exacerbated by substance abuse and addiction. In some states, juvenile
justice cases may be represented in this category as well. Seventy per cent of those
costs were assumed to be linked to substance abuse.
Civil courts
No share for spending on substance abuse was developed for civil courts be-
cause it was not possible to link costs of tort, property rights, and estate or small
claim cases to substance abuse and addiction.
Drug courts
Any state spending on drug courts, including family dependency drug courts,
was considered 100 per cent attributable to substance abuse.
In order to estimate costs relating to substance abuse that were linked to the
courts, state authorities were asked to identify all court costs for state programmes
by type of court, including court personnel, contracted services, supplies and the cost
of state programme administrators and policy analysts who spent the majority of
their time on the programme. The share of spending attributable to substance abuse,
adjusted for state differences in prevalence of alcohol and illicit drug use, were
applied to the total spending by type of court. The values of substance-linked spend-
ing by type of court were added together to obtain a total for courts.
Child welfare programmes
The link between substance abuse and child neglect and abuse is well docu-
mented. CASA research found that substance abuse and addiction cause or exacer-
bate 70 per cent of child welfare cases in the United States. In other studies, the rate
of substance abuse among parents of children in child protective services was found
to be between 40 and 90 per cent [22-25]. For the present study, 70 per cent was
used as the share of child welfare spending attributable to substance abuse.
To determine spending on child welfare, states were asked to identify all pro-
gramme costs, including grants to individuals and families, the cost of caseworkers
or service providers and other programme costs. They were also asked to include the
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following costs: adoption assistance; foster care; independent living; family preser-
vation and other programmes to prevent out-of-home placements, promote reunifica-
tion of families or provide a safe environment for children; child abuse and neglect
intake and assessment; and administrative and staffing costs to run such pro-
grammes.
The 70 per cent share of spending attributable to substance abuse, adjusted for
state differences in alcohol prevalence, was added to total state spending on child
welfare, after the cost of any child welfare programmes specifically targeting sub-
stance abuse was removed. Both categories of costs were combined to obtain the
total cost of substance abuse to the child welfare system.
Income support programmes
Substance abuse may be the primary reason that people need income assistance
or it may impede a person’s ability to become self-supporting. The income support
programmes included in the present study were Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families, General Assistance and state supplements to the Supplemental Security
Income programme.
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and General Assistance
In the majority of national and state prevalence studies, it was estimated that
between 7 and 37 per cent of welfare recipients had a substance abuse problem [26].
Two previous studies by CASA estimated the prevalence of female recipients of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children with substance abuse problems to be between
20 and 27 per cent [5, 27]. For the purposes of the present study, a more conserva-
tive figure of 20 per cent was used as the share of spending attributable to substance
abuse for recipients of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.
There were limited data available on the percentage of the population receiving
General Assistance that is involved in substance abuse. In one study of a county in
California, it was estimated that at least 43.3 per cent of the population receiving
General Assistance had a substance abuse problem that was linked to the receipt of
assistance [28]. In the absence of national data, CASA used 20 per cent as the
proportion of substance-linked spending on the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families programme, recognizing that it was probably a very conservative estimate.
Supplemental Security Income
Federal legislation passed in 1996 ended payments to individuals who were
receiving Supplemental Security Income because of drug addiction and alcoholism.
When benefits were terminated on 1 January 1997, 2.6 per cent of all beneficiaries
were removed from the rolls. About one third (34 per cent) of those people retained
or re-established eligibility in December 1997 on the basis of a condition other than
substance abuse [29]. Therefore, only 1 per cent of people receiving Supplemental
Security Income were originally certified by virtue of drug or alcohol addiction.
CASA could find no studies documenting the extent to which individuals qualifying
for Supplemental Security Income under another condition also had drug and alco-
hol problems and, if so, what percentage of them might be capable of supporting
themselves if their addiction problems were addressed. For that reason, for Supple-
mental Security Income, 1 per cent was used as the associated share of spending.
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To estimate costs linked to substance abuse for those programmes, states were
asked to identify costs for cash assistance, emergency assistance, employment and
training services for the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families or for those receiving
General Assistance, income maintenance to the aged, blind and disabled, and admin-
istrative costs to run those programmes. Shares of spending associated with substance
abuse, adjusted for state differences in alcohol prevalence, were combined with total
costs in each area to obtain a figure for total spending for income support programmes.
Mental health
According to data from a nationally representative population sample of non-
institutionalized civilians in the United States, about one half (50.9 per cent) of those
with a lifetime mental disorder also have a lifetime addictive disorder, otherwise
described as alcohol and illicit drug abuse and dependence [30]. That may be a
conservative estimate of the occurrence of a co-morbid addictive disorder in the
population receiving mental health treatment through the state, since the institution-
alized population was not surveyed and people with more severe mental health
problems often receive residential care.
Mental health costs included in the present study refer to expenditures for
administration, community contracts, housing programmes, institutionalization and
capital costs for building and maintaining facilities. The share of spending associated
with substance abuse was 50.9 per cent, which was applied to the total of those costs,
after adjusting for differences in state prevalence of alcohol use.
Developmental disabilities
To estimate the share of state costs for the developmentally disabled that was
caused or exacerbated by tobacco, alcohol or drugs, CASA used as a basis The
Economic Costs of Alcohol and Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992 [1], in which
the number of individuals with fetal alcohol syndrome who were receiving care in
1992 was estimated at 38,884,* or approximately 9 per cent of the total develop-
mentally disabled population of 434,657 who were served in 1992 in institutional
and residential care in the United States [31]. While CASA considered the figure of
9 per cent to be conservative, since it was based solely on fetal alcohol syndrome,
that figure was used to calculate the share of state spending for the developmentally
disabled that was attributable to substance abuse. That share, adjusted for state
differences in prevalence of alcohol and illicit drug use, was applied to total state
costs for developmental disabilities, such as administration, community contracts,
housing programmes, institutionalization and capital cost to build and maintain fa-
cilities, to develop state totals of associated costs.
Public safety
There were limited data available for estimating costs to the state for public safety
other than for criminal and juvenile justice and courts. CASA asked states to report
costs for special drug law enforcement programmes, highway safety and accident
prevention programmes, state highway patrol and local law enforcement programmes.
*That figure includes moderately retarded persons with fetal alcohol syndrome aged 22-65 in the
developmentally disabled systems and severely retarded persons with fetal alcohol syndrome aged 5-65 in
those systems.
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The main area where some data were available was highway safety, that is, the
proportion of motor vehicle accidents that involved alcohol. There were no data
available on the number of drug-related motor vehicle accidents. Using data col-
lected by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [32], CASA made an
estimate of the proportion of reported motor vehicle accidents involving alcohol,
based on the following:*
(a) A calculation of the number of motor vehicle accidents where alcohol was
involved for each type of accident (such as property damage, injury and fatality):
crashes involving alcohol accounted for 16.7 per cent of accidents involving prop-
erty damage, 20.4 per cent of accidents involving injuries and 40.8 per cent of
accidents involving fatalities;
(b) A calculation of the percentage of total motor vehicle accidents involving
alcohol for each accident type: property damage involving alcohol represented
78 per cent of all traffic accidents involving alcohol; injuries represented 21 per cent
and fatalities represented 0.003 per cent;
(c) A calculation of an average for total accidents involving alcohol.
Using that approach, CASA estimated that 17.6 per cent of highway traffic
accidents involved alcohol. That percentage was also applied to accident prevention
programmes, state highway patrol and local law enforcement programmes not spe-
cifically targeting alcohol or drug abuse. Costs were adjusted for state differences in
prevalence of alcohol use. The total cost of programmes targeting alcohol or drug
abuse was included.
Capital costs
As mentioned in other categories, CASA included in its analysis funds ex-
pended (not budgeted amounts) by the state for new construction, capital improve-
ments and equipment for adult and juvenile correctional facilities, substance abuse
treatment facilities, mental health facilities and facilities for the developmentally
disabled. Included were funds paid for out of current general taxes or dedicated
taxes, capital spending from bond proceeds and interest paid out for bonds already
issued. The share of each category spent on efforts to deal with substance abuse (for
example, 81 per cent for capital spending on adult correctional facilities and 50.9 per
cent for capital spending on mental health), adjusted for prevalence of alcohol and
illicit drug use, was used to estimate the portion of capital spending linked to sub-
stance abuse. Capital spending associated with substance abuse was added to other
costs in each category.
Education
States spent almost one quarter of total state funds (22 per cent) on primary and
secondary education in the fiscal year 1998 [10]. In that area of the budget, it was
difficult to establish the share of state spending attributable to substance abuse for
three major reasons:
(a) State governments allocated most education funds in lump sums to local
school districts;
*The estimation was made with the guidance of the author of the report presenting the data collected
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [32].
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(b) There was a bias against labelling children; therefore, it was difficult for
researchers to determine which children were exposed to substances in utero or in
the home and which children were abusing substances;
(c) It was difficult to find literature or research linking costs in the education
system to substance abuse.
Using the International Guidelines for Estimating the Costs of Substance Abuse
[33] as a benchmark, there is neither a matrix of costs nor any delineation of the
theoretical issues to help lead to agreement on how to measure those costs in the
case of public education. Nonetheless, there is a broad consensus that the costs are
potentially significant.*
CASA has identified three ways that substance abuse affects schools:
(a) Parental use affects the capacity and readiness of children to learn;
(b) Faculty and staff use affects the learning environment;
(c) Student use affects the interest and capacity to learn, and school security.
All of those factors might affect the costs of education. For example, maternal
alcohol use during pregnancy could result in increased special education costs for
students with fetal alcohol syndrome. Parental substance abuse might result in pro-
grammes for at-risk youth, staff-intensive compensatory education programmes,
after-school programmes, summer school and other programmes. Substance abuse
by students might necessitate increased staff in support and health-care roles or
might result in class disruption; violence associated with such substance abuse might
require increased school security costs for security personnel and equipment and
increased expenses for insurance and workers’ compensation and for repairs and
replacement of vandalized or stolen material. Substance abuse by faculty members
might involve increased workforce costs and lost productivity.
Although few of those costs are reported to states in ways that can be linked
to budgets, when those costs are combined, they represent a considerable amount of
expenditure. To take the first steps towards developing an estimate of the costs of
substance abuse to the education system, CASA identified cost areas that could be
linked to substance abuse, including the following:
Lost productivity of staff and added costs for additional staffing
Programmes for at-risk children
Prevention programmes
Special education programmes
Delinquency
Administration
Property and liability
Staff health insurance
Legal expenses
Drug testing
Employee assistance programmes
Employee training, policy and staff development
Capital outlay
*Experts in the field of education, school finance and cost estimation of substance abuse formed a
focus group, conducted by CASA on 19 July 1999, in Washington, D. C. The group reached the conclusion
that the costs of substance abuse were potentially significant.
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CASA estimated that those costs combined could account for between 10 and
22 per cent of annual state expenditures for primary and secondary education.
To review that approach and associated estimates of costs, CASA convened a
group of experts in the area of school finance and substance abuse. The group was
concerned by the unavailability of data for making more precise estimates, but after
reviewing and refining the list of effects, it informally posited a range of 10-20 per
cent for the estimated impact of substance abuse on the public education system. For
the purposes of the present study, the lower end of the range, 10 per cent, was
chosen as a conservative estimate of the share of education spending attributable to
substance abuse.
CASA included that estimate as a placeholder for budget purposes for three
reasons:
(a) State budgets were heavily dominated by education spending, and failure
to recognize costs in that area would be a major oversight;
(b) According to experts in the field and qualitative literature, substance abuse
had a significant impact on schools and on the achievement of their goals;
(c) Schools represented an important opportunity to intervene, since problems
of substance abuse that started in primary and secondary school would show up later
in other state systems such as correctional services, child welfare, mental health or
welfare.
By including that budget estimate, CASA hoped to promote research into the
question of the impact of substance abuse on schools and education spending.
Regulation and compliance
In its analysis, CASA total spending on state personnel responsible for collect-
ing alcohol and tobacco taxes (including fringe benefits) and state funds budgeted
for boards or governing bodies enforcing alcohol and tobacco regulations or issuing
alcohol and tobacco licences. Those costs were 100 per cent attributable to substance
abuse. CASA also estimated the total tax revenues received by states from alcohol
and tobacco sales.
Policy implications
The present study documents the full dimensions of state spending linked to
substance abuse and addiction. Specifically, the study reveals that states devote
tremendous resources to managing the effects of substance abuse through incarcera-
tion, treatment in health and mental health systems, foster care, special and compen-
satory education and various other areas. Only a small portion of state spending is
aimed at reducing substance abuse through treatment and prevention programmes.
By focusing on state budget costs, it can be shown more clearly which of those
costs are under the control of state policy makers. It does not, however, provide a
comprehensive picture of governmental spending on that problem. Similar analyses
of federal and local spending are needed to complete the picture.
By providing a map of state spending on substance abuse, the present study
establishes a base against which policy makers can begin to compare the value of
alternative prevention, treatment, regulatory and tax policies that might reduce the
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consequences for the state budget of substance abuse and addiction. Understanding
the enormous costs attached to current policy choices on substance abuse should
help policy makers think more strategically about how they might invest in interven-
tions that would yield a better return on their investments.
If, for example, 4 per cent of a state budget is linked to coping with the
consequences of untreated addiction in state prisons, the costs and benefits of inter-
ventions to reduce those costs can be considered in terms of how they affect current
spending. States might want to consider investments such as the following: the
elimination of mandatory sentences for drug offences and the requirement of man-
datory treatment; treatment-linked diversion programmes; prevention activities in the
schools; treatment for parents who abuse substances and who neglect or abuse their
children; increased taxes on alcohol; or any of a variety of other interventions that
might reduce the consequences of substance abuse linked to crime.
As the present study shows, a policy response of reductions in prevention or
treatment expenditures will have the effect of increasing rather than decreasing state
costs. Furthermore, policy strategies that involve only civil or criminal justice sanc-
tions without requiring treatment will, in the long term, raise rather than reduce state
costs. By thinking about expenditures as investments, policy makers will be in a
better position to demand specific results for their investments. An investment-based
approach will help policy makers ensure accountability for expenditure of public
funds by showing the return and the results.
CASA recognizes that the spending map presented is breaking new ground and
hopes that it will help to shift the public debate from expenditures on the problem
of substance abuse to investments in better results.
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ABSTRACT
The development of reliable estimates of the economic costs of substance abuse
can help to prioritize drug issues and provide useful information to policy
makers. Nevertheless, only a few developed countries have so far attempted to
carry out such studies.
The present paper reviews the current situation of drug abuse in a develop-
ing country widely recognized as a country struggling to overcome a problem of
drug production. The data confirm the trend observed elsewhere: countries in
which drugs are produced also tend to see rising levels of consumption. On the
other hand, it is shown that the lack of systematic information in many areas
makes it almost impossible to calculate the costs of drug abuse in countries such
as Colombia. Various suggestions are made with a view to correcting some of the
problems identified.
Introduction*
In assessing the economic costs of drug abuse in Colombia, the following
background information on the economic situation of the country should be borne
in mind:
(a) At the time of the last census, in 1993, the total population of Colombia
was set at 37.7 million. Projected estimates for 2000 place the figure at slightly over
42.3 million, including 12.4 million (29.3 per cent) people between 10 and 24 years
of age;
(b) In December 1999, unemployment in the 11 main urban areas of Colom-
bia was estimated at 18.1 per cent. The figure reached 20.1 per cent by the end of
March 2000, which meant that some 1.5 million people were out of jobs;
*Figures given in the present section were drawn from: Departamento Nacional de Planeación,
Indicadores de Coyuntura Económica Mensual—Febrero de 2000 (Bogotá, 2000); Departamento Adminis-
trativo Nacional de Estadística, Proyecciones Anuales de Población 1985-2015 (Bogotá, 2000); and
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 1999 (Bogotá,
2000).
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(c) The gross national product for 1998 was estimated at 99,357.6 million
United States dollars ($). For 1999, it was expected to fall by almost 15 per cent to
$84,742 million;
(d) The internal inflation rate for 1999 was 9.2 per cent, while devaluation of
the Colombian peso against the dollar reached 22.2 per cent (estimates for 2000:
10 per cent and 17.5 per cent, respectively);
(e) Colombian exports for the period January-November 1999 totalled
$10,325.7 million, while imports amounted to $9,627.2 million. Exports consisted
mainly of oil, coffee, chemical products for industrial use, coal, bananas and flowers.
Imports, on the other hand, originated mostly in the United States of America, the
European Community and the countries known as the Andean group (Bolivia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela);
(f) As estimated by a research team from a leading local university in a recent
study,* drug production in Colombia may have led to illegal exports worth $2,229
million per year on average over the period 1982-1998. If accurate, the figure would
surpass that of coffee, thus making the production of illicit crops the country’s most
important source of income based on agriculture.
Drug production estimates for 1995
From the early 1970s, an illegal drug industry gradually evolved in Colombia.
Narcotrafficking, the term often used to describe the illicit activity, comprises the
growth and trade (export) of marijuana, coca leaf and poppy flower. Only a handful
of studies are available that attempt to analyse the economics of drug production. To
date, no studies have been published regarding the economics of drug use.
According to one study on drug production [1], crops of marijuana, coca leaf
and poppy flower covered some 110,000 hectares (ha) in 1994, that is, an area
equivalent to 1.4 per cent of the land devoted to agricultural use in Colombia. On
the basis of the same study, a brief review of the economics of each type of drug
is given below.
Marijuana
Although cannabis was introduced at the time of the Spanish conquest, it was
only by the 1970s that the illegal production and trade of marijuana began in
Colombia as a direct result of the eradication of crops in Mexico. By the end of the
same decade, production on the northern coast of Colombia was at a high point.
Local government efforts to control the illicit exports, combined with the increasing
substitution of imports by the United States, led to a decline in marijuana production
and a displacement of the illicit industry towards the production of cocaine and
heroin instead. Seemingly, these were regarded as easier products to smuggle, the
crops being more difficult to detect and the produce yielding a higher price-to-
volume ratio. Nevertheless, by 1994, the production and export of marijuana from
Colombia to the United States market was second only to that of Mexico.
*Study carried out at the Universidad de los Andes, Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo Económico,
quoted in El Tiempo, 5 August 2000 (Bogotá), pp. 2-7.
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Most of the production of marijuana in Colombia takes place near the Atlantic
coast in the northern part of the country around Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta in
Magdalena province and Serranía del Perijá in Cesar province. Crops are also to be
found in the southern provinces of Cauca and Nariño. Though there was a sharp
decline in marijuana exports during the 1980s (their estimated worth is thought to
have fallen from $132 million to $20 million), production seems to have somewhat
recovered in recent years, possibly as a result of an apparent stabilization of the risks
involved in smuggling it into the consumer markets. That may have something to do
with a relaxation of legal sanctions against use in those markets, as they currently
regard it as a soft drug.
By 1994, the total area devoted to growing marijuana in Colombia was esti-
mated at 6,112 ha (down from an average of 10,062 ha in 1982-1987), and the
corresponding exports were valued at some $250 million.
Coca leaf
Traditionally, the quality of local produce has been regarded as lower than that
of Bolivia and Peru. As a consequence, until the earlier part of the 1980s, most of
the base used in the cocaine production process in Colombia seems to have been
imported from Bolivia and Peru, regarded, in that order, as the world’s largest
producers. Since then, however, the crop area of coca leaf has increased steadily
(mainly in the eastern provinces of Meta, Caquetá and Guaviare and in southern
Putumayo). In 1994, it was estimated at 45,000 ha, according to one source [2],
while other estimates have been as high as 83,000 ha [3]. Depending on the figure
of choice, Colombia would have become the third (or second) largest producer of
coca leaf in the world.
Poppy flower
Poppy flower was the last drug-producing crop to be introduced into Colombia
during the late 1980s. Since then, the area under poppy flower cultivation has rap-
idly expanded. In 1994, an estimated 20,405 ha were devoted to growing poppy
flower, mostly in the central provinces of Tolima and Huila and in eastern Caquetá.
Little more is known about the economics of poppy flower cultivation in
Colombia. From the flower, a latex is extracted from which heroin and morphine are
obtained. The world’s main producers are Myanmar and Afghanistan, followed by
Colombia in third place.
Substance abuse in Colombia, 1992-1996
Major studies on substance abuse were conducted in Colombia for the years
1992 [4] and 1996 [5]. They had been commissioned by the Dirección Nacional de
Estupefacientes, the national agency in charge of coordinating efforts to prevent and
control illicit drug abuse. The same methodology was applied in both studies, al-
though the size of the sample was about twice as large in 1996. The findings pre-
sented in the report on the 1996 study [6] are briefly summarized below.
Abuse of illicit drugs in Colombia was estimated to occur, at some time, among
6.5 per cent of the population, or 1,676,924 individuals. Prevalence of abuse was
approximately four times higher among males than among females. On the whole,
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the extent of abuse increased with the level of instruction. The northwestern prov-
ince of Antioquia had the highest rate of drug abuse (12.3 per cent). Higher levels
occurred in urban areas.
In the year prior to the survey, 1.6 per cent of the population, or 400,768
individuals reported the abuse of at least one illicit drug.
In 1996, as compared with 1992, there was an increase in the abuse of drugs.
It was a matter of concern that the estimated prevalence of abuse had doubled in just
four years. The main differences were found in women, in 12- to 17-year-olds, and
in the unemployed. Geographically, only the Pacific coast region showed a signifi-
cant change.
The number of new abusers of any illicit drug was estimated at 117,453. For
the most part, they were between 12 and 17 years of age, currently attended school,
and lived in densely populated urban areas in the coffee-growing region (locally
known as eje cafetero), and in or around the main cities (Bogotá, Cali and Medellín).
Marijuana had been, and remained, the illicit drug of choice for the majority of
abusers. At least once in their lifetime, 5.4 per cent of the population had used it.
Abusers of cocaine and basuco were estimated at 1.6 per cent and 1.5 per cent of
the population, respectively. Heroin, on the other hand, showed a low prevalence of
abuse. It was estimated that 12,566 individuals had used heroin at least once. A
comparison of the abuse of illicit drugs by type during the year previous to the 1996
survey with the results of the 1992 survey showed that an increase in the abuse of
marijuana (from 0.6 to 1.1 per cent) accounted for most of the difference.
An increase in the abuse of illicit drugs had important implications for treat-
ment and prevention. In that regard, there was an obvious need to focus immediate
attention on children and adolescents. In the long run, an increasing number of
young abusers of illicit drugs would probably push up demand for treatment in the
years to come, since many new abusers gradually sank into addiction.
During the month prior to the 1996 survey, 18.5 per cent of the population
under study had used tobacco, and 21.4 per cent had done so within the last year.
Proportions varied greatly according to gender and increased with age. The 25- to
44-year-old age group accounted for most of the abusers. A high prevalence of
abuse was found among individuals with a low level of instruction, as well as among
those with a high level. Prevalence was higher among the employed than among the
unemployed. Geographically, drug abuse tended to increase with urbanization.
Antioquia and Bogotá showed the highest rates of abuse within one month of, and
a year prior to, the survey. In comparison with those of 1992, levels of drug abuse
in the two cases were 3 and 4 per cent lower, respectively, the difference being
greater among individuals over 25 years of age living in Bogotá or on the Atlantic
coast. Students and unemployed individuals increased their use of tobacco.
The proportion of the population using alcoholic beverages of any kind during
the year prior to, and within one month of, the survey was estimated at 59.8 and 35
per cent, respectively. Higher levels were to be found among 18- to 44-year-old
males with a university education and currently employed. Geographically, a higher
prevalence was to be found in Bogotá and the eastern region of Colombia. Use of
alcohol tended to be higher in both low- and high-population areas.
The index known as the CAGE index of alcoholism* shows that an estimated
15.8 per cent of the population between 12 and 60 years of age was at risk of
*Based on D. Mayfield, G. McLeod and P. Hall, “The CAGE questionnaire: validation of a new
alcoholism instrument”, American Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 131 (1974), pp. 1121-1123.
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becoming alcoholic, while among the group of alcohol users within the last year, the
proportion went up to 25.6 per cent. Prevalence was higher among 25- to 44-year-
old males currently employed and living in or around Bogotá and in the eastern
region of Colombia.
The number of people taking psychoactive pills of any kind during the year
prior to the survey was estimated at 182,000, or 0.7 per cent of the population
between 12 and 60 years of age. A higher level of abuse was associated with 45- to
60-year-old females (women were found to outpace men by more than two to one),
most of them housekeepers living in urban areas. There was an observable decrease
in the use of drugs of this type in 1996 as compared with 1992, although methodo-
logical difficulties were reported concerning the estimation of lifetime prevalence.
The proportion of the population that abused inhalable substances (such as
gasoline, paint, thinner and glue) was estimated at 6.7 per cent, with a higher rate
among 25- to 44-year-old males. The Pacific coast and the eastern region of Colom-
bia showed a higher prevalence.
Substance abuse among Colombian youth in 1999
On 20 October 1999, the Colombian Programa Presidencial para Abordar el
Consumo de Drogas (Presidential Programme against Drug Abuse), known as
RUMBOS, conducted a national survey on drug consumption among 10- to 24-year-
olds living in the provincial capital cities of Colombia. A very simple instrument in
the form of a six-question survey was devised to overcome the universal aversion
of young people to long questionnaires. A multimedia campaign had been conducted
nationwide during the previous September, inviting youth to participate, and
regional and local authorities as well as public and private civic organizations ac-
cepted the invitation to become involved. The project was a complete success. Out
of 420,000 forms prepared, a record 305,869 (or 72.8 per cent) were submitted in
response.
Differences in both methodology and target population make it impossible to
compare the results of the survey with those of the two major studies on substance
abuse referred to above. Moreover, the limited amount of information to be derived
from such a simplified questionnaire could raise doubts about the exercise. Such an
approach, however, has the following advantages:
(a) The size of the sample and the quality of the inferences based on the
observations made are far greater than what can be achieved through the alternative
method of household surveys, in which the number of responses were, by compari-
son, 8,975 in 1992 and 18,770 in 1996;
(b) By their very nature, household surveys cannot account for drug abuse in
environments other than homes. Thus, institutionalized abusers (for example, those
in foster homes, rehabilitation or detention facilities) go unnoticed who probably
would have made a significant impact on the results. Very much the same could be
said of children and youth living on the streets (a sad and depressing reality in
developing countries) who are probably much more frequent drug abusers than their
counterparts in the sanctuary of the home;
(c) The target population of youth between 10 and 24 years of age consists
precisely of those who, statistically, are both at higher risk of becoming abusers
94 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LII, Nos. 1 and 2, 2000
(requiring preventive measures) and, at the same time, more likely to be rescued
from the inferno of addiction (through treatment);
(d) Simple and straightforward questions do away with interviewers and, at
the same time, eliminate or reduce the possibility of denial or conscious alteration
of facts;
(e) Lastly, the economics of the approach make a big difference, especially
in countries such as Colombia, where the resources available to meet social needs
are so limited.
Globally, the main findings of the RUMBOS survey may be summarized as
follows:
(a) Among licit psychoactive substances, alcohol has, by far, the highest
prevalence in terms of lifetime use (72.9 per cent) and use in the last month before
the survey (47.6 per cent). Tobacco comes second (35.9 and 20.0 per cent for
lifetime and last-month use, respectively). Use of tranquillizers and inhalables is
much less frequent (approximately 2 and 1 per cent, respectively);
(b) The overall results for illicit drugs are shown in the following table:
Level of drug abuse
(Percentage of total responses)
Period of use
Drug Lifetime Last month
Marijuana 9.2 3.6
Cocaine 3.6 1.2
Basuco 2.1 0.9
Ecstasy 1.8 0.6
Hallucinogenic fungi 1.3 0.3
Acid 0.6 0.2
Mandrax 0.3 0.1
Amphetamines 0.7 0.2
Heroin 0.8 0.4
(c) In terms of gender, males equal females in their use of licit substances,
except in the case of inhalables (where the proportion is 2:1). With illicit drugs,
males exceed females in the following proportions: 2:1 (marijuana, ecstasy, acid and
amphetamines); 3:1 (cocaine, fungi and heroin); and 4:1 (mandrax);
(d) The highest levels of abuse, whether of licit or illicit substances, are to be
found among 20- to 24-year-olds, with adolescents aged 15 to 19 closely behind;
(e) Education does seem to have an effect on patterns of abuse. Youth at
university level tend to indulge more in alcohol and tobacco. In the abuse of illicit
drugs, that group comes second after youth with little or no education. Basuco and
inhalables abuse is more frequent among the less educated;
(f) Youth without an activity (non-students or the unemployed) are prone to
indulge in substance abuse as measured by the last-month prevalence ratio. In the
long run, however, as measured by lifetime prevalence, the situation reverses.
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Towards a study of the cost of illness associated with drug abuse
A three-day seminar on the estimation of the economic cost of drug abuse in
Colombia, sponsored by the Embassy of Canada in cooperation with the Canadian
Centre on Substance Abuse (CCSA), was held at RUMBOS in Bogotá, from 27 to
29 March 2000.
During the seminar, a comprehensive review was presented on the cost-of-
illness methodology as applied to economic cost estimates of drug abuse. It soon
became evident that the proposed CCSA international guidelines for estimating the
costs of substance abuse might provide a useful framework for a similar study to be
conducted in Colombia. There are, however, important differences between devel-
oped consumer countries and developing producer/consumer countries, differences
extending well beyond the mere notion of economic development and calling for a
somewhat varied approach to cost estimation and the selection of alternative analyti-
cal tools.
The present section provides a preliminary inventory of differences and key
issues that need to be addressed in order to formulate alternative guidelines on cost
estimation for cases such as that of Colombia.
General inadequacy of statistical data
Failure to maintain up-to-date records makes it very difficult to carry out de-
tailed studies on specific issues. Colombia has been traditionally averse to record-
keeping, a fact that has made research often nearly impossible, be it because of a
total lack of information, random discontinuity in a time series, or an unexplained
inconsistency among sources or between different periods. It is therefore not
unusual, in Colombia, to find extreme discrepancies in estimates from what seem to
be the simplest economic data. In such circumstances, studies that might have ap-
peared easy when first undertaken often become impossible, and the task of research
becomes endless and inconclusive.
Types of cost not incurred in developing producer/consumer countries
Certain costs, however normal in developed countries and regardless of their
economic or social justification, appear to be either not currently found in develop-
ing countries, or of such limited importance as to be irrelevant for all practical
purposes. Those costs include the following:
(a) Welfare costs arising from:
i(i) Treatment of addictions (such costs, in developing producer/con-
sumer countries, being sometimes paid by the drug abusers them-
selves or by their families, although, more often than not, the addic-
tion goes untreated);
(ii) Unemployment benefits (food stamps or similar programmes);
(b) Costs of prevention and research.
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Types of cost not incurred in developed consumer countries
Certain costs arising from drug-related activities, although part and parcel of
day-to-day reality in developing producer/consumer countries, are largely unknown
in developed consumer countries. Those costs include the following:
(a) Widespread corruption brought about by huge amounts of cash that make
it possible to buy everything and everyone;
(b) Damage to the environment at every stage of the illegal activity (destruc-
tion of tropical forest to allow agriculture, and subsequent destruction of illicit crops
by means of chemical agents that render the land useless for many years or for
good);
(c) Economic effects of money (laundered or otherwise) derived from the
manufacture of and trafficking in narcotic drugs;
(d) Economic effects of guerrilla warfare associated with the manufacture of
and trafficking in narcotic drugs and its sequel (casualties and injuries; actual or
threatened kidnappings with demands for ransom payments; private security
arrangements; forced recruitment of youth/children; dislocation of communities; and
property losses due to the impossibility of finding buyers);
(e) Law enforcement costs relating to the manufacture of and trafficking in
narcotic drugs, including both police and military costs (whether or not borne by
other countries);
(f) General institutional instability/destabilization.
Types of cost requiring alternative evaluation techniques
Certain costs, while similar in both developed and developing countries, should
probably receive different treatment when attempting to place a value on them. They
include the cost of human life in the presence of: chronically high levels of unem-
ployment; a state of civil war; and measures to promote social cleansing.
Final comments on attempts to estimate costs arising from consumption
Efforts to estimate costs arising from the consumption of drugs may be hin-
dered by certain limitations, ranging from severe to insurmountable. On the basis of
a tentative list prepared for the Bogotá seminar, those limitations are briefly
reviewed below.
Productivity losses from morbidity
Apart from the lack of precise record-keeping by Colombian hospitals, which
makes it exceedingly difficult to accurately measure morbidity in general, there is an
additional problem. Due to regulations governing the provision of health care, doc-
tors and hospitals are frequently compelled not to record and report the real causes
of a medical condition, lest the patient, with other options closed, go untreated.
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Law enforcement costs arising from drug possession and crime related to drug use
There is no tradition of record-keeping in regard to law enforcement costs
arising from drug possession and crime related to drug use, which may have made
little difference, since most of the cases never reach the courts, or even the police
station. Impunity has thus become the law of the land in Colombia, with general
corruption as its unfortunate result.
Health-care costs
Because of a chronic lack of resources in the public welfare system, most
health-care costs are borne by the private sector, including health maintenance
organizations, insurance companies, families and individuals. There are no informa-
tion systems or agencies that automatically collect the relevant data.
Prevention and research
The costs associated with prevention and research should be less difficult to
assess, given the small sums involved. Prevention is mainly the responsibility of
government agencies, always short of funds. Research, apart from the efforts of a
few private institutions, is not actively promoted in Latin American countries.
Other costs
Other costs associated with substance abuse, although difficult to assess in
economic terms, include those entailed by: children dropping out of school because
of substance abuse; accidents, injuries or crimes caused by individuals while under
the influence of drugs; losses in the workplace caused by accidents, absenteeism or
psychological disorders brought about or worsened by drug abuse; and loss of value
of real estate located in or around consumption areas.
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ABSTRACT
Various methods of measurement are used to establish and present estimates of
the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing countries, countries with
economies in transition and States members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). From 1989 to 1993, the average size of
the shadow economy as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) was 39
per cent in developing countries, 23 per cent in transition countries, and 12 per
cent in OECD countries. An increasing burden of taxation and social security
contributions combined with rising State regulatory activities are the driving
forces behind the growth of the shadow economy. According to some findings,
a growing shadow economy has a negative impact on official GDP growth,
although other studies show the opposite effect.
Introduction
As crime and other underground economic activities (including the shadow
economy) are a fact of life around the world, most societies attempt to control such
activities by measures such as punishment, prosecution, economic growth or educa-
tion. Gathering statistics about who is engaged in underground (or criminal) activi-
ties and about the frequency and scale of such activities is crucial for sound deci-
sion-making on the allocation of resources in this area. Unfortunately, it is very
difficult to get accurate information about underground, or shadow-economy, activi-
ties, because those involved are careful to conceal their identities. Estimating
shadow-economy activities can therefore be likened to a scientific passion for know-
ing the unknown.
Although a large literature** is devoted to specific aspects of the hidden
economy, a comprehensive survey has just been carried out by Schneider and Enste
*Email address: friedrich.schneider@jk.uni-linz.ac.at.
**The literature on the “shadow”, “underground”, “informal”, “second”, “cash” or “parallel”
economy is expanding rapidly. Various topics, including its measurement, its causes and its impact on the
official economy, have been analysed. See, for example, Tanzi [2, 3], Frey and Pommerehne [4], Feige [5],
Thomas [6], Loayza [7], Pozo [8], Lippert and Walker [9], Schneider [10-13], Johnson, Kaufmann and
Shleifer [14], Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón [15].
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[1]. The subject remains controversial [16], and there are disagreements about the
definition of shadow-economy activities, measurement procedures and the use of
estimates in economic analysis and addressing policy issues.* Nevertheless, around
the world, there are strong indications of a growing shadow economy. The size, the
causes and the consequences of the shadow economy are different in different coun-
tries, but comparisons are possible and they may be of interest to social scientists and
the public at large and useful to politicians, who will have to deal with this phenom-
enon sooner or later. By their very nature, shadow-economy activities are difficult
to measure, and there is a wide divergence of opinion among academics, experts in
the public sector, policy or economic analysts and politicians, as to what the shadow
economy is all about or how big it is.
Nevertheless, the shadow economy is an area of growing concern, and there are
several important reasons why politicians and public sector officials should be wor-
ried about its size and growth, including the following:
(a) If an increase in the shadow economy is caused mainly by a heavier tax
and social security burden, it could lead to an erosion of the tax base and social
security contributions, resulting in a decrease in tax revenue and a rising budget
deficit, triggering even higher tax rates with a consequent growth in the shadow
economy as the cycle continues. A growing shadow economy can therefore be seen
as the result of decisions taken by individuals who feel overwhelmed by the
demands of the State;
(b) A growing shadow economy implies that economic policy is based on
erroneous or unreliable official indicators (such as unemployment rates, labour
force statistics and levels of income and consumption). In such a situation, a pros-
pering shadow economy may cause severe difficulties for politicians, because the
unreliable official indicators may be used as the basis for questionable policy
measures;
(c) On the one hand, a growing shadow economy may provide strong incen-
tives to lure domestic and foreign workers and other resources away from the official
economy. On the other hand, two thirds of the income earned in the shadow
economy is spent in, and strongly stimulates the growth of, the official economy.**
The growing concerns referred to above and the complex issues raised by the
underground economy inspired the present study, which involved the challenging
task of collecting all available data on the shadow economy, in an effort to gain
insight into its main causes and its effects on the official economy. The matters
covered in the sections below are as follows: first, an attempt is made to define the
shadow economy; secondly, empirical results are presented on the size of the
shadow economy in 76 countries throughout the world; thirdly, the main causes of
the shadow economy are considered; fourthly, the interactions of the official and
unofficial economies are analysed; fifthly, the various methods used to estimate the
size of the shadow economy are presented; and finally, a summary is provided and
various conclusions are drawn.
*Compare the views of Tanzi [17], Thomas [18] and Giles [19, 20].
**This figure has been derived from polls of the German and Austrian populations about the effects
of the shadow economy. For further information, see Schneider [21]. The polls also show that two thirds
of the value added accounted for by the shadow economy would not be produced in the official economy
if the shadow economy did not exist.
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Definition of shadow economy
Most attempts to measure the shadow economy are hampered by the difficulty
of defining the term. According to one commonly used working definition, the
shadow economy consists of all currently unregistered economic activities that con-
tribute to the officially calculated (or observed) gross national product (GNP).*
Smith [24] defines it as “market-based production of goods and services, whether
legal or illegal, that escapes detection in the official estimates of gross domestic
product”. As such definitions leave many open questions, table 1 might shed some
light on the content of a possible consensus definition of the legal and illegal under-
ground or shadow economy.
Table 1. Taxonomy of types of underground economic activity
Type of
activity
involved Monetary transactions and tax issues Non-monetary transactions and tax issues
Illegal Trade in stolen goods; drug manufacture Barter of drugs and stolen goods,
and trafficking; prostitution; gambling; smuggling etc.; production or theft
smuggling and fraud of drugs for own use
Involving tax Involving tax Involving tax Involving tax
evasion avoidance evasion avoidance
Legal Unreported income Employee discounts Barter of legal Do-it-yourself work
from self-employment; and fringe benefits services and goods and help given to
wages, salaries and neighbours
assets from unreported
work related to legal
services and goods
Note: Structure of table based on Lippert and Walker [9], p. 5.
Table 1 shows that the shadow economy includes unreported income from the
production of legal goods and services, involving either monetary or barter transac-
tions, hence all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they re-
ported to the State tax authorities. A precise definition of the term seems quite
difficult, if not impossible, as “the shadow economy develops all the time according
to the ‘principle of running water’: it adjusts to changes in taxes, to sanctions from
the tax authorities and to general moral attitudes, etc.” (Mogensen and others [25],
p. 5).** The subject of tax evasion or tax compliance, already the focus of consid-
erable research [27], is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Size of the shadow economy in 76 countries
For single countries and sometimes for a group of countries, such as the States
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
*This definition is used, for example, by Feige [5, 22] Schneider [10], Frey and Pommerehne [4],
Lubell [23].
**For a detailed discussion, see Frey and Pommerehne [4], Feige [5], Thomas [6], Schneider [10,
13, 26].
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or countries with economies in transition, research has been undertaken to estimate
the size of the shadow economy (see Pozo [8], Loayza [7], Lippert and Walker [9],
Schneider [13], Lackó [28]) using various methods and different time periods. In
tables 2 to 4, an attempt is made to compare estimates of the size of the shadow
economy in various countries over a fixed time period, using measurement methods
described later in the present paper, in the section entitled “Methods used to estimate
the size of the shadow economy”,* with findings reported on the shadow economy
in 76 countries throughout the world for the periods 1989-1990 and 1990-1993.**
For Central and South American countries, one estimate is made using the
physical input method (Lackó [29]) and one using the MIMIC approach (Loayza
[7]). For some countries, such as Brazil, Guatemala and Venezuela, estimates of the
size of the shadow economy are quite similar; for others, such as Mexico, Panama
and Peru, there are great differences. A ranking of the South American countries
using the MIMIC approach shows that the biggest shadow economies, as a percent-
age of GDP, can be found in Bolivia, at 65.6 per cent of GDP, Panama, at 62.1 per
cent, Peru, at 57.4 per cent, and Guatemala, at 50.4 per cent. Ranked lowest are the
shadow economies of Costa Rica, at 23.2 per cent of GDP, Argentina, at 21.8 per
cent, and Chile, at 18.2 per cent (all estimated for the period 1990-1993). In Asia,
the shadow economy of Thailand is the largest, at 71 per cent of GDP, followed by
the Philippines, at 50 per cent, and Sri Lanka, at 40 per cent. Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (SAR) of China and Singapore have the smallest shadow
economies, each estimated at 13 per cent of GDP. The large size of the shadow
economy in some developing countries suggests that it is more a “parallel” or second
economy that has not been adequately captured by official statistics.
Transition countries
The physical input (electricity) method has been applied to the transition coun-
tries in central and eastern Europe and to the States that emerged from the breakup
of the former Soviet Union. The results, shown in table 3, cover the periods 1989-
1990, 1990-1993 and 1994-1995.*** According to the estimates based on the physi-
cal input method applied by Johnson and others [14] (shown together with values
based on Lackó [28] for the States that constituted the former Soviet Union, during
the period 1990-1993, Georgia had the largest shadow economy, at 43.6 (50.8) per
cent of GDP, followed by Azerbaijan, at 33.8 (41) per cent, and the Republic of
Moldova, at 29.1 per cent. The Russian Federation was in the middle range, with a
shadow economy estimated at 27 (36.9) per cent of GDP. On the basis of Johnson
and others, the shadow economies of Belarus, estimated at 14 per cent of GDP, and
*The physical input (electricity) and the currency demand methods are comparable because both
assume an excessive use of a source (electricity and cash, respectively) for shadow-economy activities, and,
in both, a “potential GNP” is calculated. The two methods are similarly used by Lackó [29-31], Portes [32],
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón [15, 33], who have applied them to measure a series of shadow
economies in a cross section of countries.
**It should be borne in mind that such country comparisons give only a very rough picture of the
relative size of the shadow economy in different countries, because each method has its shortcomings. See,
for example, Thomas [6, 18], Tanzi [17]. In the comparison presented, the same time periods (either 1989-
1990 or 1990-1993) are used for all countries. If possible, the values were calculated as averages for each
period.
***The results for the period 1989-1990, which was marked by the collapse of the communist
regimes, can only be seen as rough approximations and are therefore not discussed in detail in the present
paper.
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Table 2. Size of the shadow economy in developing countries
(Percentage of GDP)
Size of the shadow economy
Physical input Currency demand
(electricity) method approach MIMICa approach
Developing countries (average 1989-1990) (average 1989-1990) (average 1990-1993)
Africa
Botswana 27.0 .. ..
Egypt 68.0 .. ..
Mauritius 20.0 .. ..
Morocco 39.0 .. ..
Nigeria 76.0 .. ..
South Africa .. 9.0b ..
Tunisia 45.0 .. ..
United Republic of Tanzania .. 31.0c ..
Central and South America
Argentina .. .. 21.8
Bolivia .. .. 65.6
Brazil 29.0 .. 37.8
Chile 37.0 .. 18.2
Colombia 25.0 .. 35.1
Costa Rica 34.0 .. 23.2
Ecuador .. .. 31.2
Guatemala 61.0 .. 50.4
Honduras .. .. 46.7
Mexico 49.0 33.0d 27.1 (35.1)d
Panama 40.0 .. 62.1
Paraguay 27.0 .. ..
Peru 44.0 .. 57.4
Uruguay 35.2 .. ..
Venezuela 30.0 .. 30.8
Asia
China
Hong Kong 13.0 .. ..
Special Administrative Region
Taiwan Province .. .. 16.5e
Cyprus 21.0 .. ..
India .. 22.4f ..
Israel 29.0 .. ..
Malaysia 39.0 .. ..
Philippines 50.0 .. ..
Republic of Korea 38.0 .. 20.3e
Singapore 13.0 .. ..
Sri Lanka 40.0 .. ..
Thailand 71.0 .. ..
Sources: Calculations based on Lackó ([29], table 18) for developing countries in Africa and Asia, and on Loayza
[7] for those in Central and South America.
aMultiple-indicator multiple-cause.
bBased on Van der Berg [34], Hartzenburg and Leimann [35], who both used the currency demand approach.
cBased on Bagachwa and Naho ([36], p. 1394), who used the currency demand approach.
dUsing the currency demand approach, Pozo [8] estimates the size of the shadow economy in Mexico, as a
percentage of GDP, at 33 per cent in 1989-1990 and 35.1 per cent in 1990-1993.
eEstimated by Yoo and Hyun [37] using the income discrepancy method.
fCalculations based on Bhattacharyya [38].
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Table 3. Size of the shadow economy in transition countries
(Percentage of GDP)
Average size based on the physical input (electricity) method
Transition countries 1989-1990 1990-1993 1994-1995
States formerly part of the Soviet Uniona
Azerbaijan 21.9 (..) 33.8 (41.0) 59.3 (49.1)
Belarus 15.4 (..) 14.0 (31.7) 19.1 (45.4)
Estonia 19.9 (19.5) 23.9 (35.9) 18.5 (37.0)
Georgia 24.9 (..) 43.6 (50.8) 63.0 (62.1)
Kazakhstan 17.0 (13.0) 22.2 (29.8) 34.2 (38.2)
Kyrgyzstan .. (13.9) .. (27.1) .. (35.7)
Latvia 12.8 (18.4) 24.3 (32.2) 34.8 (43.4)
Lithuania 11.3 (19.0) 26.0 (38.1) 25.2 (47.0)
Republic of Moldava 18.1 (..) 29.1 (..) 37.7 (..)
Russian Federation 14.7 (..) 27.0 (36.9) 41.0 (39.2)
Ukraine 16.3 (..) 28.4 (37.5) 47.3 (53.7)
Uzbekistan 11.4 (13.9) 10.3 (23.3) 8.0 (29.5)
Average for the States formerly
part of the Soviet Union 16.7 (16.2) 25.7 (34.9) 35.3 (43.6)
Central and Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 24.0 (26.1) 26.3 (32.7) 32.7 (35.0)
Croatia 22.8b (..) 23.5b (39.0) 28.5b (38.2)
Czech Republic 6.4 (23.0) 13.4 (28.7) 14.5 (23.2)
Hungary 27.5 (25.1) 30.7 (30.9) 28.4 (30.5)
The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia .. (..) .. (40.4) .. (46.5)
Poland 17.7 (27.2) 20.3 (31.8) 13.9 (25.9)
Romania 18.0 (20.9) 16.0 (29.0) 18.3 (31.3)
Slovakia 6.9 (23.0) 14.2 (30.6) 10.2 (30.2)
Slovenia .. (26.8) .. (28.5) .. (24.0)
Average for the States of
central and eastern Europe 17.6 (17.6) 20.6 (32.4) 20.9 (31.6)
Sources: Calculations based on Johnson and others ([14], table 1, pp. 182-183), Johnson and others ([15], p. 351)
and, for data within parentheses, Lackó ([28], table 8).
aFor the States formerly part of the Soviet Union, values calculated for 1990 were used as average values for
1989-1990, since no data for 1990 were available from Johnson and others [14].
bSee Madzarevic and Milkulic ([41], table 9, p. 17), who used the discrepancy method.
Uzbekistan, at 10.3 per cent were the smallest. With the sole exception of the
estimate for Uzbekistan based on Johnson and others, the shadow economy in all the
other States born of the former Soviet Union experienced a strong increase from an
average of 25.7 (34.9) per cent based on Lackó) for 1990-1993 to 35.3 (43.6) per
cent based on Lackó) for 1994-1995. With regard to the transition countries of
central and eastern Europe, the estimates based on Johnson and others for the period
1990-1993 show that Hungary has the largest shadow economy, at 30.7 per cent of
GDP, followed by Bulgaria, at 26.3 per cent. The smallest are those of the Czech
Republic, at 13.4 per cent of GDP, and Slovakia, at 14.2 per cent. On the basis of
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Table 4. Size of the shadow economy in OECD countries
(Percentage of GDP)
Size of the shadow economy
Physical input Currency demand
(electricity) Currency demand method method used by
method used by Schneider Johnson and others
(average (average (average
OECD countries (1990) 1989-1990) 1990-1993) 1990-1993)
Australia 15.3 10.1 13.0 13.1
Austria 15.5 5.1 6.1 5.8
Belgium 19.8 19.3 20.8 15.3
Canada 11.7 12.8 13.5 10.0
Denmark 16.9 10.8 15.0 9.4
Finland 13.3 .. .. ..
France 12.3 9.0 13.8 10.4
Germany 14.6 11.8 12.5 10.5
United Kingdom
of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland 13.1 9.6 11.2 7.2
Greece 21.8 .. .. 27.2
Ireland 20.6 11.0 14.2 7.8
Italy 19.6 22.8 24.0 20.4
Japan 13.2 .. .. 8.5
Netherlands 13.4 11.9 12.7 11.8
New Zealanda .. 9.2 9.0 9.0
Norway 9.3 14.8 16.7 5.9
Portugal 16.8 .. .. 15.6
Spainb 22.9 16.1 17.3 16.1
Sweden 11.0 15.8 17.0 10.6
Switzerland 10.2 6.7 6.9 6.9
United States of America 10.5 6.7 8.2 13.9
Average for
21 OECD countries 15.1 11.9 13.5 11.3
Sources: Calculations using the physical input method (Lackó [28-31]) and the currency demand approach
(Schneider [10, 13], Johnson and others [15, 33] and Williams and Windebank [40]).
aCalculations using the MIMIC method and the currency demand approach (Giles [20]).
bCalculations based on Mauleon [42].
the Lackó estimates, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has the largest
shadow economy, at 40.4 per cent of GDP, followed by Croatia, at 39 per cent. The
Lackó estimates show that the smallest shadow economies were those of Slovenia,
at 28.5 per cent of GDP, and the Czech Republic, at 28.7 per cent. Whereas a strong
increase was observed in the shadow economy of States that were part of the former
Soviet Union for the periods 1990-1993 and 1994-1995, the average size of the
shadow economy in States of central and eastern Europe was almost stable during
those periods. The estimates of Johnson and others show that the shadow economy
in States of central and eastern Europe averaged 20.6 per cent of GDP (32.4 per cent
according to Lackó) over the period 1990-1993 and 20.9 per cent (31.6 per cent
according to Lackó) over the period 1994-1995.
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States members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development
Either the currency demand method or the physical input method was applied
to each of the 21 States members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Two series of figures are based on the currency demand
method, one from Schneider [10, 13] and one from Johnson and others [15, 33].*
The series by Johnson and others, involving estimates of the shadow economy in
most OECD countries (20 out of the 21 countries investigated) over the period 1990-
1993, shows that the southern European countries had the largest shadow economies
as a percentage of GDP: Greece (27.2 per cent), Italy (20.4 per cent), Spain (16.1
per cent) and Portugal (15.6 per cent). A similar result can be found by using
estimates from Schneider and, to a much lesser extent, those provided by Lackó [31]
through the physical input (electricity) method. Ranked at the lower end by Johnson
and others are Switzerland (6.9 per cent), Norway (5.9 per cent) and Austria (5.8 per
cent); whereas Schneider finds the United States of America (8.2 per cent), Switzer-
land (6.9 per cent) and Austria (6.1 per cent) at the bottom. The ranking of the size
of the shadow economy in OECD countries by Schneider is supported by other
studies.**
In table 5, OECD averages are shown for 1994-1995 and for 1996-1997. In
principle, the ranking of shadow economies by size is similar to that of table 4.
However, the size of the shadow economy in all OECD countries has increased
compared to the results for 1990-1993. Whereas the average size of the shadow
economy in the OECD countries studied was 13.5 per cent of GDP in 1990-1993,
it had increased to 16 per cent of GDP in 1994-1995. It increased further to 16.9 per
cent in 1996-1997. The findings clearly show that even in the late 1990s the shadow
economy was still growing in most OECD countries.
Average size of the shadow economy in developing countries,
transition countries and OECD countries
A comparison of the average size of shadow economies in the three major
country groupings yields the results shown in table 6.
Only a crude comparison can be made of the size of the shadow economy in
the various countries and country groupings because, in the studies conducted:
(a) different independent variables (such as tax variables) and different specifica-
tions for the dependent variable and the relevant equations were used; (b) different
assumptions about the velocity of currency circulation were made; and (c) other
factors affecting electricity consumption were taken into account. As can be seen
from table 6, the average size of the shadow economy in developing countries is by
far the largest, at between 35 and 44 per cent of GDP, followed by the transition
countries, at between 20.7 per cent and 34.9 per cent, and finally the OECD coun-
tries, estimated at 15.1 per cent using the electricity method and at 11.9 per cent
*The main difference between the two series is that, given a monetary approach, Johnson and others
use average values, coming from different sources, of the size of the shadow economy of a country, whereas
in Schneider, the currency demand approach and only one value for a given year (or an average over a time
period) are used. The problem with using averages from various sources is that: the time period is greater
(1985-1995); and the monetary approaches specified by different authors may be quite different.
**Similar rankings are established by Frey and Pommerehne [4], Frey and Weck-Hannemann [39],
Williams and Windebank [40], Thomas [6] and Lippert and Walker [9].
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Table 5. Size of the shadow economy in OECD countries, 1994-1997
(Percentage of GDP)
Size of the shadow economy based on the currency demand approach
OECD countries Average 1994-1995a Average 1996-1997a
Australia 13.8 13.9
Austria 7.0 8.6
Belgium 21.5 22.2
Canada 14.8 14.9
Denmark 17.8 18.2
France 14.5 14.8
Germany 13.5 14.8
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland 12.5 13.0
Greece 29.6 30.1
Ireland 15.4 16.0
Italy 26.0 27.2
Japan 10.6 11.3
Netherlands 13.7 13.8
New Zealand 11.31a ..
Norway 18.2 19.4
Portugal 22.1 22.8
Spain 22.4 23.0
Sweden 18.6 19.5
Switzerland 6.7 7.8
United States of America 9.2 8.8
Average for 20 OECD countries 16.0 16.9
Sources: Calculations based on Schneider [13] and Schneider and Pöll [43].
aCalculated only for 1994, based on Giles [20].
Table 6. Average size of the shadow economy in developing countries, transition
countries and OECD countries
Country grouping and measurement Average for 1989-1993
method used (percentage of GDP)
Developing countries (electricity method used)
Africa 43.9 (39.4)a
Asia 35.0
Central and South America 38.9
Transition countries (electricity method used)
Central and Eastern Europe 20.7 (32.4)b
States formerly part of the Soviet Union 25.7 (34.9)b
OECD countries
Electricity method used 15.1
Currency demand method used 11.9
Source: Calculations using tables 2-4 above.
aIncluding South Africa.
bBased on values from Lackó [28] for 1990-1993.
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using the currency demand method. But such a comparison, as noted above, can
only be indicative, since the methods, statistical approaches and specifications used
differ widely in the various studies.
Some remarks on the labour force in a shadow economy
After the review given above of the size and growth of the shadow economy
in terms of value added over time, the focus on the present section will be on the
“shadow labour market”, since within the official labour market there is particularly
close contact between those who are active in the shadow economy.* Moreover, by
definition, every shadow economic activity to some extent involves a shadow labour
market. Hence, the shadow labour market includes all cases where the employees or
employers, or both, occupy a position in the shadow economy. Why do people work
in the shadow economy? In the official labour market, the costs that firms (and
individuals) have to pay when officially hiring someone are greatly increased by the
burden of taxation and social contributions linked to wages, as well as by legal and
administrative regulations to control economic activity.** In various OECD coun-
tries, such costs are greater than the wage effectively earned by the worker, thus
providing a strong incentive to work in the shadow economy. The underground use
of labour may involve a second job after (or even during) regular working hours.
Another form of work in the shadow economy is carried out by individuals who do
not participate in the official labour market. A third component consists in the
employment of people (for example, clandestine or illegal immigrants) who are not
allowed to work in the official economy.
Studying the labour market in the shadow economy is even more difficult than
studying value added in the shadow economy, because very little is known about
how many hours a shadow economy worker actually works on average (from full
time to only a few hours). Empirical facts are therefore not easy to come by. The
few estimates available are shown in table 7 for OECD countries.*** The figures in
table 7 give a rough idea of the size of the shadow labour market. For example, the
estimates for Denmark show that the population of adult Danes engaged in the
shadow economy ranged from 8.3 per cent of the total labour force in 1980 to
15.4 per cent in 1994. In Germany, the figure rose from 8 to 12 per cent during the
period 1974-1982, to 22 per cent in 1997-1998.
That is a very strong increase for both countries. The size of the labour force
in the shadow economy is also quite large in other countries: in Italy, 30-48 per cent
(1997-1998); in Spain, 11.5-32.3 per cent (1997-1998); in Sweden, 19.8 per cent
(1997-1998); and in France, 6-12 per cent (1997-1998). In the European Union, at
least 10 million people are engaged in shadow-economy activities, and in the OECD
countries, about 16 million work on an illicit, irregular or unofficial basis. Those
figures demonstrate that the labour market in the shadow economy is thriving, and
may explain, for example, why there is such high and persistent unemployment in
Germany.
*Pioneering work in this area has been done by L. Frey [44-47], Cappiello [48], Lubell [23], Pozo
[8], Bartlett [49] and Tanzi [17].
**This is especially true in Europe (for example, in Germany and Austria), where the total tax and
social security burden adds up to 100 per cent of the wage effectively earned. See the section below on the
increase in the burden of taxation and social security contributions.
***For developing countries, the literature about the shadow labour market includes Dallago [50],
Pozo [8], Loayza [7] and especially Chickering and Salahdine [51].
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Table 7. Size of the labour force in the shadow economy of selected OECD
countries, 1974-1998
(percentage of GDP)
Size of the
shadow
Country or Participantsb economyc
economic Participantsa (percentage of (percentage Source of estimates of the
grouping Year (thousands) labour force) of GDP) level of participation
Austria 1990-1991 300 9.6 5.47 Schneider [13, 21]
1997-1998 500 16.0 8.93
Denmark 1980 .. 8.3 8.6 Mogensen and others [25]
1986 .. 13.0 ..
1991 .. 14.3 11.2
1994 .. 15.4 17.6
France 1975-1982 800-1 500 3.0-6.0 6.9 Raffaele de Grazia, Le travail
1997-1998 1 400-3 200 6.0-12.0 14.7 clandestin: situation dans les pays
industrialisés à économie de
marché (Geneva, International
Labour Organization, 1983) and
author’s calculations
Germany 1974-1982 2 000-3 000 8.0-12.0 10.6 de Grazia, op. cit. and
1997-1998 5 000 22.0 14.7 Schneider [21]
Italy 1979 4 000-7 000 20.0-35.0 16.7 D. Gaitani and G. d’Aragona,
1997 6 600-11 400 30.0-48.0 27.3 “I. Somersi”, Nord e Sud,
vol. 26, No. 7 (1979), pp. 26-46
and author’s calculations
Spain 1979-1980 1 250-3 500 9.6-26.5 19.0 Author’s calculations
1997-1998 1 500-4 200 11.5-32.3 23.1
Sweden 1978 750 13.0-14.0 13.0 de Grazia, op. cit. and author’s
1997 1 150 19.8 19.8 calculations
European
Union 1978 10 000 .. 14.5 de Grazia, op. cit. and author’s
1997-1998 20 000 calculations
OECD 1978 16 000 .. 15.0 de Grazia, op. cit. and author’s
1997-1998 35 000 calculations
aEstimated number of persons holding full-time jobs, including unregistered workers, illegal immigrants and those
holding second jobs.
bPopulation aged 20-69; in Denmark, those heavily engaged in shadow economy activities.
cBased on the currency demand method. Source of data on the size of the shadow economy: Friedrich Schneider
[10, 12] and “Ist Schwarzarbeit ein Volkssport geworden? Ein internationaler Vergleich des Ausmaßes der Schwarzarbeit
von 1970-97”, in Der Sozialstaat zwischen Markt und Hedonismus, Siegfried Lamnek and Jens Luedtke, eds. (Obladen,
Germany, Leske und Budrich, 1999), pp. 293-318.
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More detailed information on the labour supply in the underground economy is
given by Lemieux and others [52] using data from a survey conducted in the city of
Quebec, Canada. In particular, their study provides some economic insight into the
size of the distortion caused by income taxes and the welfare system. The findings of
the study suggest that hours worked in the shadow economy are responsive to changes
in net wages in the regular (official) sector. The study also provides some support for
the existence of a Laffer curve. The Laffer curve suggests that an increase in the
marginal tax rate leads to a decrease in tax revenue when the tax rate is too high.
According to the empirical findings of the study, that is attributable to a misallocation
of work from the official to the informal sector, where it is not taxed. In that case, the
exchange of labour market activities between the two sectors is high. The empirical
findings clearly indicate that “participation rates and hours worked in the underground
sector also tend to be inversely related to the number of hours worked in the regular
sector” (Lemieux and others, [52], p. 235). The findings demonstrate a large negative
elasticity of hours worked in the shadow economy with respect to the wage rate in the
regular sector and also a high mobility between the sectors.
Main causes of the growth of the shadow economy
Increase in the burden of taxation and social security contributions
In almost all studies,* it has been found that an increase in taxes and social
security contributions is one of the main causes of the growth of the shadow economy.
Since taxes affect choices of labour and leisure and also stimulate the labour supply
in the shadow economy, or the untaxed sector of the economy, the distortion of that
choice is a major concern of economists. The bigger the difference between the total
cost of labour in the official economy and the after-tax earnings from work, the greater
is the incentive to avoid the loss by working in the shadow economy. Since the
difference depends broadly on the social security system and the overall tax burden,
they are key features of the existence and growth of the shadow economy. But even
tax reforms with major deductions in the tax rate deductions will not lead to a
substantial decrease in the size of the shadow economy. They will only be able to
stabilize the size of the shadow economy and avoid a further increase. Social networks
and personal relationships, the high profit from irregular activities and associated
investments in real and human capital are strong ties that prevent people from
transferring to the official economy. For Canada, Spiro [54] expected similar reactions
of people facing an increase in indirect taxes (value added tax (VAT) and goods and
services tax (GST)). After the introduction of GST in 1991, in the midst of a recession,
people suffering economic hardship because of the recession turned to the shadow
economy, which led to a substantial loss in tax revenue. “Unfortunately, once this
habit is developed, it is unlikely that it will be abandoned merely because economic
growth resumes.” (Spiro [54], p. 255). They may not return to the formal sector, even
in the long run. That makes it even more difficult for politicians to carry out major
reforms, because they may not gain much from them.**
*See, for example, Thomas [6], Lippert and Walker [9], Schneider [10-13, 21, 53], Johnson and others
[15, 33], Tanzi [17] and Giles [19].
**See Schneider [11, 21] for similar findings on the effects of a major tax reform in Austria on the
shadow economy. Schneider shows that a major reduction in the direct tax burden did not lead to a major
reduction in the shadow economy. Because legal tax avoidance was abolished and other factors, like
regulations, were not changed, for many taxpayers the actual tax and regulation burden remained unchanged.
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The most important factor in neoclassical models is the marginal tax rate. The
higher the marginal tax rate, the greater is the substitution effect and the bigger the
distortion of the decision between labour and leisure. Especially when taking into
account that the individual can also receive income in the shadow economy, the
substitution effect is definitely larger than the income effect* and, hence, the indi-
vidual works less in the official sector. The overall efficiency of the economy is
therefore, ceteris paribus, lower, and the distortion leads to a welfare loss (based on
official GNP and taxation). But the welfare might also be viewed as increasing, if
the welfare of those who are working in the shadow economy were taken into
account, too (Thomas [6], pp. 134-137).
Empirical results of the influence of the tax burden on the shadow economy are
provided in the studies of Schneider [11, 53] and Johnson and others [15, 33]. They
all found strong evidence for the general influence of taxation on the shadow
economy. This strong influence of indirect and direct taxation on the shadow
economy will be further demonstrated by showing empirical results for Austria and
the Scandinavian countries. In the case of Austria, Schneider [11] estimates a cur-
rency demand function including as driving forces for the shadow economy the
following four types of variables:
(a) The burden of total direct taxation;
(b) The burden of indirect taxation;
(c) The complexity of the tax system;
(d) The intensity of government regulation.
The results of the application of the currency demand function are shown in
table 8.
All coefficients of the independent variables have the theoretically expected
sign and, with the exception of the indirect tax burden, are statistically significant at
the 95 per cent confidence level. The other test statistics show satisfactory results,
In particular, the “true ex-post” forecast of currency demand for the period 1985-
1991 indicates that the major independent factors in the currency demand function
are included. The driving force for the shadow economy activities is the direct tax
burden (including social security payments), which has the biggest impact, followed
by the intensity of regulation and the complexity of the tax system. A similar result
has been achieved by Schneider [26] for Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway
and Sweden). In all three countries, various tax variables (average direct tax rate and
average total tax rate (consisting of indirect and direct tax rates)) and marginal tax
rates have the expected positive sign (on currency demand) and are highly signifi-
cant statistically. Similar results were reached by Kirchgaessner [55, 56] for Ger-
many and by Kloveland [57] for Norway and Sweden.
Several other recent studies provide further evidence of the influence of income
tax rates on the shadow economy. Cebula [58], using Feige data for the shadow
economy, found evidence of the impact of government income tax rates, Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) audit probabilities and IRS penalty policies on the relative
size of the shadow economy in the United States. Cebula concludes that refraining
from any further increase of the top marginal income tax rate may at least curb a
further increase in the shadow economy, while increased IRS audits and penalties
*If leisure is assumed to be a normal good.
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Table 8. Results of the application of the currency demand function to Austria
Dependent variable: real currency
per capita, ln (CURt/POPt) estimation period,
Independent variables 1956-1991 1956-1985
Lagged dependent variable 0.534** 0.551**
ln (CURt-1 /POPt-1) (8.91) (9.43)
Real consumption per capita 0.703** 0.724**
ln (Ct /POPt) (5.49) (5.99)
Number of Eurocheque systems per capita -0.213* -0.174*
ln (ESt-1 /POPt-1) (-2.51) (-2.09)
Real interest rate on bonds -0.123* -0.139*
ln (IRt) (-2.51) (-2.65)
Direct tax burden (including social security payments) 0.173** 0.182*
ln (DIRTt) (3.09) (2.86)
Indirect tax burden 0.117(*) 0.123(*)
ln (INDTt) (1.88) (1.92)
Complexity of the tax system 0.154** 0.147**
ln (VISTt) (2.77) (2.86)
Intensity of regulation 0.166** 0.159**
ln (REGt) (2.94) (2.72)
Constant term -2.24(*) -2.39(*)
(-1.80) (-1.74)
Test statistics
R² 0.992 0.990
S.E. 0.014 0.015
Durbin’s h 1.06 1.16
rho (1) 0.18 0.20
D.F. 27 21
Ex-post Forecast 1985-1991
RMSE - 1.51
Theil’s U 1 - 0.42
Note: All equations are estimated by an ordinary least-squares procedure using annual data. R² is the coefficient
of determination (corrected for the degrees of freedom); S.E. shows the standard error of the estimation. Durbin’s h is
Durbin’s h-test against auto-correlation when lagged dependent variables are used as regressors. Rho (1) is the auto-
correlation coefficient of first order. D.F. stands for the “degrees of freedom”. RMSE is the root mean squared error and
Theil’s U 1 stands for Theil’s inequality coefficient. The term “ln” indicates that these variables have been transformed
to natural logarithms. Numbers in parentheses below coefficient estimates are t-values. (*),* and** indicate significance
at the 90, 95 and 99 per cent confidence level, respectively.
might reduce the size of the shadow economy. His findings indicate that there is
generally a strong influence of State activities on the size of the shadow economy.
For example, if the marginal federal personal income tax rate increases by one
percentage point, ceteris paribus, the shadow economy rises by 1.4 percentage
points. In another investigation, Hill and Kabir [59] found empirical evidence that
marginal tax rates are more relevant than average tax rates, and that a substitution
of direct taxes by indirect taxes seems unlikely to improve tax compliance. Further
evidence of the effects of taxation on the shadow economy is presented by Johnson
and others [33], who come to the conclusion that it is not higher tax rates per se that
increase the size of the shadow economy, but the ineffective and discretionary
application of the tax system and government regulations. Their finding that there
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is a negative correlation* between the size of the unofficial economy and the top
(marginal) tax rates might be unexpected. But since other factors like tax deducti-
bility, tax relief, tax exemptions, the choice between different tax systems and vari-
ous other options for legal tax avoidance were not taken into account, it is no great
surprise.** On the other side, Johnson and others [33] find a positive correlation
between the size of the shadow economy and the corporate tax burden. They come
to the overall conclusion that there is a large difference between the impact of either
direct taxes or the corporate tax burden. Institutional aspects, like the efficiency of
the administration, the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats,
and the amount of bribery and especially corruption, therefore play a major role in
the bargaining game between the Government and the taxpayers.
Intensity of regulations
The increase of the intensity of regulation (often measured by the number of
laws and regulations, such as licence requirements) is another important factor that
reduces the freedom of choice for individuals engaged in the official economy.***
Labour market regulations, trade barriers and labour restrictions for foreigners are
relevant examples. Johnson and others [33] find overall significant empirical evi-
dence of the influence of (labour) regulations on the shadow economy, and the
impact is clearly described and theoretically derived in other studies, for example,
the study on Germany carried out by the Deregulation Commission in 1990-1991.
Regulations lead to a substantial increase in labour costs in the official economy. But
since most of the costs can be shifted on to the employees, they provide another
incentive to work in the shadow economy, where they can be avoided. Empirical
evidence supporting the model of Johnson and others [14], which predicts, inter alia,
that countries with more general regulation of their economies tend to have a higher
share of the unofficial economy in total GDP, is found in their empirical analysis.
A one-point increase of the regulation index (ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 corre-
sponding to the most regulation in a country), ceteris paribus, is associated with an
8.1 percentage point increase in the share of the shadow economy, when controlled
for GDP per capita (Johnson and others [33], p. 18). They conclude that it is the
enforcement of regulations, which is the key factor in the burden levied on firms and
individuals, and not the overall extent of regulations, mostly not enforced, that drives
firms into the shadow economy. Friedman and others [60] reach a similar result. In
their study, every available measure of regulation is significantly correlated with the
share of the unofficial economy and the sign of the relationship is unambiguous:
more regulation is correlated with a larger shadow economy. A one-point increase
in an index of regulation (ranging from 1 to 5) is associated with a 10 per cent
increase in the shadow economy for 76 developing countries, transition countries
and developed countries.
*The higher the top marginal tax rate, the lower the size of the shadow economy.
**Friedman and others [60] found a similar result in a cross-country analysis showing that higher tax
rates are associated with less official activity as a percentage of GDP. They argue that entrepreneurs go
underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. However,
considering their empirical (regression) results, the finding that higher tax rates are correlated with a lower
share of the unofficial economy is not very robust, and in most cases, using different tax rates, they do not
find a statistically significant result.
***For a (social) psychological and theoretical foundation of this feature, see Brehm [61, 62], and
for a first application to the shadow economy, see Pelzmann [63].
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The above-mentioned findings demonstrate that Governments should put more
emphasis on improving enforcement of laws and regulations, rather than increasing
their number. Some Governments, however, prefer this policy option (more regula-
tions and laws) when trying to reduce the shadow economy, mostly because it leads
to an increase in power of the bureaucrats and to a higher rate of employment in the
public sector.*
Social transfers
The social welfare system leads to strong negative incentives for beneficiaries
to work in the official economy since their marginal tax rate often equals or nearly
reaches 100 per cent. That can be derived either from the neoclassical leisure-income
model or from empirical results.** Such a system provides major disincentives for
individuals who are getting welfare payments to even search for work in the official
economy, since their overall income is much higher when they are still receiving the
transfers, while possibly working in the underground economy.
Public sector services
An increase in the size of the shadow economy leads to reduced State revenues,
which in turn reduces the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and
services. Ultimately, this can lead to an increase in the tax rates for firms and
individuals in the official sector, quite often combined with a deterioration in the
quality of the public goods (such as the public infrastructure) and of the administra-
tion, with the consequence of even stronger incentives to participate in the shadow
economy. Johnson and others [33] present a simple model of this relationship. Their
findings show that smaller shadow economies appear in countries with higher tax
revenues, if achieved by lower tax rates, fewer laws and regulations and less bribery
facing enterprises. Countries with a better rule of the law that is financed by tax
revenues also have smaller shadow economies. Transition countries have higher
levels of regulation leading to a significantly higher incidence of bribery, higher
effective taxes on official activities and a large discretionary framework of regula-
tions, and consequently to a higher shadow economy. The overall conclusion is that
“wealthier countries of the OECD, as well as some in eastern Europe, find them-
selves in the ‘good equilibrium’ of relatively low tax and regulatory burden, sizeable
revenue mobilization, good rule of law and corruption control, and [relatively] small
unofficial economy. By contrast, a number of countries in Latin America and the
former Soviet Union exhibit characteristics consistent with a ‘bad equilibrium’: tax
and regulatory discretion and burden on the firm is high, the rule of law is weak, and
there is a high incidence of bribery and a relatively high share of activities in the
unofficial economy” ([15], p. 388).
Effects of the shadow economy on the official economy
In order to study the effects of the shadow economy on the official economy,
several studies integrate underground economies into macroeconomic models.***
*See, for example, Frey [64] for a first application of the public choice theory to the shadow economy.
**See, for example, Lemieux and others [52].
***For Austria, this was done by Schneider and others [68] and Neck and others [69]. For further
discussion of this aspect, see Quirk [70] and Giles [19].
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Houston [65] develops a theoretical macroeconomic model of the business cycle as
well as tax and monetary policy linkages with the shadow economy. He concludes
from his investigation of the growth of the shadow economy that, on the one hand,
its effect should be taken into account in setting tax and regulatory policies, and, on
the other, the existence of a shadow economy could lead to an overstatement of the
inflationary effects of fiscal or monetary stimuli. Adam and Ginsburgh [66] focus on
the implications of the shadow economy on official growth in their study for Bel-
gium. They find a positive relationship between the growth of the shadow economy
and the official one, and under certain assumptions (that is, very low costs of entry
into the shadow economy due to a low probability of enforcement), they conclude
that an expansionary fiscal policy has a positive stimulus for both the formal and
informal economies. A study for the United States by Fichtenbaum [67] argues that
the United States productivity slowdown over the period 1970 to 1989 was vastly
overstated, as the underreporting of income due to the more rapid growth of the
United States shadow economy during that period was not taken into account.*
Another hypothesis is that a substantial reduction of the shadow economy leads
to a significant increase in tax revenues, and therefore to a greater quantity and quality
of public goods and services, which ultimately can stimulate economic growth. Some
authors found evidence for that hypothesis. A recent study by Loayza [7] presents a
simple macroeconomic endogenous growth model whose production technology de-
pends on congestable public services. The determinants and effects of the informal
sector are studied, where excessive taxes and regulations are imposed by Governments
and where the capability to enforce compliance is low. The model leads to the
conclusion that in economies where the statutory tax burden is larger than the optimal
tax burden, and where the enforcement of compliance is too weak, the increase in the
relative size of the informal economy generates a reduction of economic growth. The
linkage is due to the strongly negative correlation between the informal sector and
public infrastructure indices, with public infrastructure being the key element for
economic growth. For example, Loayza finds empirical evidence that, in Latin Ameri-
can countries, if the shadow economy increases by one percentage point of GDP,
ceteris paribus, the growth rate of official real GDP per capita decreases by 1.22
percentage points. This negative impact of informal sector activities on economic
growth is not broadly accepted.** For example, the key feature of the model has been
criticized, because the model is based on the assumption that the production technol-
ogy essentially depends on tax-financed public services, which are subject to conges-
tion. In addition, the informal sector is not paying any taxes, but must pay penalties
that are not used to finance public services. The negative correlation between the size
of the informal sector and economic growth is therefore not very surprising.
Depending on the prevailing view of the informal sector, the opposite conclu-
sion might be reached. In the neoclassical view, the underground economy is opti-
mal in the sense that it responds to the demand of the economic environment for
urban services and small-scale manufacturing. From this point of view, the informal
sector provides the economy with a dynamic and entrepreneurial spirit and can lead
to more competition, higher efficiency and strong boundaries and limits for govern-
ment activities. The informal sector may offer great contributions “to the creation of
markets, increase financial resources, enhance entrepreneurship, and transform the
legal, social, and economic institutions necessary for accumulation” (Asea [72],
*Compare also the findings of Pommerehne and Schneider [71], who come to similar conclusions.
**See Asea [72] for a more detailed criticism of the Loayza model.
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p. 166). The voluntary self-selection between the formal and informal sectors, as
described above in microeconomic models, may provide a higher potential for eco-
nomic growth and, hence, a positive correlation between an increase in the informal
sector and economic growth. The effects of an increase in the size of the shadow
economy on economic growth therefore remain highly ambiguous.
The empirical evidence of the hypotheses is also not clear. On the one hand,
since many Latin American countries had or still have a tradition of excessive
regulations and weak government institutions, Loayza [7] finds some evidence of the
implications of his growth model during the early 1990s in those countries. The
increase in the size of the shadow economy negatively affects official GDP growth
by reducing the availability of public services for everyone in the economy, and by
causing the existing public services to be used less efficiently, or not at all. On the
other hand, the positive effects of shadow economy activities should also be consid-
ered. Empirical findings of Schneider [21] show clearly that over 66 per cent of the
earnings in the shadow economy are immediately spent in the official sector. The
positive effects of this expenditure for economic growth and for the indirect tax
revenues must be taken into account as well. Bhattacharyya [38] found clear evi-
dence that, in the United Kingdom (1960-1984), the hidden economy had a signifi-
cant positive effect on consumer expenditures in the official economy. He points out
that the hidden economy has a positive effect on consumer expenditure for non-
durable goods and services, and an even stronger positive effect on consumer ex-
penditure for durable goods and services.*
Methods used to estimate the size of the shadow economy
As has already been mentioned above in the section on the definition of the
shadow economy, the attempt to measure the size of a shadow economy is a difficult
and challenging task. In the present section, a comprehensive overview is given of
the current knowledge of the various procedures for estimating the size of the
shadow economy. To measure the size and development of the shadow economy,
three different types of methods are most widely used.** They are briefly discussed
in the next three sections.
Direct approaches
There are micro-approaches that employ either well-designed surveys and sam-
ples based on voluntary replies or tax auditing and other compliance methods. Sam-
ple surveys designed for estimating the size of the shadow economy are widely used
in a number of countries.*** The main disadvantage of such a method is that it
presents the flaws of all surveys: the precision of averages and results depend greatly
on the willingness of respondents to cooperate. It is difficult to assess the rise of
undeclared work from a direct questionnaire. Most interviewees hesitate to confess
fraudulent behaviour and responses are seldom reliable, so that it is difficult to
*A close interaction between official and unofficial economies is also emphasized in Giles [19] and
in Tanzi [17].
**The discussion below closely follows Schneider and Enste [1]. See also Frey and Pommerehne [4],
Feige [5], Thomas [6, 18] and Schneider [10, 13, 26].
***The direct method of voluntary sample surveys has been extensively used for Norway by Isachsen
and others [73] and Isachsen and Strom [74]. For Denmark, this method is used by Mogensen and others
[25], who report estimates of the shadow economy at 2.7 per cent of GDP for 1989, 4.2 per cent for 1991,
3 per cent for 1993 and 3.1 per cent for 1994.
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calculate a true estimate, in monetary terms, of the amount of undeclared work. The
main advantage of the method lies in the detailed information that it provides about
the structure of the shadow economy, but the results from such surveys are highly
sensitive to the way in which the questionnaire is formulated.*
Estimates of the shadow economy can also be based on the discrepancy
between income declared for tax purposes and that measured by selective checks.
Fiscal auditing programmes have been particularly effective in that regard. Designed
to measure the amount of undeclared taxable income, they have been used to cal-
culate the size of the shadow economy in several countries.** A number of difficul-
ties beset this approach. First, using tax compliance data is equivalent to using a
possibly biased sample of the population. However, since a selection of taxpayers
for auditing is generally not random, but based on properties of submitted tax returns
that indicate a certain likelihood of fraud, such a sample is not a random one of the
whole population. That factor is likely to bias compliance-based estimates of the
shadow economy. Secondly, estimates based on tax audits reflect the portion of
shadow economy income that the authorities succeeded in discovering, and are
likely to be only a fraction of hidden income.
A further disadvantage of the two direct methods (surveys and tax auditing) is
that they lead to only point estimates. Moreover, since it is unlikely that they capture
all shadow economy activities, they can be seen as providing estimates at the lower
end of the scale. They are currently unable to provide estimates of the development
and growth of the shadow economy over a longer period of time. As already noted,
however, they have at least one considerable advantage: they can provide detailed
information about the structure of shadow economy activities and about those who
work in the shadow economy.
Indirect approaches
Indirect approaches, which are also called “indicator” approaches, are mostly
macroeconomic measures that use various economic and other indicators containing
information about the development of the shadow economy over time. Currently,
there are five indicators that leave some traces of the development of the shadow
economy, as described below.
Discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics
One approach is based on discrepancies between income and expenditure stat-
istics. In national accounting, the income measure of GNP should be equal to the
expenditure measure of GNP. Thus, if an independent estimate of the expenditure
site of the national accounts is available, the gap between the expenditure measure
and the income measure can be used as an indicator of the scale of the shadow
economy.*** However, since national accounts statisticians will be anxious to mini-
mize this discrepancy, the initial discrepancy or first estimate, rather than the pub-
*The advantages and disadvantages of this method are extensively dealt with by Mogensen and
others [25].
**For the United States, see IRS [75, 76], Simon and Witte [77], Witte [78], Clotefelter [79] and Feige
[80]. For a more detailed discussion, see Dallago [50] and Thomas [6].
***See, for example, Franz [81], for Austria; MacAfee [82], O’Higgins [83] and Smith [24], for the
United Kingdom; Petersen [84] and Del Boca [85], for Germany; and Park [86], for the United States. For
a survey and critical remarks, see Thomas [6].
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lished discrepancy, should be employed for this purpose. If all the components of the
expenditure site were measured without error, then this approach would indeed yield
a good estimate of the scale of the shadow economy. Unfortunately, that is not the
case, and the discrepancy therefore reflects all omissions and errors everywhere in
the national accounts statistics as well as the shadow economy activity. The esti-
mates may therefore be very crude and of questionable reliability.*
The discrepancy between the official and actual labour force
A decline in the participation of the labour force in the official economy can be
seen as an indication of increased activity in the shadow economy. If the participation
of the total labour force is assumed to be constant, a decreasing official rate of
participation can be seen as an indicator of an increase in the activities of the shadow
economy, ceteris paribus.** The weakness of this method is that differences in the rate
of participation may also have other causes. Moreover, people can work in the shadow
economy and have a job in the official economy. Such estimates may therefore be
viewed as weak indicators of the size and development of the shadow economy.
Transactions approach
This approach has been developed by Feige.*** It assumes that there is a
constant relation over time between the volume of transactions and official GNP.
Feige’s approach therefore starts from Fisher’s quantity equation,
M*V = p*T where M = money, V = velocity, p = prices
and T = total transactions.
Assumptions have to be made about the velocity of money and about the
relationships between the value of total transactions (p*T) and total (official + un-
official) nominal GNP. Relating total nominal GNP to total transactions, the GNP of
the shadow economy can be calculated by subtracting the official GNP from total
nominal GNP. However, to derive figures for the shadow economy, Feige has to
assume a base year in which there is no shadow economy. Therefore, the ratio of
p*T to total nominal (official = total) GNP was “normal” and would have been
constant over time, if there had been no shadow economy. This method, too, has
several weaknesses, for instance, the assumption of a base year with no shadow
economy and the assumption of a normal ratio of transactions constant over time.
Moreover, to obtain reliable estimates of the shadow economy, precise figures of the
total volume of transactions should be available. This availability might be espec-
ially difficult to achieve for cash transactions, because they depend, among other
factors, on the durability of bank notes, in terms of the quality of the paper on which
they are printed.**** Also, in this approach, the assumption is made that all vari-
*A related approach is pursued by Pissarides and Weber [87], who use microdata from household
budget surveys to estimate the extent of income understatement by the self-employed. In this micro-
approach, more or less the same difficulties arise and the figures calculated for the shadow economies may
be crude.
**Such studies have been made, for example, by Contini [88] and Del Boca [85], for Italy; and by
O’Neill [89], for the United States. For a survey and critical remarks, see Thomas [6].
***For an extended description of this approach, see Feige [5, 90, 91]. For a further application for
the Netherlands, see Boeschoten and Fase [92], and for Germany, see Langfeldt [93].
****For a detailed criticism of the transaction approach, see Boeschoten and Fase [92], Frey and
Pommerehne [4], Kirchgaessner [56], Tanzi [2, 94], Dallago [50], Thomas [6, 18, 95] and Giles [19].
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ations in the ratio between the total value of the transactions and the officially
measured GNP are due to the shadow economy. This means that a considerable
amount of data is required in order to eliminate financial transactions from “pure”
cross payments, which are totally legal and have nothing to do with the shadow
economy. In general, although this approach is theoretically attractive, the empirical
requirements necessary to obtain reliable estimates are so difficult to fulfil that its
application may lead to doubtful results.
Currency demand approach
The currency demand approach was first used by Cagan [96], who calculated
a correlation of the currency demand and the tax pressure (as one cause of the
shadow economy) for the United States over the period 1919 to 1955. Twenty years
later, Gutmann [97] used the same approach, but did not use any statistical proce-
dures. Instead, he only looked at the ratio between currency and demand deposits
over the years 1937 to 1976.
Cagan’s approach was further developed by Tanzi [98, 99], who econometri-
cally estimated a currency demand function for the United States for the period 1929
to 1980 in order to calculate the shadow economy. His approach assumes that
shadow (or hidden) transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as
to leave no observable traces for the authorities. An increase in the size of the
shadow economy will therefore increase the demand for currency. To isolate the
resulting excess demand for currency, an equation for currency demand is econome-
trically estimated over time. All possible conventional factors, such as the develop-
ment of income, payment habits and interest rates, are subject to control.
Additionally, such variables as the direct and indirect tax burden, government
regulations and the complexity of the tax system, which are assumed to be the major
factors causing people to work in the shadow economy, are included in the estima-
tion equation. The basic regression equation for the currency demand, proposed by
Tanzi [99], is the following:
ln (C / M2)t = 0 + 1 ln (1 + TW)t + 2 ln (WS / Y)t + 3 ln Rt + 4 ln(Y / N)t + ut with 1 > 0, 2 > 0, 3 < 0, 4 > 0
where
ln denotes natural logarithms,
C / M2 is the ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts,
TW is a weighted average tax rate (to proxy changes in the size of the shadow
economy),
WS / Y is a proportion of wages and salaries in national income (to capture
changing payment and money holding patterns),
R is the interest paid on savings deposits (to capture the opportunity cost of
holding cash) and
Y / N is the per capita income.*
*In table 8 of the present paper, the econometric estimation of such a currency demand function for
Austria is shown. More causes of the shadow economy (regulations, different tax rates, complexity of the
tax system) are also included. The application of such a currency demand equation has been criticized by
Thomas [18], but part of this criticism has been considered by Giles [19-20] and Bhattacharyya [38], who
both use the latest econometric techniques.
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The excess increase in currency, which is the amount unexplained by the con-
ventional or normal factors (mentioned above) is then attributed to the rising tax
burden and the other reasons leading people to work in the shadow economy. Fig-
ures for the size and development of the shadow economy can be calculated in a first
step by comparing the difference between the development of currency when the
direct and indirect tax burden (and government regulations) are held at its lowest
value, and the development of currency with the current (much higher) burden of
taxation and government regulations. Assuming in a second step the same income
velocity for currency used in the shadow economy as for legal M1 in the official
economy, the size of the shadow economy can be computed and compared to the
official GDP.
The currency demand approach is one of the most commonly used approaches.
It has been applied to many OECD countries [12, 13, 15, 40], but has nevertheless
been criticized on various grounds [6, 8, 18, 86, 95]. The most commonly raised
objections to this method are as follows:
(a) Not all transactions in the shadow economy are paid in cash. Isachsen and
Strom* used the survey method to find out that in Norway, in 1980, roughly 80 per
cent of all transactions in the hidden sector were paid in cash. The size of the total
shadow economy (including barter) may thus be even larger than previously esti-
mated;
(b) Most studies consider only one particular factor, the tax burden, as a cause
of the shadow economy. But other factors, such as the impact of regulations, taxpay-
ers’ attitudes toward the State and tax morality, are not considered, because reliable
data for most countries are not available. If, as seems likely, these other factors also
have an impact on the extent of the hidden economy, it might again be higher than
reported in most studies;**
(c) A further weakness of this approach, at least when applied to the United
States, is discussed by Garcia [101], Park [86] and Feige [91], who point out that
increases in currency demand deposits are due largely to a slowdown in demand
deposits rather than to an increase in currency caused by activities in the shadow
economy;
(d) Blades [102] and Feige [80, 103] criticize Tanzi’s studies on the grounds
that the United States dollar is used as an international currency. Tanzi should
have considered allowed United States dollars, which are used as an international
currency and held in cash abroad.*** Moreover, Frey and Pommerehne [4]
*See [74] and Anne I. Isachsen and Steinar Strom, “The hidden economy, the labour market and tax
evasion”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 82 (1980), pp. 304-311.
**One weak justification for the use of only the tax variable is that it has by far the strongest impact
on the size of the shadow economy in the studies known to the authors. The only exception is the study by
Frey and Weck-Hannemann [39], where the “tax immorality” variable has a quantitatively larger and
statistically stronger influence than the direct tax share in the model approach. In the study of the United
States by Pommerehne and Schneider [71], which covers various tax measures and provides data on
regulations, tax immorality and minimum wage rates, the tax variable has a dominating influence and
contributes roughly 60-70 per cent to the size of the shadow economy. See also Zilberfarb [100].
***In another study by Tanzi ([3], pp. 110-113), this criticism is explicitly dealt with. A careful
investigation of the amount of United States currency used abroad and in the shadow economy and of
traditional criminal activities has been undertaken by Rogoff [104], who concludes that bills of large
denomination are the major driving force behind the growth of the shadow economy and traditional criminal
activities because of reduced transaction costs.
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and Thomas [6, 18 and 95] claim that Tanzi’s parameter estimates are not very
stable;*
(e) Another weak point of this procedure, in most studies, is the assumption
of the same velocity of money in both types of economy. As Hill and Kabir [59] for
Canada and Kloveland [57] for the Scandinavian countries argue, there is already
considerable uncertainty about the velocity of money in the official economy; the
velocity of money in the hidden sector is even more difficult to estimate. Without
knowledge about the velocity of currency in the shadow economy, assumption of an
equal money velocity in both sectors has to be accepted;
(f) Finally, the assumption of no shadow economy in a base year is open to
criticism. Relaxing this assumption would again imply an upward adjustment of the
figures attained in the bulk of the studies already undertaken.
Physical input (electricity consumption) method
Kaufmann-Kaliberda method**
To measure overall (official and unofficial) economic activity in an economy,
Kaufmann and Kaliberda [107] assume that the consumption of electric power is the
single best physical indicator of overall economic activity. Overall (official and
unofficial) economic activity and electricity consumption have been empirically ob-
served throughout the world to move in lockstep with an electricity/GDP elasticity
usually close to one. By having a proxy measurement for the overall economy and
subtracting it from estimates of official GDP, Kaufmann and Kaliberda derive an
estimate of unofficial GDP. Kaufmann and Kaliberda thus suggest that the growth
of total electricity consumption is an indicator for representing growth of official and
unofficial GDP. According to this approach, the difference between the gross rate of
registered (official) GDP and the gross rate of total electricity consumption can be
attributed to the growth of the shadow economy. This method is very simple and
appealing; however, it can also be criticized on the following grounds:
(a) Not all shadow economy activities (such as personal services) require a
considerable amount of electricity. Other energy sources can be used (gas, oil, coal
etc.), so that only a part of the shadow economy will be captured;
(b) Over time, there has been considerable technical progress. Both the pro-
duction and use of electricity are more efficient than in the past, and that will apply
in both official and unofficial uses;
(c) There may be considerable differences or changes in the elasticity of
electricity/GDP across countries and over time.***
*However, in studies of European countries, Kirchgaessner [55, 56] and Schneider [26] reach the
conclusion that the estimation results for Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are quite robust when
using the currency demand method. For Canada, Hill and Kabir find that the rise of the shadow economy
varies with respect to the tax variable used and conclude that “when the theoretically best tax rates are
selected and a range of plausible velocity values is used, this method estimates underground economic
growth between 1964 and 1995 at between 3 and 11 per cent of GDP” ([59], p. 1553).
**This method was used earlier by Lizzeri [105] and Del Boca and Forte [106], and then much later
by Portes [32], Kaufmann and Kaliberda [107] and Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer [14]. For a critique,
see Lackó [29-31, 108].
***Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer [14] attempt to adjust for changes in the elasticity of
electricity/GDP.
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Lackó method
Lackó [28, 29, 108] assumes that a certain part of the shadow economy is
associated with the household consumption of electricity. It includes, inter alia, so-
called household production, do-it-yourself activities and other non-registered pro-
duction and services. Lackó assumes that in countries where the section of the
shadow economy associated with household electricity consumption is high, the rest
of the hidden economy, that is, the part that Lackó cannot measure, will also be high.
Lackó ([29], pp. 19 ff.) assumes that in each country a part of the household con-
sumption of electricity is used in the shadow economy.
Lackó’s approach ([108], p.133) can be described by the following two equa-
tions:
ln Ei = 1 ln Ci + 2 ln PRi + 3 Gi + 4 Qi + 5 Hi + ui (1)
with 1 > 0, 2 < 0, 3 > 0, 4 < 0, 5 > 0
Hi = 1 Ti + 2 (Si – Ti) + 3 Di (2)
with 1 > 0, 2 < 0, 3 > 0
where
i is the number assigned to the country,
Ei is per capita household electricity consumption in country i in millions of
tons,
Ci is per capita real consumption of households without the consumption of
electricity in country i in United States dollars (at purchasing power parity),
PRi is the real price of consumption of 1 kilowatt-hour of residential electricity
in United States dollars (at purchasing power parity),
Gi is the relative frequency of months when heating is needed in homes in
country i,
Qi is the ratio of energy sources other than electric energy to all energy sources
in household energy consumption,
Hi is the per capita output of the hidden economy,
Ti is the ratio of the sum of paid personal income, corporate profit and taxes on
goods and services to GDP,
Si is the ratio of public social welfare expenditures to GDP,
and Di is the sum of number of dependants over 14 years and of inactive
earners, both per 100 active earners.
In a cross-country study, Lackó econometrically estimates equation (1), substi-
tuting equation (2) for Hi. The econometric estimation results can then be used to
establish an ordering of the countries with respect to electricity use in their shadow
economies. For the calculation of the actual size (value added) of the shadow
economy, Lackó should know how much GDP is produced by one unit of electricity
in the shadow economy of each country. Since the data are not known, Lackó takes
the results obtained from shadow economy estimations carried out for a market
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economy using another approach during the early 1990s, and applies the results to
the other countries. Lackó used the shadow economy of the United States as such
a base (the shadow economy value of 10.5 per cent of GDP taken from Morris
[109]), and then calculated the size of the shadow economy for other countries.
Lackó’s method is also open to the following criticism:
(a) Not all shadow economy activities require a considerable amount of elec-
tricity and other energy sources can be used;
(b) Shadow economy activities do not take place only in the household sector;
(c) It is doubtful whether the ratio of social welfare expenditures can be used
as the explanatory factor for the shadow economy, especially in transition countries
and developing countries;
(d) It is not clear which base value of the shadow economy is the most
reliable in calculating the size of the shadow economy for all other countries, espec-
ially the transition countries and developing countries.
Model approach*
All methods described so far that are designed to estimate the size and devel-
opment of the shadow economy consider just one indicator that must capture all
effects of the shadow economy. However, it is obvious that its effects show up
simultaneously in the production, labour and money markets. An even more impor-
tant critique is that the causes that determine the size of the hidden economy are
taken into account only in some of the monetary approach studies that usually
consider one cause, the burden of taxation. The model approach explicitly considers
multiple causes leading to the existence and growth of the shadow economy over
time, with the multiple effects that it entails. The empirical method used is quite
different from those used so far. It is based on the statistical theory of unobserved
variables, which considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the phenom-
enon to be measured. For the estimation, a factor-analytic approach is used to meas-
ure the hidden economy as an unobserved variable over time. The unknown coef-
ficients are estimated in a set of structural equations within which the unobserved
variable cannot be measured directly. The DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators
multiple-causes) model consists in general of two parts, while the measurement
model links the unobserved variables to observed indicators. The structural equa-
tions model specifies causal relationships among the unobserved variables. In this
case, there is one unobserved variable, the size of the shadow economy. It is as-
sumed to be influenced by a set of indicators for the size of the shadow economy,
thus capturing the structural dependence of the shadow economy on variables that
may be useful in predicting its movement and size in the future. The interaction over
time between the causes Zit (i = 1, 2, ..., k), the size of the shadow economy Xt and
the indicators Yjt (j = 1, 2, ..., p) is shown in figure I.
*This part is a summarized version from a longer study by Aigner, Schneider and Ghosh ([110], p.
303), applying this approach for the United States over time. The pioneers of this approach are Weck [111]
and Frey and Weck-Hannemann [39], who applied this approach to cross-section data from the 24 OECD
countries for various years. Before turning to this approach, they developed the concept of “soft modelling”
(Frey, Weck and Pommerehne [112] and Frey and Weck [113, 114]), an approach which has been used to
provide a ranking of the relative size of the shadow economy in different countries.
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Figure I. Development of the shadow economy over time
There is a large body of literature [6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 19, 20, 33] on the possible
causes and indicators of the shadow economy. Causes of the following three types
have been identified:
(a) The burden of direct and indirect taxation, both actual and perceived. A
rising burden of taxation provides a strong incentive to work in the shadow
economy;
(b) The burden of regulation as a proxy for all other State activities. It is
assumed that increases in the burden of regulation give a strong incentive to enter
the shadow economy;
(c) The tax morality (citizens’ attitudes towards the State), which describes
the readiness of individuals (at least partly) to leave their official occupations and
enter the shadow economy. It is assumed that a declining tax morality tends to
increase the size of the shadow economy.*
A change in the size of the shadow economy may be reflected in the following
indicators:
(a) Development of monetary indicators. If activities in the shadow economy
rise, additional monetary transactions are required;
(b) Development of the labour market. Increasing participation of workers in
the hidden sector results in a decrease in participation in the official economy.
Similarly, increased activities in the hidden sector may be expected to be reflected
in shorter working hours in the official economy;
(c) Development of the production market. An increase in the shadow
economy means that inputs (especially labour) move out of the official economy (at
least partly). Such displacement might have a depressing effect on the official
growth rate of the economy.
Causes Xt-1 Indicators
Z1t   Y1t
Development of the shadow
economy over time
Z2t   Y2t
... ...
Xt
Zkt Ypt

*When applying this approach for European countries, Frey and Weck-Hannemann [39] had difficulty
in obtaining reliable data for the cause series, besides the ones of direct and indirect tax burden. Hence, their
study was criticized by Helberger and Knepel [115], who argue that the results were unstable with respect
to changing variables in the model and over the years.
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The latest use of the model approach has been undertaken by Giles [19, 20] and
by Giles, Linsey and Gupsa [116]. They basically estimate a comprehensive (dy-
namic) MIMIC model to get a time-series index of the hidden/measured output of
New Zealand or Canada, and then estimate a separate cash-demand model to obtain
a benchmark for converting this index into percentage units. Unlike earlier empirical
studies of the hidden economy, they paid proper attention to the non-stationary, and
possible co-integration of time-series data in both models. This MIMIC model treats
hidden output as a latent variable, and uses several (measurable) causal variables and
indicator variables. The former include measures of the average and marginal tax
rates, inflation, real income and the degree of regulation in the economy. The latter
include changes in the (male) labour force participation rate and in the cash/money
supply ratio. In their cash-demand equation they allow for different velocities of
currency circulation in the hidden and recorded economies. Their cash-demand
equation is not used as an input to determine the variation in the hidden economy
over time. It is used only to obtain the long-run average value of hidden/measured
output, so that the index for this ratio predicted by the MIMIC model can be used
to calculate a level and the percentage units of the shadow economy. The latest
combination by Giles of the currency demand method and the MIMIC approach
clearly shows that some progress in the technique used in estimating the shadow
economy has been achieved and a number of critical difficulties have been over-
come.
Comparison of the results of the estimation of the shadow economy
using different methods
As discussed above, there are nine different methods used to estimate the
shadow economy. Table 9 shows the empirical results of the application of those
methods to Canada, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The survey method used for all five countries provides lower estimates ranging
from 1.5 per cent to 4.5 per cent for the period 1970-1980. The tax auditing method
provides higher estimates of the shadow economy ranging from 2.9 per cent to 8.2
per cent for the period 1970-1980. Both methods also show that the shadow
economy increases over time (for example, in the United States). The two discrep-
ancy methods (expenditure versus income and official versus actual labour force)
show no clear pattern. For some countries, they produce high shadow economy
values (compared to the other methods used, as in the case of Germany); for some,
the values are low (as in the case of Canada). Nor do they show a consistent time
pattern. The physical input (electricity) method, for which only values for the period
1986-1990 are available for all five countries, shows values in the middle range for
all countries (average value of 12.7 per cent over all countries and all periods). A
comparison of the three monetary approaches (currency demand, cash-deposit ratio
and transactions approach) reveals a clear pattern. The largest shadow economies for
all five countries were achieved using the transactions approach (Feige method),
ranging from 15 per cent to 35 per cent of GNP (average value of 21.9 per cent over
all countries and periods). Somewhat lower results were achieved using the cash-
deposit ratio approach (Gutmann method), ranging between 10 per cent and 30 per
cent for all countries (average value of 15.5 per cent over all countries and all
periods). Considerably lower values were achieved using the currency demand ap-
proach, ranging from 4 per cent to 20 per cent of GNP over the period 1970-1990
for all five countries (average value of 8.9 per cent over all countries and periods).
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Table 9. Comparison of the average size, estimated by nine methods, of the shadow economy in five OECD countries
over the period 1970-1990
(Percentage of GDP)
Canada Germany United Kingdom Italy United States
Average over time period Average over time period Average over time period Average over time period Average over time period
1970- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1970- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1970- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1970- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1970- 1976- 1981- 1986-
Method 1975 1980 1985 1990 1975 1980 1985 1990 1975 1980 1985 1990 1975 1980 1985 1990 1975 1980 1985 1990
Household surveys - - 1.3 1.4 3.6 - - - 1.5 - - - - - - - 3.7 4.5 5.6 -
Tax auditing - - 2.9 - - - - - - - - - 3.0 3.9 - 10.0 4.9 6.3 8.2 10.0
Discrepancy between
expenditure
and income - - - - 11.0 10.2 13.4 - 2.5 3.6 4.2 - 3.2 4.3 - 9.3 3.2 4.9 6.1 10.2
Discrepancy between
official and actual
employment - - - - 23.0 38.5 34.0 - - - - - - 18.4 - - - - - -
Physical input
(electricity) method - - - 11.2 - - - 14.5 - - - 13.2 - - - 19.3 - - 7.8 9.9
Currency demand
(Tanzi) 5.1 6.3 8.8 12.0 4.5 7.8 9.2 11.3 4.3 7.9 8.5 9.7 11.3 13.2 17.5 21.3 3.5 4.6 5.3 6.2
Cash deposit
ratio (Gutmann) 13.8 15.9 11.2 18.4 - - - - 14.0 7.2 6.2 - 23.4 27.2 29.3 - 8.8 11.2 14.6 -
Transactions
approach (Feige) - 26.5 15.4 21.2 17.2 22.3 29.3 31.4 17.2 12.6 15.9 - 19.5 26.4 34.3 - 17.3 24.9 21.2 19.4
MIMIC method (Frey
and Weck-Hanneman) - 8.7 - - 5.8 6.1 8.2 - - 8.0 - - - 10.5 - - - 8.2 - -
Number of
methods used 2 4 5 5 6 5 5 3 5 5 4 2 5 7 3 4 6 7 7 5
Note: The values were grouped (when possible, averaged) in the time periods 1970-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985 and 1986-1990, in order to make a rough comparison. The sources
of the values are given by country.
Sources: Author’s calculations using the following sources:
For Canada, Lippert and Walker [9], Thomas [6], Hill and Kabir [59], Schneider [12] and Bendelac and Clair [117].
For Germany, Lippert and Walker [9] and Schneider [10-12].
For the United Kingdom, Thomas [6], Lippert and Walker [9], Schneider [10-12] and Pozo [8].
For Italy, Thomas [6], Lippert and Walker [9], Pozo [8], Schneider [10-12] and Bendelac and Clair [117].
For the United States, Thomas [6], Lippert and Walker [9], Pozo [8], Schneider [10-12] and Bendelac and Clair [117].
Tanzi (1986), Feige (1986), Thomas (1986).
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The currency demand approach shows a strongly rising shadow economy in all five
countries, a result opposite to that given by the transactions and cash-deposit meth-
ods. The model approach shows values in the medium range, from 6.1 to 10.5 per
cent for the period 1976-1980 (average value of 7.9 per cent for all countries over
all periods). In general, these results demonstrate quite clearly that a huge range of
estimates of the shadow economy for a country in a given time span is achievable
using different calculation methods. Hence, there is a need for great caution when
interpreting the size of the shadow economy of a country using only one method.
Summary and conclusions
There are many obstacles to be overcome to measure the size of the shadow
economy and to analyse its impact on the official economy, although some progress
has been made. The present paper has shown that while it is difficult to estimate the
size of the shadow economy, it is not impossible. It has been demonstrated that with
various methods, such as the currency demand method, the physical input method
and the model approach, some insights can be provided into the size and develop-
ment of the shadow economy of developing countries, transition countries and
OECD countries. The results achieved through the use of these methods give the
general impression that, in all the countries investigated, the shadow economy has
become remarkably large.
In summary, there appears to be no best or commonly accepted method; each
approach has its specific strengths and weaknesses as well as specific insights and
results. Although the different methods provide a rather wide range of estimates,
there is a common finding that the size of the shadow economy has been growing
over the recent decade in most transition countries and in all the OECD countries
studied. A similar finding has emerged for the shadow labour market, which is
attracting growing attention because of high unemployment in European OECD
countries. Furthermore, the results of the present survey show that an increasing
burden of taxation and social security payments, combined with rising State regula-
tory activities, is the major driving force for the growth of the shadow economy.
According to some studies, a growing shadow economy has a negative impact on
official GDP growth, but other studies show a positive impact, hence, much more
research is needed. Finally, shadow economies are a complex phenomenon, present
to an important extent even in industrialized and developed economies. People
engage in shadow economic activity for a variety of reasons, the most important of
which include government actions, in particular, taxation and regulatory measures.
With those two insights goes a third and no less important one: a Government that
wants to decrease shadow economic activity has to first and foremost analyse the
complex and frequently contradictory implications of its own policy decisions.
References
1. Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste, “Shadow economies: size, causes, and conse-
quences”, The Journal of Economic Literature (Spring 2000).
2. Vito Tanzi, ed., The Underground Economy in the United States and Abroad (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1982).
128 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LII, Nos. 1 and 2, 2000
3. Vito Tanzi, “A second (and more sceptical) look at the underground economy in the United
States” in The Underground Economy in the United States and Abroad..., pp. 38-56.
4. Bruno S. Frey and Werner W. Pommerehne, “The hidden economy: state and prospects
for measurement”, Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 30, No. 1 (1984), pp. 1-23.
5. Edgar L. Feige, ed., The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distor-
tion (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
6. Jim J. Thomas, Informal Economic Activity, London School of Economics, Handbooks
in Economics (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
7. Norman V. Loayza, “The economics of the informal sector: a simple model and some
empirical evidence from Latin America”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on
Public Policy, vol. 45 (1996), pp. 129-162.
8. Susan Pozo, ed., Exploring the Underground Economy: Studies of Illegal and Unre-
ported Activity (Kalamazoo, Michigan, W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Re-
search, 1996).
9. Owen Lippert and Michael Walker, eds., The Underground Economy: Global Evidence
of its Size and Impact (Vancouver, British Columbia, The Fraser Institute, 1997).
10. Friedrich Schneider, “Measuring the size and development of the shadow economy. Can
the causes be found and the obstacles be overcome?” in Essays on Economic Psychology,
Hermann Brandstaetter and Werner Güth, eds. (Berlin, Springer Publishing Company,
1994), pp. 193-212.
11. Friedrich Schneider, “Can the shadow economy be reduced through major tax reforms?
An empirical investigation for Austria”, Supplement to Public Finance/Finances
Publiques, vol. 49 (1994), pp. 137-152.
12. Friedrich Schneider, “The shadow economies of Western Europe”, Journal of the Insti-
tute of Economic Affairs, vol. 17, No. 3 (1997), pp. 42-48.
13. Friedrich Schneider, “Further empirical results of the size of the shadow economy of 17
OECD-countries over time”, discussion paper to be presented at the fifty-fourth Congress
of the International Institute of Public Finance, held in Cordoba, Argentina, in 1998
(Linz, Austria, University of Linz, Department of Economics, 1998).
14. Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer, The Unofficial Economy in
Transition, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Washington, D.C., 1997).
15. Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, “Regulatory discretion and
the unofficial economy”, The American Economic Review, vol. 88, No. 2 (1998), pp.
387-392.
16. “Controversy: on the hidden economy”, Economic Journal, vol. 109, No. 456 (June
1999).
17. Vito Tanzi, “Uses and abuses of estimates of the underground economy”, The Economic
Journal, vol. 109, No. 456 (1999), pp. 338-340.
18. Jim J. Thomas, “Quantifying the black economy: ‘Measurement without theory’ yet
again?” The Economic Journal, vol. 109, No. 456 (1999), pp. 381-389.
19. David Giles, “Measuring the hidden economy: implications for econometric modelling”,
The Economic Journal, vol. 109, No. 456 (1999), pp. 370-380.
20. David Giles, “Modelling the hidden economy in the tax-gap in New Zealand”, working
paper (Victoria, British Columbia, University of Victoria, Department of Economics,
1999).
21. Friedrich Schneider, “Stellt das Anwachsen der Schwarzarbeit eine wirtschaftspolitische
Herausforderung dar? Einige Gedanken aus volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht”, Mitteilungen
des Instituts für angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, vol. I/98 (Linz, 1998), pp. 4-13.
Illegal activities and the generation of value added 129
22. Edgar L. Feige, “The underground economy and the currency enigma”, Supplement to
Public Finance/Finances Publiques, vol. 49 (1994), pp. 119-136.
23. Herald Lubell, The Informal Sector in the 1980’s and 1990’s (Paris, Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1991).
24. J. D Smith, “Market motives in the informal economy”, in The Economics of the Shadow
Economy, W. Gaertner and A. Wenig, eds. (Heidelberg, Springer, 1985), pp. 161-177.
25. Gunnar V. Mogensen, Hans K. Kvist, Eszter Körmendi and Soren Pedersen, The Shadow
Economy in Denmark 1994: Measurement and Results, study No. 3 (Copenhagen, The
Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, 1995).
26. Friedrich Schneider, “Estimating the size of the Danish shadow economy using the
currency demand approach: an attempt”, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol.
88, No. 4 (1986), pp. 643-668.
27. James Andreoni, Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein, “Tax compliance”, Journal of
Economic Literature, vol. 36 (1998), pp. 818-860.
28. Mária Lackó, “Hidden economy an unknown quantity? Comparative analyses of hidden
economies in transition countries in 1989-95”, working paper No. 9905 (Linz, Austria,
University of Linz, Department of Economics, 1999).
29. Mária Lackó, “Hidden economy in East-European countries in international compari-
son”, working paper (Laxenburg, Austria, International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis, 1996).
30. Mária Lackó, “The hidden economies of Visegard countries in international comparison:
a household electricity approach”, working paper (Budapest, Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, Institute of Economics, 1997).
31. Mária Lackó, “Do power consumption data tell the story? (Electricity intensity and the
hidden economy in post-socialist countries”, working paper (Laxenburg, International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1997).
32. Alejandro Portes, “The informal economy”, in Exploring the underground economy:
Studies of Illegal and Unreported Activity, Susan Pozo, ed. (Kalamazoo, Michigan, W.
E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1996), pp. 147-165.
33. Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, Corruption, Public
Finances and the Unofficial Economy, discussion paper (Washington, D.C., World Bank,
1998).
34. Franz Van der Berg, “The shadow economy in South Africa: some new results”, unpub-
lished manuscript (Cape Town, South Africa, University of South Africa, 1990).
35. G. M. Hartzenburg and A. Leimann, “The informal economy and its growth potential”,
in Economic Growth in South Africa, E. Adebian and B. Standish, eds. (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1992), pp. 187-214.
36. M.S.D. Bagachwa and A. Naho, “Estimating the second economy in Tanzania”, World
Development, vol. 23, No. 8 (1995), pp. 1387-1399.
37. Tiho Yoo and Jin K. Hyun, “International comparison of the black economy: empirical
evidence using micro-level data”, unpublished paper presented at the fifty-fourth Con-
gress of the International Institute of Public Finance, held in Córdoba, Argentina, in
1998.
38. D. K. Bhattacharyya, “On the economic rationale of estimating the hidden economy”,
The Economic Journal, vol. 109, No. 456 (1999), pp. 348-359.
39. Bruno S. Frey and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, “The hidden economy as an ‘unob-
served’ variable”, European Economic Review, vol. 26, No. 1 (1984), pp. 33-53.
130 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LII, Nos. 1 and 2, 2000
40. Colin C. Williams and Jan Windebank, “Black market work in the European Commu-
nity: Peripheral work for peripheral localities?”, International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research, vol. 19, No. 1 (1995), pp. 23-39.
41. Sanja Madzarevic and Davor Mikulic, “Measuring the unofficial economy by the system
of national accounts”, working paper (Zagreb, Institute of Public Finance, 1997).
42. Ignacio Mauleon “Quantitative estimation of the Spanish underground economy”, dis-
cussion paper (Salamanca, Spain, University of Salamanca, Department of Economics
and History, 1998).
43. Friedrich Schneider and Günther Pöll, “Schattenwirtschaft”, in Handbuch der Wirt-
schaftsethik, Wilhelm Korff, ed. (Güthersloh, Germany, Gütersloher Publishing Com-
pany, 1999).
44. L. Frey, Il lavoro a domicilio in Lombardia (Milan, Giunta Regionale Lombarda,
Assessorato al Lavoro, 1972).
45. L. Frey, “Il potenziale di lavoro in Italia”, Documenti ISVET, No. 50 (1975).
46. L. Frey, “Il lavoro nero nel 1977 in Italia”, Tendenze della occupazione, No. 6 (1978).
47. L. Frey, “Introduzione all’ analisi economica del lavoro minorile”, Economia del Lavoro,
No. 1-2 (1980), pp. 5-16.
48. M. A Cappiello, “Proposita di bibliografia ragionata sull’economia sommersa
nell’industria (Italia 1970-82)”, in L’altra metà dell’economia. La ricerca internazionale
sull’economia informale, A. Bagnasco, ed. (Naples, Liguori, 1986), pp. 307-345.
49. Bruce Bartlett, “Corruption, the underground economy, and taxation”, unpublished
manuscript (Washington, D.C., National Center for Policy Analysis, 1998).
50. Bruno Dallago, The Irregular Economy: The “Underground Economy” and the “Black
Labour Market” (Aldershot, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990).
51. Lawrence A. Chickering and Muhamed Salahdine, eds., The Silent Revolution—The
Informal Sector in Five Asian and Near-Eastern Countries, an International Center for
Economic Growth Publication (San Francisco, ICS Press, 1991).
52. Thomas Lemieux, Bernard Fortin and Pierre Fréchette, “The effect of taxes on labor
supply in the underground economy”, The American Economic Review, vol. 84, No. 1
(1994), pp. 231-254.
53. Friedrich Schneider, “The increase of the size of the shadow economy of 18 OECD-
countries: some preliminary explanations”, paper presented at the Annual Public Choice
Meeting, held in Charleston, South Carolina, from 10 to 12 March 2000.
54. Peter S. Spiro, “Evidence of a post-GST increase in the underground economy”, Can-
adian Tax Journal, vol. 41, No. 2 (1993), pp. 247-258.
55. Gebhard Kirchgaessner, “Size and development of the West German shadow economy,
1955-1980”, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, vol. 139, No. 2 (1983), pp.
197-214.
56. Gebhard Kirchgaessner, “Verfahren zur Erfassung des in der Schattenwirtschaft erar-
beiteten Sozialprodukts”, Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, vol. 68, No. 4 (1984),
pp. 378-405.
57. Jan Kloveland, “Tax evasion and the demand for currency in Norway and Sweden: Is
there a hidden relationship?”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 86, No. 4 (1984),
pp. 423-439.
58. Richard Cebula, “An empirical analysis of the impact of government tax and auditing
policies on the size of the underground economy: the case of the United States 1993-
1994”, American Journal of Economic Sociology, vol. 56, No. 2 (1997), pp. 173-185.
Illegal activities and the generation of value added 131
59. Roderick Hill and Muhammed Kabir, “Tax rates, the tax mix, and the growth of the
underground economy in Canada: What can we infer?” Canadian Tax Journal/Revue
Fiscale Canadienne, vol. 44, No. 6 (1996), pp. 1552-1583.
60. E. Friedman, S. Johnson, D. Kaufmann and P. Zoido-Labton, “Dodging the grabbing
hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries”, discussion paper (Wash-
ington, D.C., World Bank, 1999).
61. J. W. Brehm, A Theory of Psychological Reactance (New York, Academic Press, 1966).
62. J. W. Brehm, Responses to Loss of Freedom. A Theory of Psychological Reactance
(Morristown, General Learning Press, 1972).
63. Linde Pelzmann, Wirtschaftspsychologie: Arbeitslosenforschung, Schattenwirtschaft,
Steuerpsychologie (Vienna, Springer, 1988).
64. Bruno S. Frey, “How large (or small) should the underground economy be?”, in The
underground economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion, Edgar L. Feige, ed.
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 133-149.
65. John F. Houston, “Estimating the size and the implication of the underground economy”,
Working Paper No. 87-89 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Federal Reserve Bank, 1987).
66. Markus C. Adam and Viktor Ginsburgh, “The effects of irregular markets on macroeco-
nomic policy: some estimates for Belgium”, European Economic Review, vol. 29, No.
1 (1985), pp. 15-33.
67. Ronald Fichtenbaum, “The productivity slowdown and the underground economy”,
Quarterly Journal of Business and Economies, vol. 28, No. 3 (1989), pp. 78-90.
68. Friedrich Schneider, Markus F. Hofreither and Reinhard Neck, “The consequences of a
changing shadow economy for the official economy: Some empirical results for Austria”,
in The Political Economy of Progressive Taxation, Dieter Boes and Bernhard Felderer,
eds. (Heidelberg, Springer, 1989), pp. 181-211.
69. Reinhard Neck, Markus Hofreither and Friedrich Schneider, “The consequences of pro-
gressive income taxation for the shadow economy: some theoretical considerations”, in
The Political Economy of Progressive Taxation, Dieter Boes and Bernhard Felderer, eds.
(Heidelberg, Springer Publishing Company, 1989), pp. 149-176.
70. Peter J. Quirk, “Macroeconomic implications of money laundering”, IMF working paper
WP/96/66 (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 1996).
71. Werner W. Pommerehne and Friedrich Schneider, “The decline of productivity growth
and the rise of the shadow economy in the United States”, working paper (Aarhus,
Denmark, University of Aarhus, 1985).
72. Patrick K. Asea, “The informal sector: baby or bath water?”, Carnegie-Rochester Con-
ference Series on Public Policy, 45 (1996), pp. 163-171.
73. Arne J. Isachsen, Jan Klovland and Strom Steinar, “The hidden economy in Norway”,
in The Underground Economy in the United States and Abroad, Vito Tanzi, ed.
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Heath, 1982), pp. 209-231.
74. Arne J. Isachsen and Strom Steinar, “The size and growth of the hidden economy in
Norway”, Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 31, No. 1 (1985), pp. 21-38.
75. Estimates of Income Unreported on Individual Tax Forms (Washington, D.C., United
States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 1979).
76. Income Tax Compliance Research: Estimates for 1973-1981 (Washington, D.C., United
States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 1983).
77. C. B. Simon and A. G. Witte, Beating the System: The Underground Economy (Boston,
Massachusetts, Urban House, 1982).
132 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LII, Nos. 1 and 2, 2000
78. A. D. Witte, “The nature and extent of unreported activity: a survey concentrating on
recent United States research”, in The Unofficial Economy: Consequences and Perspec-
tives in Different Economic Systems, S. Alessandrini and B. Dallago, eds. (Aldershot,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Gower, 1987).
79. Charles T. Clotefelter “Tax evasion and tax rates: an analysis of individual return”,
Review of Economic Statistics, vol. 65, No. 3 (1983), pp. 363-373.
80. Edgar L. Feige, “A re-examination of the ‘underground economy’ in the United States”,
IMF Staff Papers, vol. 33, No. 4 (Washington, D.C., 1986), pp. 768-781.
81. A. Franz, “Wie groß ist die ‘schwarze’ Wirtschaft?”, Mitteilungsblatt der Österreichi-
schen Statistischen Gesellschaft, vol. 49, No. 1 (1983), pp. 1-6.
82. Kerrick MacAfee, “A glimpse of the hidden economy in the national accounts”, Eco-
nomic Trends, vol. 136 (1980), pp. 81-87.
83. Michael O’Higgins, “Assessing the underground economy in the United Kingdom”, in
The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion, Edgard L. Feige,
ed. (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 175-195.
84. Hans-Georg Petersen, “Size of the public sector, economic growth and the informal
economy: development trends in the Federal Republic of Germany”, Review of Income
and Wealth, vol. 28, No. 2 (1982), pp. 191-215.
85. Daniela Del Boca, “Parallel economy and allocation of time”, Micros (Quarterly Journal
of Microeconomics), vol. 4, No. 2 (1981), pp. 13-18.
86. T. Park, “Reconciliation between personal income and taxable income”, mimeograph
(Washington, D.C., Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1979), pp. 1947-1977.
87. C. Pissarides and G. Weber, “An expenditure-based estimate of Britain’s black
economy”, Creative Learning Exchange working paper No. 104 (London, Creative
Learning Exchange, 1988).
88. Bruno Contini, “Labour market segmentation and the development of the parallel
economy—the Italian experience”, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 33, No. 4 (1981), pp.
401-412.
89. David M. O’Neill, “Growth of the underground economy 1950-81: some evidence from
the current population survey”, study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the
United States Congress (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1983).
90. Edgar L. Feige, “How big is the irregular economy?”, Challenge, vol. 22, No. 1 (1979),
pp. 5-13.
91. Edgar L. Feige, “Overseas holdings of United States currency and the underground
economy”, in Exploring the Underground Economy: Studies of Illegal and Unreported
Activity, Susan Pozo, ed. (Kalamazoo, Michigan, W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, 1996), pp. 5-62.
92. Werner C. Boeschoten and Marcel M. G. Fase, The Volume of Payments and the Infor-
mal Economy in the Netherlands 1965-1982 (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1984).
93. Enno Langfeldt, “The unobserved economy in the Federal Republic of Germany”, in The
Unobserved Economy, Edgar L. Feige, ed. (New York, Cambridge University Press.,
1984), pp. 236-260.
94. Vito Tanzi, “The underground economy in the United States: reply to comments by
Feige, Thomas, and Zilberfarb”, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 33, No. 4 (1986), pp. 799-811.
95. Jim J. Thomas, “The underground economy in the United States: a comment on Tanzi”,
IMF Staff Papers, vol. 33, No. 4 (1986), pp. 782-789.
96. Phillip Cagan, “The demand for currency relative to the total money supply”, Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 66, No. 3 (1958), pp. 302-328.
Illegal activities and the generation of value added 133
97. Pierre M. Gutman, “The subterranean economy”, Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 34,
No. 1 (1977), pp. 24-27.
98. Vito Tanzi, “The underground economy in the United States: estimates and implica-
tions”, Banca Nazionale de Lavoro, vol. 135, No. 4 (1980), pp. 427-453.
99. Vito Tanzi, “The underground economy in the United States: annual estimates, 1930-
1980”, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 30, No. 2 (Washington, D.C., International Monetary
Fund, 1983), pp. 283-305.
100. Ben-Zion Zilberfarb, “Estimates of the underground economy in the United States, 1930-
80”, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 33, No. 4 (1986), pp. 790-798.
101. Gillian Garcia, “The currency ratio and the subterranean economy”, Financial Analysts
Journal, vol. 69, No. 1 (1978), pp. 64-66.
102. Derek Blades, “The hidden economy and the national accounts”, OECD Occasional
Studies (Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1982),
pp. 28-44.
103. Edgar L. Feige, “Revised estimates of the underground economy: implications of U.S.
currency held abroad”, in The Underground Economy: Global Evidence of its Size and
Impact, Owen Lippert and Michael Walker, eds. (Vancouver, British Columbia, The
Frazer Institute, 1997), pp. 151-208.
104. Kenneth Rogoff, “Blessing or curse? Foreign and underground demand for euro notes”,
Economic Policy: The European Forum, No. 26 (1998), pp. 261-304.
105. C. Lizzeri, Mezzogiorno in controluce (Naples, Enel, 1979).
106. Daniela Del Boca and Francesco Forte, “Recent empirical surveys and theoretical inter-
pretations of the parallel economy in Italy”, in The Underground Economy in the United
States and Abroad, Vito Tanzi, ed. (Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1982),
pp. 160-178.
107. Daniel Kaufmann and Aleksander Kaliberda, “Integrating the unofficial economy into
the dynamics of post-socialist economies: a framework of analyses and evidence”, policy
research working paper No. 1691 (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1996).
108. Mária Lackó, “The hidden economies of Visegard countries in international comparison:
a household electricity approach”, in Hungary: towards a market economy, L. Halpern
and C. Wyplosz, eds. (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1998),
pp. 128-152.
109. B. Morris, International Statistical Yearbook (Budapest, 1993).
110. Dennis Aigner, Friedrich Schneider and Damayanti Ghosh, “Me and my shadow: esti-
mating the size of the United States hidden economy from time series data”, in Dynamic
Econometric Modelling, W. A. Barnett, E. R. Berndt and H. White, eds. (Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 224-243.
111. Hannelore Weck, Schattenwirtschaft: Eine Möglichkeit zur Einschränkung der öffent-
lichen Verwaltung? Eine ökonomische Analyse, Frankfurt, Verlag Lang, 1983.
112. Bruno S. Frey, Hannelore Weck and Werner W. Pommerehne, “Has the shadow
economy grown in Germany? An exploratory study”, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,
vol. 118, No. 4 (1982), pp. 499-524.
113. Bruno S. Frey and Hannelore Weck, “Bureaucracy and the shadow economy: a macro-
approach”, in Anatomy of Government Deficiences, Horst Hanusch, ed. (Berlin), Springer
(1983), pp. 89-109.
114. Bruno S. Frey and Hannelore Weck, “Estimating the shadow economy: a ‘naive’
approach”, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 35 (1983), pp. 23-44.
134 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LII, Nos. 1 and 2, 2000
115. Claus Helberger and Hans Knepel, “How big is the shadow economy? A re-analysis of
the unobserved-variable approach of B. S. Frey and H. Weck-Hannemann”, European
Economic Journal, vol. 32 (1988), pp. 965-976.
116. David Giles, Linsey Tedds and Gugsa Werkneh, “The Canadian underground and meas-
ured economies”, working paper (Victoria, British Columbia, University of Victoria,
Department of Economics, 1999).
117. Jacques Bendelac and Pierre-Maurice Clair, “Macroeconomic measures of the hidden
economy”, paper presented at the forty-ninth Congress of the International Institute of
Public Finance, held in Berlin in 1993.
